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I. lNTRODUC110N 
• 
The elderly are the fastest growing segment in the U.S. population. 
In 1990, persons over sixty-five comprised 12.5% of the United States 
population; by 2020, it is projected this group will be 17.7% and by 
2050, 25% of the total population.• Unfortunately, interest in solving 
the problems facing the elderly has not grown as fast as the elderly 
population. Despite congressional and scholarly estimates that between 
1 and 2 million cases of elder mistreatment occur every year,2 few 
cases are reported to .state authorities3 and only a minute number result 
in criminal prosecution or civil litigation. In our civil courts and crimi-
nal justice system, mistreated aged persons are truly voiceless and their 
suffering invisible. 
Elder mistreatment occurs in all segments of our population, irre-
spective of race, sex, ethnic or socioeconomic background.4 Victims 
often feel powerless. Much mistreatment occurs within the family and 
the elderly person is often simultaneously embarrassed by the abuse,-
fearful of future mistreatment, and paradoxically, protective of the abus-
L See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF 
nm UNITED STATES: 1990,_ at 16, 37 (llOth ed. 199.0) [hereinafter 1990 STATISTICAL AD· 
STRACT] (table no. 18, Projections of the Total Population by Age, Sex, and Race: 1989 to 
2010). 
2~ See House Subcomm~ on Health Long-Tenn _Care, Elder Abuse: A Decade of Shame and 
Inaction: A Report by the Chairman of the Subcomm. on Health and Long-Term Care of the 
Select Comm. on-Aging, House of Representatives, lOlst Cong.,_ 2d Sess. XI (1990) (hereinnller 
1990 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPORT] (estimating more than 1.5 million persons may be victims 
of such abuse each year, and the number is rising); see also Karl A. Pillemcr & David 
Finkelhor, The Prevalence of Elder Abuse: A Random Sample Survey, 28 GERONTOLOGIST S 1 
(1988) (estimating 700,000-1,100,000 cases of elder mistreatment, excluding financial exploita· 
tion, more than a decade ago). 
3. See 1990 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at XIII (summarizing data report· 
ed by States and Adult Protective Services workers and estimating only one in eight cases or 
elderly abuse is ever reported). 
4. See Steuer & Austin, Family Abuse of the Elderly, 28 J. AM. GERIATRIC Soc'y 372 
(1980). 
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er.5 Because it most often occurs in private residences against persons 
who have limited contact \Vith outsiders, it is antong the most hidden 
of contemporary America's _problems.6 Mistreatment of the elderly is 
often equated with physical abuse, but more often it takes the fotnl of 
less drmnatic but equally damaging behaviors psychological or emo-
tional abuse, financial exploitation, .and neglect of care-taking obliga-
tions.' 
S. See, e.g., Jordan I. Kosberg & Daphne Nahmiash.. Ch:araclerlstlcs. of J7ctfm.s· and Perpe-
trators and Milieus of Abuse and Neg/eel, in ABUSE, NEGLECt, M'D ExPLOrrATJON OF OLDER 
PERSONS: S'IRATEGIES FOR AsSESSt-fENT AND INTERVENTION 31, 33, 42 (Lorin A. Baum}Jover & 
S. Colleen Beall eds~ l996) [hereinafter Kosberg & Nahmiash]. 
6. See id. at 32. 
7. Examples of shocking mistreatrnent could be recounted without end. A fc\v· of the situ• 
ations described by the 1990 Elder Abuse House Report arc reproduced here \·erb3lim to Ulus-
bate the danger faced by some elderly persons. 
An 82-year.-old woman suffered a brutal beating at the hands of her 40-y~-otd 
daughter and had to be hospitalized for 8 v.·eeks. She had been kicked and had her 
hair pulled out and puncture wounds had been inflicted by sharp Qbjects all o\·er her 
body. The daughter, who was reportedly unable to \\·ork because of back problems. 
was totally dependent upon her mother for financial support. The mother \'t-as found 
to be passive, withdrawn, pale and weak and so intimidated by the daughter that she 
was unable to consider taking any action to move or seek retribution. 
An elderly woman was brought to the hospital by paramedics. confused and minimal· 
ly responsive. She was severely dehydrated and her hair was completely matted. 
She had maggots all over her left leg, which had been \\Tapped in cloth, and bloody 
drainage coming out of her btees. She vtcigbed about 60 pounds. All unco_vered 
parts of the woman's body revealed deep pwplc bruises. She also ha.d a left 
blacked :eye and a deep gash over her right eyebrow. The· \\·oman, upon questioning 
by police., said she lived with her daughter and children. She \VouJdn't confun1 that 
her daughter had beaten her or denied her care because, "I don't \\'ant to get anyQnc 
in trouble." 
From Texas ·came the report of a client, age 69, \Vho \Vas. found by a neighbor one 
night, lying on the ground naked with ants cra\vling on her. The v.·oman \\'US para-
lyzed on one side from a stroke and had heart problems. 
An 88-year-old \Vashington State woman had her prescribed medications ,,·ithhcld by 
her guardian. Cared for by a home health aide, the ·woman has ~portcdty had teeth 
extracted without any anesthetic and is continually having her tracheotomy nnd g•tubc 
replaced by unqualified help. She was re.cenUy dropped during a move from room 
to room and now has a broken nose. No X-rays or pain medication \\"Crc adminis-
tered. She has been routinely left in her chair for 12 hours nt a time nnd has· very 
fragile skin which is wlnerabte to decubiti. 
A home health aide in New Hampshire was startled to fmd her client, an elderly 
woman,_ in urine and feces·soiled clothing. The· v.·oman had sUffered severe \ttcight 
loss, too. The woman's husband, her caregiver, had failed to contact his \\ifc•s 
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This Article explores the critical legal issues underlying this preva-
lent, disturbing, yet unremediated phenomenon. At present our legal 
system tries to protect the elderly in two major ways: through criminal 
laws which outlaw mistreatment and prescribe punishments for it, and 
through legal mandates that require professionals to report reasonably 
suspected instances of abuse, thus triggering state protective services. 8 
My thesis is that these fonns of protection are ineffective. Our present 
system of reliance on the criminal law to deter and punish abusers is 
inadequate, and penal statutes which mandate professionals to report 
cases of mistreatment have failed.- New approaches are -needed. Civil 
remedies, especially malpractice actions against professionals who fail 
to report cases despite statutory obligations, may prove more effective 
in identifying and ultimately preventing instances of mistreatment. 
The first five parts of the Article present an overview of the history 
of elder abuse and neglect, its contemporary "discovery," and its preva-
lence. In Part VI, the main state statutory responses are reviewed, in 
conjunction with a series of appendices which list, and provide easy 
access to, the statutes. Legal actions against perpetrators are discussed 
in Part VII. Part VIII outlines the obligations of various profession-
als- e.g., physicians, nurses, social service agencies, home health work-
ers who come in contact with the elderly and their families to identify 
mistreatment and to report it to state authorities. Available evidence 
indicates that reports are rarely made,9 and since abuse is often cyclical 
and repeated; 10 failure to report often means further injury and loss for 
victims. While 43 jurisdictions make the failure to -report reasonably 
suspected elder mistreatment a criminal offense, 11 these statutes are 
seldom enforced by prosecutors. 12 I thus propose the use of malprac-
tice theories, and other civil remedies as catalytic agents to improve 
physician as he had promised the aide he would, although his wife v1as weak and 
malnourished and had to be hospitaliZed. Upon questioning, the husband became 
angry. He denied that his wife was neglected-he said he sometimes might seem to 
be ignoring her but that was only to encourage her to do things by herseJ£ When 
officials asked him about his wife's difficulty breathing, which was another symptom, 
be said he treated that by applying Vicks ojntment to her chest In fact, she had 
serious respiratory problems. 
1990 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE RE!'ORT supra note 2, at 1-7. The Report S,ets out more than 3,5 
such stories, noting these are "meant to be illustrative, not exhaustive." ld at 1. 
8.. See infra Part VIII. 
9.. See infra notes 205 .. t 6 and accompanying texl 
10. See infra notes 358, 366-67 and accompanying text 
ll. See infra Appendices B and E (listing statutes & penalties for non-reporters). 
12. See infra note 228 and accompanying text. 
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diagnosis and increase identification of cases. Compliance \Vith manda-
tory reporting laws is critical in stemming elder abuse. Child abuse 
may be detected because children are often observed by teachers and 
. . 
others, but many aged persons are isolated or immobile. Although 
professionals may insure against monetaiy liability,. licensure sanctions, 
\Vhich are discussed in Part VIII.E, may be an even stronger lever. 
Combined with financial exposure, professional discipline may be strong 
enough to force significant changes in the behavior of professionals. 
n. HISTORICAL Co OF THE PROBLEM 
In many aspects of human endeavor there is an understandable 
tendency to view the past as a ''golden age" and to mourn the '\vorld 
we have lost"13 We are particularly prone to myth-making \Vith regard 
to the aged; we imagine a past \Vhere extended families coexisted 
peacefully and the aged received loving care. Ho,vever, much evidence 
now contradicts that view. 14 In preindustrial times, the aged \Vere often 
treated quite harshly.15 Anthropologists have documented that killing 
the aged or abandoning them to die \Vas not unusual.16 \Vestem litera-
ture, from Greek myths to modem fiction, is replete \vith child-parent 
conflict.17 In the sixteenth century, the brilliant gerontologist, \Villiam 
Shakespeare, was able to encapsulate intergenerational tension \Vith 
uncommon clarity, in the speech of Goneril, King Lear',s abusive 
daughter: 
• 
Idle old man 
That still would manage those authorities 
That he hath given away. 
Now by my life 
Old fools are babes again, and must be used \Vith checks as 
13. PErER LAsLErr, 1HE \VORLD \VE HAVE I.osr S-7. 2SO·S3 (196S). 
14. See Corinne N. Nydegger, Family Ties of the Aged In Cross.Cultural Perspeclh-e, In 
GROWING OLD IN AMERICA 71-8S (Beth B. Hess & Elizabeth \V. ~itukson eds._ 198S). 
15. See Peter J. Steams, Old Age Fami6' Conjlicl: 77:e Perspeclh·e of the Pmt,. In ELDa 
ABUSE: CONFLICT IN mE FAMILY 3•24 (Karl A. Pillemer &. Rosalie A. \Volfe c:ds._ 1986). 
16. See Nancy Foner, Caring for the Elderly: A CrolS-C.u/Jural Ylew, In GROWING OLD JN 
AMERICA 387-400 (Beth B. Hess & Elizabeth \V. 1\iarkson eds., 1985); see also Anthony 
Glascock. & Susan Feinman, Social Asset or Social Burden: An Analysis of the Treatment of 
the Aged in Non-lndzlstrial Societies, in D~fENSIONS: AGING, CULTURE AND HEALm (Christine 
L. Fey ed., 1981). 
17. See Shulamit Reinharz, Loving and Hating One's Elders: T1dn Themes in Legend tmd 
Literature, in SteamsJ supra note IS, at 2548. 
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Goneril's disdain for her father reflects her perception that his power 
has been relinquished and redistributed. His powerlessness creates the 
vacuum which her cruelty fills. As we shall see, many contemporary 
legal issues of the aged reflect their vulnerability and precarious social 
and economic position.19 
III. CONTEMPORARY DISCOVERY OF ELDER AB_USE 
Elder mistreatment is the most recent variety of domestic violence 
to command _public concern. In a pioneerin_g 1962 article, Doctor 
Kempe and colleagues directed the medical community's attention to 
the problem of physical child abuse, and coined the tenn ''battered 
child syndrome.''20 Within a few years, volumes of research on child 
abus_e were ·published, and all fifty states enacted legislation mandating 
the reporting of suspected child abuse to public agencies and providing 
protective services for children.21 Mandated reporters were typically 
professionals such as doctors, nurses, and social workers.22 By 1974, 
Congress had passed the federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment 
Act, 23 which provided fe:deral financial incentives to create comprehen-
sive state progrwns and procedures addressing child abus_e and neglect. 
The act also established the National Center on Child Abuse and Ne., 
glect to serve as a central agency on incidence and research related to 
• 24 that toptc. 
18. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, K.lNG LEAR act I, sc. 3 .. 
19. See generally BE'ITY FRIEDAN, THE FOUNTAIN OF AGE 35·38, 3941 (1993} (noting the 
absence of positive images of older persons in contemporary American mass culture, the in· 
creased attention to age as a "problem," and the burdens imposed by Social Security and Medl· 
care on younger persons). 
20. Henry Kempe et al., The Battered Child Syndrome, 181 JAMA 17~24 (1962). 
21. See Monrad G. Paulsen, The Legal Framework for Child Protection, 66 COLUM. L. Rev. 
679, 711 (1966). 
22. See Brian G. Fraser, A Pragmatic Alternative to Current Legislative Approaches to Child 
Abuse, 12 AM. CRIM~ L. REv. 103, 109-10 (1974) .. 
23. 42 U.S.C..A. §§ 5101-5107, 5119 (West 1995). 
24. See id The most recent National Incidence Study, by the National Center, based on n 
sample of 842 child protective agencies, estimates that I ,553,800 children were abused or ne"'' 
glected in 1993, quadruple the total in 1986. See ANDREA J. SEDLAK & DJANB D. 
BROADHURST, U.S. DEP~T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NAT'L CIR. ON CHILD ABUSE & 
NEGLECT; ExEctmVE SUMMARY OF THE THIRD NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUOY OP CHILD ABUSE 
AND NEGLECT 3 (Sepl 1996). 
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In the 1970s, spousal abuse and other fonns of violence against 
women began to receive organized public and professional attention.25 
A broad-based movement arose, including refonn of the law and the 
development of social programs.26 Despite the fact that aged victims 
and battered spouses/partners have much in common-indeed some 
abused elderly fit both categories-little note was taken of the special 
problems of older persons. 
While anecdotal reports were published in the 1970s in Great Brit-
ain, calling attention to "granny bashing,"27 stUdies indicating that elder 
abuse was a serious national problem in the United States did not begin 
to appear until the late 1970s.28 In 1981, the Select Committee on Ag-
ing of the United States House of Representatives issued a landmark 
report, Elder Abuse: An Examination of a Hidden Problem,29 which 
attempted to define the nature of elder mistreatment and detennine its 
extent The report estimated 4% of the elderly-roughly one million 
persons-might be victims of mistreatment annually. It concluded that 
while elder mistreatment was a "hidden problem," it was widespread 
and largely unreported.30 
Federal legislation and funding had improved systems for child 
abuse prevention and treatment In 1974, protective services for adults 
became a state-mandated program under Title XX of the Social Securi-
ty Act31 Adult Protective Services (APS) is "a system of preventive, 
supportive, and surrogate services for the elderly living in the commu-
25. The literature on spouse abuse is vast Among the earliest 1111d best known works nrc: 
LENORE E. WALKER. 1HE BATIERED WOMAN (1979); Laurie Woods, Lfllgalfon on Behalf of 
Battered Women, 5 WOMEN'S RlS. L. REP. 7 (1978); Terry L. Fromson, Note, The Case for 
Legal Remedies for Abused Women, 6 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. cw-aE 135 (1977). 
26. See, e.g., DEBORAH RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATIOM AND n1E LAW 
237-44 (1989); Naomi Hilton Archer, Note, Battered Women and the Legal System: Past, Pres-
ent and Future, 13 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 145 (1989). See generally Daniel J. Jacobs, Bat-
tered Women and Related Domestic Violence Issues: A Selecth:e Bibliography, 49 REc. Ass'N 
B. CITY N.Y. 786-94 (1994) (listing over 100 articles on domestic violence). 
27. See Letter from Burston to the Editor, in 1975 BRIT. 1\iED. J. 592; A.A. Baker, Granny 
Battering, MODERN GERIA1RICS 20-24 (Aug. 5, 1975). 
28. See, e.g., 1HE BATIERED ELDER SYNDROME: AN ExPLORATORY STUDY (Marilyn Block 
& Jan Sinnott eds., 1979); E. Lau & I. Kosberg, Abuse of the Elderly by Informal Care Pro-
viders, AGING, Sept-Oct 1979, at 10. 
29. HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, 97m CONG., 1ST SESS., ELDER ABUSE: AN Ex.\l.u-
NATION OF A HIDDEN PROBLEM (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter 1981 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE 
REPoRT]. 
30. /d. at xiii-xiv. 
31. Social Services Amendment of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, §§ 2001-2006, 88 Stat 2337-
48 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1397a-c (West Supp. 1998)). 
HeinOnline ·· 31 Conn. L. Rev. 83 1998-1999 
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nity to enable them to maintain independent living and avoid abuse and 
exploitation."32 Federal Title XX block grant funding decreased dra-
matically during the 1980s and states were forced to fund and develop 
their own responses to elder mistreatment, which soon proved inade-
quate.33 Nonetheless, state-funded Adult Protective Services agencies 
remain the primary referral source for ,elderly mistreatment reports. 
Although the 1981 Elder Abuse Report recommended that Congress 
act to assist states in identifying and treating victims of elder abuse and 
neglect, little federal action or funding followed. H.R. 7551, the Elder 
Abuse Treatment & Prevention Act of 1980, was introduced in the 96th 
Congress, and in subs,equent Congresses. The Act was modeled on the 
federal child abuse statute; but never enacted. As a result, no consis-
tent federal leadership policy or financing has emerged to protect non-
institutionalized elders living in the community.34 The federal Older 
Americans Act Amendments of 198735 required local Area Agencies on 
Aging to assess the need for elder abuse prevention services and the 
extent to which the need was being met While $5 million was autho-
rized to be spent in 1988, 1989, and 1990, no money was actuaUy 
appropriated in those years. 36 
In 1978, Congress amended the Older Americans Act of 196537 to 
mandate the establishment of -a Long Tenn Care Ombudsman program 
in every state. 38 The 1987 Amendments increased the responsibilities 
of state ombudsman programs, which attempt to protect residents of 
nursing homes and similar institutions from abuse and neglect. 39 The 
ombudsman is authorized to receive and investigate complaints of mal-
treatment and inadequacies in nursing homes. The situation of aged or 
disabled residents in institutional care is often dire. Captive markets, 
the lure of profits, and inadequate regulatory resources combine to 
32. John Regan, Intervention Through Adult Protective Services Programs, 18 THE GBR()N• 
TOLOGIST 250, 251 (1978). 
33. See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS~ GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND 
DATA ON PROGRAMS WrniiN THE JURISDICITON OF THE COMMI1.1"EE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 
103d Cong~, Ist Sess. 876 (1993). 
34. A very scaled-down and poorly funded National Center on Elder Abuse was included in 
the Older Americans Act of 1992. Today its future is in doubt because no appropriation wns 
included in the 1997 budget See Rosalie Wolf, Elder Abuse & Neglect, 2 A.B.A. SEC. PROD. 
& REAL PROP~ (8th Ann. Spring CLE Meeting) May 1997, at D-62. 
35. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3058i (West 1994). 
36. .1990 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 71. 
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 3001 et seq. (1994). 
38. See id § 3027(a)(12). 
39. See id. 
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place many at substantial risk. Problems include: lo\V pay and poor 
working conditions for staff,40 inadequate facilities and unsanitary con-
ditions_,41 and the inappropriate use of physical and chemical restraints42 
to name but a few. A considerable caselaw has emerged reflecting the 
rights of residents in such facilities,43 and the literature is \Vell-devel-
oped.44 As a result, this article will focus on issues of malb~tment of 
the elderly in the community, where litigation has been rare.45 
Until 1977, no state had a statute specifically aimed at protecting 
the aged;46 by 1985, undoubtedly expecting federal funding, 44 states 
had passed such statutes.47 Presently, all fifty states have them. The 
statutes drew on the experience with child and adult protective services 
legislation and typically include two components: 1) coordinated provi-
sion of services for the elderly determined to be at risk of abuse and 2) 
actual or potential power of state or local agencies to intervene to pro-
tect endangered individuals. Prior to 1980, only 16 states required pro-
fessionals or others to report suspected elder abuse. In the decade be-
tween 1980 and 1990, 26 additional states and the District of Columbia 
enacted such provisions.48 
IV. "GREYING" OF "IHB UNI'l"ED STATES POPULATION 
One of the dominant demographic trends in the United States this 
centuty is the aging of our population. Persons over sixty-five are the 
40. See GEORGE P. SMilH, LEGAL AND HEALlHCARE Ennes FOR nl£ ELDERLY 99 (1996). 
41. See USA TODAY, May 30, 1990, at 10-A (account of a 93-volumc report of the federal 
Health Care Financing Administration describing outrageous violations of even minilrull standards 
of sanitation in food preparation and handling, basic requirements for lavoratory needs, etc.). 
42. See SMI1H, supra note 40, at 96 ("On any given day, nearly 500,000 older Americans 
are physically restrained to their beds and chairs."). 
43. See, e.g., Martin v. Voinovicb, 840 F. Supp. 1175 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (holding privnte 
right of action created by 1987 Amendments, and enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 
public facilities); Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp. 489 N.E.2d 1374 (Ill. 1986) (lmplying dam· 
age action for nursing home residents under Illinois statute). 
44. See, e.g~, Tunothy S. Jost, Enforcement of Quality Nursing Home Care In lhe Legal 
System, 13 LAw, ?\iEDICINE & HEAL1H CARE 160 (198S); ~1nry Kalhlcen Robbins, Comment. 
Nursing Home Reform: Objective Regulation or Subjectire Decisions?, 11 ThO!-fAS COOLEY L. 
REv. 185 (1994); Bruce C. VJadeck, The Pas( Present, and Future of A'urslng Home Quality, 
275 JAMA 425 (1996). 
45. See infra note 228 and accompanying text. 
46. See Miller & Dodder, The Abused: Abuser Dyad, Elder Abuse in lhe Slate of Florida, 
in ELDER ABUSE: PRACllC£ & POUCY 167 (R. Filinson & S. Ingman cds., 1 989). 
47. See id. 
48. See 1990 ELDa ABUSE HOUSE REPoRT, supra note 2, at 66. 
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fastest growing segment of our population.49 Both the number of aged 
in this country and their percentage relative to the overall population 
have steadily increased. In 1900 there were approximately three mil-
lion people aged sixty-five and over, constituting 4% of the popula-
tion.50 By 1950, the number of elderly had increased to 12 million, or 
8% of the population.51 In 1980, the elderly were 25 million strong 
and had increased to 11% of the population. 52 Of this 25 million, 2.9 
million were older than eighty.53 By 1994, the sixty-fives and older 
had grown to 33.2 million, or 12.5% of the total population, and the 
number is expected to increase to more than 40.1 million by 2010, 
almost 13.3% of the nation's total population.54 The percentage of el-
derly in the United States population is further projected to reach 
21.8% by 2030.55 
Embedded within this general trend are two notable subfactors . 
First, the proportion of those over eighty-five years old is growing 
faster than the number of elderly in general. Although representing 
only 1% of the population in 1980 (2.2 million), this over-age eighty-
five segment will double to 2% by 2000 (4.6 million)56 and increase to 
more than 5% by 2050.57 Second, the elderly population is predomi-
nantly female. At every year past sixty-five, women outnumber men, 
and the ratio of women to men increases as the cohort ages. 58 
As the number of elderly grows and as a greater proportion of 
them live longer, the number of individuals in the general population 
that will require medical and health services will increase as well. In 
addition, given the large and increasing number of cases of elder abuse 
49. See 1990 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1. 
50. See Christine A. Metcalf, Comment, A Response to the Problem of Elder Abuse: Flori-
da's Revised Adult Protective Services Act, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 745, 746-47 (1986). 
51. See id. 
52. See id. 
53. See SENATE SUBCOMMITIEE ON AGING, CONSERVATORSHIP OF TilE ELDERLY: RECOM• 
MENDATIONS FOR ITS INTERFACE WITH PROGRAMS AND SERVICES FOR OLDER CALIFORNIANS 1 
(Senate Office of Research, prepared by Marquart Policy Analysis Assoc. 1988) [hereinafter 
CONSERVATORSHIP REcOMMENDATIONS]. 
54. See Susan Levine, Aging Baby Boomers Pose Challenge: Preparations Needed for Com· 
ing Strain on Services, Census Report Says, WASH. POST, May 21, 1996, at A09. 
55. See SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, AGING AMERICA: TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS 
(Annotated) lOlst Cong. 84-85 (Comm. Print 1990) (revised by Elizabeth Vierck). 
56. See 1990 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at 37 tbl. 41 (Population 65 Years Old 
and Over, By Age Group and Sex, 1960 to 1988, and Projections, 1990 and 2000). 
57. See 1990 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at 37 tbl. 41 (Population 65 Years Old 
and Over, By Age Group and Sex, 1960 to 1988, and Projections, 1990 and 2000). 
58. See LAWRENCE FROLIK & ALISON P. BARNES, ELDER LAW 15-16 (1992). 
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and neglect,5·9 we can predict an increasing demand for services to deal 
with this problem. 
V. PREVALENCE OF ELDER ABUSE AND NEGLECT 
You shall rise before the aged and sho1v deference to tlze old 
-Leviticus 19:3.2 
While the exact prevalence of elder mistreatment cannot be deter-
mined \vith precision, there is consensus that a very large number of 
older persons are affected. After congressional hearings \vere conduct· 
ed, a 1981 report issued by the House Select Committee on Aging 
estimated 4% of the American elderly population, approximately 1 
million persons, may be victims of moderate to severe abuse.60 The 
study also concluded that elder abuse, although at least as prevalent as 
child abuse, is far less likely to be reported.61 The committee found 
that physical abuse, including neglect, is the most common type of 
mistreatment, follo\ved by financial and psychological abuse.62 Ten 
years later, a follow up congressional report, ''Elder Abuse: A Decade 
of Shame and Inaction," detennined that the situation had \VOrsened; 
elder maltreatment was reported to be increasing and 5% of the elderly~ 
or more than 1.5 million elderly persons, \Vere estimated abused year-
ly.63 Ninety percent of states reported to the Committee that the inci-
dence of elder mistreatment was increasing.64 
Academic researchers have made similar prevalence estimates. In 
1988, using a methodology that \Vas validated previously in 1:\vo nation-
al family violence surveys, a research team surveyed over .2,000 .non-
institutionalized elders living in the metropolitan Boston area and found 
that 3.2% had experienced physical abuse, verbal aggression, and/or ne-
glect.65 Extrapolated, this finding \Vould mean 700,000 to 1,100,000 
cases of mistreatment across the nation. Spousal abuse (58%) \vas 
more prevalent than abuse by adult children (24%}, and the proportion 
of victims. was roughly equally divided bet\veen males and females. 
59. See infra Part V. 
60. See 1981 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPoRT, supra note 29, at xiv-xv. 
61. See id. at xiv. 
62.. See id. at xv. 
63 .• See 1990 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPoRT, supra note 2. at XI. 
64. See ill :at XIV. 
65. See Plllemer & Finkelhor, supra note 2, at S 1-52. 
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Financial exploitation was not even queried in this survey. Other 
American studies have produced similar estimates.66 
International surveys have confirmed these general prevalence statis-
tics. A Canadian study, using a nationally representative sample of 
elders able to respond on the telephone, found 4% had recently experi-
enced one or more fonns of mistreatment. The rates for men and 
women were about equal, but financial abuse was more common than 
physical or other maltreatment.67 A British study found 6% of individ-
uals aged 65 to 74 reported recent verbal abuse by a close family 
member or relative; 2% reported physical mistreatment, and 1% finan-
cial exploitation.68 A survey, using written questionnaires and clinical 
evaluations to detertnine the rate of abuse and neglect in a small, semi-
industrialized town in Finland, produced a 3% elder mistreatment prev-
alence rate for men and 9% for women, or 5.4% for both sexes.69 
Since all these surveys are based on self-reporting, the percentages most 
likely are an underestimation of the problem rather than an exaggera-
tion.70 
While I focus on this segment of the elderly in this Article, it is 
important to note that most older persons are not abused or neglected. 
Many live independently, or are cared for in a loving and professional 
manner by their families or others. Often that care is provided at great 
personal and societal expense. We should not categorize the aged in a 
negative, monolithic vision. At the same time, the law should provide 
remedies where wrongs are perpetrated. 
As noted earlier, only a small fraction of the estimated 1-1/2 to 2 
million cases of mistreatment in U.S. communities comes to the atten-
tion of authorities. The 1990 House of Representatives Elder Abuse 
Report concluded that elder abuse is far less likely to be reported than 
child abuse, estimating only one of eight cases of elder abuse, as com-
pared with one of three cases of child abuse, is reported to the authori-
66. See, e.g., Susan Steinmetz, Elder Abuse, AGING, Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 610. 
67. See Podnieks, National Survey of Abuse of the Elderly in Canada, 4 J. ELDER ABUSB & 
NEGLECT (1/2), 5 (1992). 
68. See Ogg & Bennett, Elder Abuse in Britain, 305 BRIT. MED. J. 998-99 (1992). 
69. See Kivela et aJ., Abuse in Old Age: Epidemiological Data from Finland, 4 J. ELD. AB. 
AND NEGL. No.3, 1 (1992). 
70. There is room for debate about these estimates; definitions used in studies and statutes 
vary, and the research methodologies utilized also vary widely. It is generally acknowledged, 
however, that very large numbers of the elderly are seriously mistreated, that even larger num-
bers of elders are at-risk in the United States today, and that our response to this problem has 
been ineffective. 
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ties.71 It noted that \vhile almost all states bad enacted statutes-or adult 
protective services laws that mandated reporting of elder abuse, state 
implementation and enforcement had been lacking, chiefly because of 
lack of financial support.72 There is a dramatic disparity benveen funds 
allocated to adult protective services and child abuse services_; nation-
wide, in 1989, $43.03 per child was spent for protective services, as 
compared to $3.80 per elderly resident for protective services.73 The 
lack of federal funding, combined \vith limited state expenditures, has 
meant fewer seiVices available to deal \Vith the problem.74 On average, 
only 3.95% of the total state protective services budgets \Vere ear-
marked for the elderly in 1989, a drop of 40% over a decade.75 
The National Center on Elder Abuse has collected data on abuse 
reports to state authorities over a number of years. The total of cases 
reported has increased steadily, most probably because of increasing 
awareness of the problem. In_ 1986, an estimated 117,000 cases \Vere 
reported, while by 1994, 241,000 cases had been reported .. 16 \Vbile this 
is an impressive increase, the numbers are small in comparison \Vith the 
projected number of community cases. Of the estimated 241,000 re-
ports in 1994, about 61% \vere substantiated; half of these \Vere self~ 
neglect. Figures for 1993 \Vere similar. In domestic .s.ettings, neglect 
was the most common fottn of maltreatment reported. Physical abuse 
accounted ·for about 16% of cases in both years, \vhile financial exploi-
- ' 
tation made up 12% of substantiated reports. In both 1993 and 1994, 
more than 65% of victims \vere \vhite, 20% African-American and 1 0% 
Hi . . 71 . spantc. 
VI. STA*IU'fORY REsPONSE BY' THE STA1FS 
State la\vs concerning elder mistreatment are extremely diverse. 
7L See 1990 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPoRT, supra .note 2, at XIV. Other estimates on 
underreporting are even more shocking. See also Society's Secret Shame: Elder Abuse tmd 
Family Violence, Hearing Before Senate Special Committee on Aging, 104th Cong. nt 2 (1995) 
(estimating only one in fourteen cases of elder abuse is ever reported). 
72. See 1990 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPoRT. supra note 2, at XJU, 40-43. 
73. See id • at XII. 
74. One state, Louisiana, even discontinued adult protective services for a period of fwe 
years because of budget exigencies. See ld. at 38 .. 
75. See id. at 40. 
76~ See NATIONAL CENmR ON ELDER ABUSE, StP..tl-ttARJES OF mE STA11ST1CAL DATA 0~ 
EIDER ABUSE IN DoMESTIC SEl"nNGS: AN ExPLORATORY S1UDY OF STAlE STAnsnCS FOR FY 
93 & FY 94, at V (1996). 
77.. See id. at v-vi. 
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They contain myriad specific sections regarding protected classes, ·man-
datory reporting of suspected abuse and neglect, definitions of report-
able behavior, guidelines for investigations of reports and a host of 
other subjects. No single definition encompasses all varieties of elder 
mistreatment. Prohibited conduct may be acts of commission or omis-
sion; it may be intentional, i.e., a conscious and voluntary attempt to 
inflict suffering, or inadvertent, i.e., reflecting inadequate knowledge, 
effort, or even infinnity, on the part of the perpetrator. Even the 
placement of the statutes is inconsistent. Many states use generic Adult 
Protective SeiVices laws to address elder mistreatment, while others 
have specific elder abuse statutes. 73 Other relevant provisions can be 
found in penal provisions or domestic violence laws.79 
Despite such diversity, some common threads stand out. Mistreat;. 
ment is typically characterized as abuse or neglect. 8° Common ele-
ments are non-accidental physical injury, sexual molestation, emotional 
or mental abuse, financial exploitation, and .neglect. Whether behavior 
is labeled as abusive or as neglectful may depend on the frequency of 
the mistreatment, its duration, intensity, and severity.81 Abuse may en-
compass several types of' behavior: a) physical abuse, the infliction of 
78. See infra Appendices A .. D. 
79. See, e.g.J 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12~21 (West 1996) (penal statute); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. til 19~A §§ 4001-4014 (West 1998) (domestic violence). 
80. The current federal definition as set forth by Section 144 of the Older Americans Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 3022-3030(g) (1997), includes_ three major types of elder maltreatment!--FphysJcal 
abuse, neglect, and exploitation, and clearly recognizes self-neg1ect as a form of neglect. Un· 
der the federal statute, "abuse" is defined as the "willful infliction of injury, unreasonable con-
finement,_ intimidation, or cruel punishment with resu1ting physical hann, pain; or mental an· 
guish; or deprivation by . • . a caregiver, of goods or services • • • necessary to avoid physical 
harm, mental anguish, or mental illness." 42 U.S.C.A. § 3002(13)(A-B) (West 1997). "Nc· 
glect'' is the "failure to provide for oneself goods or services necessary to avoid physical hnrm, 
mental anguish, or mental illness" or the ''failure of a caretaker to provide such goods or ser· 
vices." 42 U.S.C.A .. § 3002(37)(A-B) (West 1997)jt The tenn "exploitation" means "the illegal 
or improper act or process of an individual, including a caregiver, using the resources or an 
older individual for monetary or personal benefit, profit, or gain." 42 U.S.C.A. § 3'002(26) 
(West 1998). A ''caregiver'' is an individual ''Who has the responsibility for the core of an 
older individual, either voluntarily, by contract, by receipt of payment for care, or as a result 
of the operation of the Jaw." 42 U.S.C.A. § 3002(20) (West 1997). 
Section 144 notes that "elder abuse" refers to "abuse of an older individual', but docs not 
specify any particular age. However, because other provisions under Title III of the Older 
Americans Act are applicable to people who are sixty years of age and older, it may be as· 
sumed that the congressional intent is to cover the elderly in the same age group with the new 
elder abuse prevention program. The language clearly implies that the federal elder abuse 
definitions cover both domestic and institutional abuse. 
81. See Audrey Garfield, Elder Abuse & the States.' Adult Protective Services: Time for 
Change in California,_ 42 HAsTINGS LJ. 861, 872-74 (1991). 
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non-accidental physical pain or injury, (e.g., slapping, bruising, restrain-
ing, molesting, and similar behavior);82 b) psychological abuse, the \Vill-
ful infliction of severe mental anguish, (e.g., humiliation, threats, etc.);83 
and c) financial abuse, the unauthorized or exploitative use of funds, 
property or resources of an elder p-erson.84 Neglect is generally defined 
as the willful or passive failure of a caregiver to fulfill his or her care-
taking obligations or duties, (e.g., the deprivation of basic services such 
as food, housing, care for physical or mental health, such as medica-
tion}.85 "Self Neglect" is selt:directed conduct by an older person that 
threatens his or her safety or health. 86 Adult protective services are the 
''preventive and remedial activities perfonned on behalf of elders and 
dependent adults who are unable to protect their O\vn interests.,87 
The penalty to be imposed upon p_ersons responsible for the mis-
treatment varies. In many states the perpetrator is guilty of a misde~ 
meanor.88 Some, however, classify many forxns of maltreatment as a 
82. See, e.g~, N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 473(6)(a) (fticKinney Supp. 1997) \'Physical abuse' 
means the non-accidental use of force that results in bodily injwy, pain or impainnent. includ-
ing but not limited to, being slapped, burned, cut, bruised or improperly physically restrained:'); 
. . 
IDAHO CODE § 39-5302(i) (1997) ("'Abuse' means the nonnccidental infliction of physical pain. 
injwy or mental injury."). 
83. See, e.g., N~D. CENT. CODE § S0-25.2-01(1) (1995) \~Abuse' means any \\illful act or 
omission of a caregiver ••• which results in • .•• mental anguish, •••• "); NEV. REv. STAT. 
ANN. § 41.1395(4)(a)(1) (l\iicbie Supp. l997) \'Abuse' means \'rillful and unjustified infliction 
of pain, injwy, or mental anguish ••• • }. 
84. See,. e.g.. Miss. CODE. ANN. § 43-47-S(i) {\'lest 1993) ("Exploitation shall mean the ille-
gal or improper use of a vulnerable adult or his resources for another's profit or advantagc.").-
85. See, e.g., AlOC CODE ANN. § S•28-101(3)(A) ~iichic 199.7) ("'Neglect' means 
[n]egligently failing to provide necessary treatJnent, rehabilitation, care. food, clothing. shelter, 
supervision, or medical setvices to an endangered or impaired ndulL "); see also CAL. \VELF.. & 
INST. CODE § 15610.07 (\Vest Supp. 1998) \'Abuse of an elder or a depend.ent adult• means 
physical abuse, neglect • • • or the deprivation by a care custodian of goods or services that 
are necessary to avoid physical hann or mental sutTering. "). 
86. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 38-9-2(1 0) (lt1ichie Supp. 1997) (Neglect is ". • • the ftillurc of 
the person to provide • • • basic needs for himself or herself \\·hen the failun: is the result of 
the person's mental or physical inability."). 
87. Regan, supra note 32~ at 251; see also CAL. \VEI.F. & INST. COD£ § 15610.10 (\Vest 
Supp. 1998). 
88. See, e.~, UTAH CODE. ANN. § 76-5·111(3) (Michie Supp. 1998): 
Under circumstances other than those. likely to produce death or serious physical 
injury any person, including a caretaker, \vbo causes a disnbled or elder adult to 
suffer physical 'injury, abuse, or neglect, or having the care_ or custody of a disabled 
or elder adult, causes or permits that adult's person or health to be injured, nbused, 
or neglected, or causes or pennits a disabled or elder adult to be placed in a situa· 
tion where his person or health is endangered, is guilty of the offense of abuse of a 
disabled or elder adult as follo\\'S: (a) if done intentionally or kno\vingly, the offense 
is a -class A misdemeanor; (b) if done recklessly, the offense is- t1 class B misdc-
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felony.89 Many states, however, make no mention of penalty.90 Nor-
mally the statutes create liability for the caretaker of an elderly person 
or any other person who willfully commits an abusive act or omission. 
Caretaker is typically defined as an individual or entity responsible for 
the care of a vulnerable adult as a result of family relationship, volun-
tary assumption, or contract.91 • 
To facilitate comparative analysis, the appendices at the end of this 
article catalogue key provisions of state law. Several focus on statutes 
mandating reporting of suspected elder abuse, and the process for re-
ceiving and investigating such reports, statutes which are of particular 
relevance to subsequent sections of this article. Laws protecting elders 
and mandating reporting are listed alphabetically by state in Appendices 
A and B. 
Appendix C identifies the protected individuals and categories of 
harm. Column 1 shows_ that some states protect all "vulnerable," "dis-
abled'' or "incapacitated'' adults (using different verbal fonnulations) 
whatever their age,92 while others cover only those over a designated 
meanor; and (c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class_ C misde-
meanor. 
See also W. VA. CoDE § 61-2·29(4)(b) (Michie- 1997) ("Any care giver \Vho -neglects an inca· 
pacitated adult, or who knowingly penuits another person to neglect said adult, is guilty of a 
misdemeanor . • . ."). 
89. See, e.g.~ NEV. REv~ STAT. ANN. § 200.5099(1) (Michie Supp. 1997): 
[A]ny person who abuses an older person, causing the older person- to suffer unjusti· 
fiable physical pain or mental suffering is guilty of a category B felony and shall be 
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a minimum tenn of not less than 
two years and a maximum tenn of not more than six years, unless a more severe 
penalty is prescribed by law . . . . 
See also ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-28-103((a-b(l)) (Michie 1997): 
It shall be unlawful for any person . .. . to abuse, neglect, or exploit any person 
subject to protection . .. . of this chapter. Any p_erson or caregiver who purposely 
abuses an endangered or impaired adult in violation of the provisions of this chapter, 
if the abuse causes serious physical injury or substantial risk of death, shall be guilty 
of a Class B felony and shaJI be punished as provided by law. 
90. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. §§ 47.24.010-4724.900 (Michie 199_6); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6· 
2501 to -2513 (Michie 1996). 
91. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. §' 47 .24.900(3)(A) (Michie 1996) ('"[C]aregiver' menns a per· 
son who is providing care to a vulnerable adult as a result of a family relationship, or \Vho 
has assumed responsibility for the care of a vulnera:bte adult voluntarily, by contract, or by 
court order}'); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-47 .. S(c) (West Supp. 1998) ('"Caretaker' sbaU mean an 
individual • • . which has assumed the responsibility for the care of a vulnerable adult."). 
92. See, e.g.~ ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 464Sl(A)(IO) (West 1997) ("Vulnerable adult 
means an individual who is eighteen years of age or older who is unable to .protect himself 
.from abuse, neglect or exploitation by others because of a phy$ical or mental impainnent.''); 
DEL~ CoO.E ANN. tit 31 § 3902(1) (Michie I 9.97) ("Infirm adult s.hall mean any person l8 
years of age or over who, because of physical or mental disability, is substantially impaired In 
• 
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age, usually sixty,93 or sixty-five94 \vho experience mistreatment. Each 
state operates under its own set of definitions. Components of mal-
treatment vary widely. As Column 2 demonstrates, all states include 
physical harm as abuse) although some jurisdictions require a \Villful 
infliction of injury or deprivation of needed services.95 Neglect is like--
wise included by all statutes (Column 3).96 Self-neglect is included by 
more than one-half of the states (Column 9). Financial exploitation 
and fiduciary abuse (C-olumn 5), the illegal or improper use of a vul-
nerable or incapacitated elder's resources or prop:erty for the exploiter's 
or another's profit or personal advantage, is almost al\vays covered.97 
Variations in state definitions occur in other areas. Some statutes 
include "emotional abuse,') or ''mental anguish" (Column 4) as prohibit-
ed conduct,98 although these tertns present obvious difficulties in classi-
fication and severity. Sexual abuse (Column 6) is a separate category 
in some states, 99 while in others it is considered a part of the general 
the abilit¥ to provide adequately for the person's ov.n care and custody."); NEB. REv. STAT. § 
28~371 (\Vest 1995) {"Vulnerable adult shall mean any person eighteen years or age or older 
who has a substantial mental or functional impainnent or for \vhom a guardian has been ap-
pointed under the Nebraska Probate Code.") .. 
93. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17b-4S0(1) (\Vest Supp. 1998) \The term 'elderly 
person' means any resident of Connecticut who is sixty years of age-or older.}. 
94. See, e.g., CAL. \VELF. & INSI. CODE § 1561.0.27 (\Vest Supp. 1998} \'Elder~ means 
any person residing in this state, 65 years of age or older."). 
95. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. 82S.l02(l)(a) (\1/est Supp. 1998) (Abuse or an elderly per-
son consists of the "intentional infliction of physical or psychological injury."); CiA. CODE ANN. 
§ 30-S-3(1) (Harrison Supp. 1997) \'Abuse means the ••• \Villful deprivation of essential ser· 
vices to a disabled adult or elder person/'); ~1lss. CODE ANN. § 43-47-S(a) (199.3) ("\~illful 
infliction" of physical pain or injury). 
96. See, e.g., CAL. WEI-F. & INST .. CODE § 15610.57 (\Vest Supp. 1998) \'Neglect' mCIDlS 
that negligent failure of any person having the care or custody of an elder • • • to exercise 
that degree of care which a reasonable person in a like position v.-outd exercise."); IDAHO 
CoDE § 39-5302(8) (Michie 1998) ("'Neglect' means failure of a caretaker to provide foo~ 
clothing, shelter or medical care reasonably necessary to sustain the life and henlth or a vulner-
able adult ..... "). 
97 .. ; See, e.g., ILL. COl-iP. STAT. ANN •. cb. 720, para.. S/16-13 (1998) f'(a) A person commits_ 
the offense of _financial exploitation of an elderly person when he stnnds_ in a position of trust 
and confidence with the elderly or disabled person and he kno\vingly and by deception or 
intimidation obtains control over the elderly or disabled person's property Vtith the intent to 
pennanently deprive the elderly or disabled person of the use. benefi~ or possession or his 
property .. "); :MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. 19a § 14 (\Vest 1994) \An net or omission by nnother 
person, which causes a substantial moneta!)' or property loss to an elderly person • • • ."). 
98. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. :§ l61-F:43(III)(a) {B'utterYiOJth 1994) \'Emotional 
abuse" means the misuse of power, authority, or both, vcrb:ll harassment, or unreasonable con-
finement which results or could result in the mental anguish or emotional distress of an inca-
pacitated adult"-) GA. CODE. ANN. § 30-S-3(1) {Harrison 1997) ("'Abuse• means the ,,;urut in-
fliction of ••• mental anguish •••• "). 
99. See~ e.g., FLA. STAT .. ANN. § 415.102{1) (\Vest 1998) ("'Abuse' means the nonatcidental 
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definition of abuse. The lack of consistent definitions among states is 
a major problem; it hinders efforts to obtain prevalence and incidence 
data, and it makes useful comparisons between research findings diffi-
cult. 
Appendix D presents the criminal penalties prescribed for perpetra-
tors,. Again, these vary widely, with different states defining the same 
conduct as either felony or a misdemeanor (Columns 1 & 2). Many 
states require referral of cases to criminal authorities (Column 3). 
Appendix E is a compilation of laws relating to the reporting prov.i-
sions. Forty-two states and the District of Columbia mandate a wide 
variety of professionals to report known or susp,ected cases of elde.r 
abuse. The remaining states (Colorado, Illinois, New Jersey, New 
York,_ North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Wisconsin) make 
reporting voluntary. 100 The categories of professionals required to re-
port instances of mistreatment include health care and social servlce 
professionals, and law enforcement personnel. My own inexact count 
encompassed at least twenty different types of professionals as "manda• 
tory reporters" in the various states. As this app-endix makes clear, 
some groups are almost always required to report, e.g., physician, 
nurse, mental health professional, social worker, etc. 101 Other states 
infliction of physical or psychological injury or sexual abuse upon a djsabled adult or an. elder· 
ly person by a relative; can;giver, or household member .. . • or sexual abuse of a disabled 
adult or an elderly person by any person. 'Abuse' also means the active encouragement of any 
person by a relative, caregiver, or household member to commit an act that inflicts or could 
reasonably be expected to result in physical or psychological ·injury to a disable adult or an 
elderly person.") .. 
100. See COLO REv. STAT. ANN. § 26-3 . .t-102(b) (Bradford 1998) ("The following persons 
are urged to make or initiate an initial oral report within twenty-four hours followed by a 
written report within forty-eight hours.'') (emphasis added); ILL. COMP, STAT- ANN. ch. 320, 
para. 20/4 (West 1993) ("(a) Any p.erson wishing to report a case of alleged or suspected 
abuse or neglect may make such a report ...• ") (emphasis added}; NJ. STAT. ANN. § 
52:270-409 (West Supp. 1998) ("(a) A person who has reasonable cause- to believe that o vul· 
nerable adult is the subject of abuse, neglect, or exploitation may report . ~ . /') (emphasis 
added); see also N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 473~b (McKinney 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § SO· 
25.2-03 (Michie 1997); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10215 (West 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAws 
§ 22-46-6 (Michie 1998); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 46.90 (West 1997) .. 
101. See~ e:g., ALA. CODE § 38·9-8(a) (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1996) ("All physicians and 
other practitioners of the healing ans having reasonable cause to believe that any adult protect· 
ed under the provisions of this chapter has been subjected to physical abuse, neglect or explol· 
tation shall report or cause a report to be made .... ''); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-454 
(West 1998) ("A physician, hospital intern or -resident, -surgeon~ .... psychologist, or social 
worker, who has a reasonable basis to believe that abuse or neglect of the adult has occurred . 
.. . shall ·immediately report or cause reports to be made .. . . "); ARK. CODE ANN. § S-28· 
203(a)(l) (Michie. 1997) ("Whenever any physician ••• registered nurse, hospital personnel~ •• 
. social worker, . . .. mental health professional, . . . has reasonable cause to suspect that an 
• 
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also include clergy, 102 attorneys, 103 dentists, 104 chiropractors, 105 ambulance 
drivers, 106 and a host of others. Many states also mandate that "any 
person" with knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that the defined 
abuse has occurred report the incident}07 Column 12 notes the mental 
state required for criminal conviction under the mandatory reporting 
statutes, 108 if one is specified, and the penalties for failure to report ,a 
violation, typically classified as a misdemeanor.109 
Appendix F swveys the type and timing of the required reports. 
The content of the report usually includes names and addresses of the 
allegedly abused citizen, the reporter, and the alleged abuser, as \Vell as 
infonnation relating to the nature of the extent of the hann, the basis 
of the reporter's knowledge, etc.110 The time frame for making such a 
report is delineated either explicitly (Columns 3 & 4) or through gener-
endangered adult has been subjected to .. • • abus,c • • • he shall immediately report or cause a 
report to be made in accordance with the provisions of this section."). 
102. Reports of suspected abuse must be made by "[c]very clergyman, practitioner of Chris-
tian Science or religious healer, unless he has acquired the- knowledge of abuse, neglect or 
exploitation ftOm the offender during a confession." NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432B.220(2)(d) 
(Michie 1997); see also ALAsKA STAT. § 47.24.010(a)(IO) (l\1ic.hie 1996); Co~. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 17b-4Sl (West 1997); NEV. REv. STAT. § 200.5093(2)(dHt) {Michie 1997); OHIO REv. 
CODE ANN. § 5010.61 (Anderson 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 124.060 (Michie Supp. 1996); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 43-35-25 (Law. Co--op 1997). 
103. See, e.g., NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 200 .. 5093(i) ~iichie 1997) (Reporting required by 
"[e]vecy attorney, unless be has acquired the knowledge of abuse, neglect. exploitation or isola· 
tion • • . from a client who has been or may be accused of such abuse, neglect, exploitation 
or isolation."'). 
104., See, e.g., GA., CODE ANN. § 30·S-4(a)(l) (Hanisonl997). 
lOS.. See, e.g., MoNT. CODE ANN. § 52·3-811(3)(a-c) (1997). 
106. See id. 
107 .. See, e.g., Miss~ CODE ANN. § 43-47-7(1.) (\Vest Supp .. 1998) \[A]ny person having rea-
sonable cause to believe that a wlnerablc adult has been or is being abused, neglected. or 
exploited shall report such information •••• "). 
108. See, e;.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2512(a)(l) ~iichie 1996) ("Any person required to re-
port under § 6~2503(a)(l) who willfully fails to do so shall be guilty of a ,misdemeanor and. 
upon conviction, subject to a fine not exceeding $300 .. "). 
109. See IDAHO CODE § 39-5303(2) (1\iichie- l998) ("Failure to report as provided under this 
section is a misdemeanor subject to punishment as provided in section 18·113, Idaho Code.} .. 
110. See, e.g., LA.. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:403.2{0)(2) (\Vest 1986 & Supp. 1996) \All re-
ports shall contain the name and address of the adult, the name and address of the person 
responsible for the care of the adult, if available, and any other pertinent in(onnation."). See 
also MAss. GEN. LAws. ANN. l9A § IS(c) (\Vest 1994 & Supp. 1998) ("Reports ••• shall 
contain the name,- address and approximate age of the elderly person \'iho is the subject of the 
report, information regarding the nature and extent of the abuse, the name of the person"s care-
taker, if known, any medical treatment being received or immediately required, if kno\\11, any 
other infonnation the reporter believes to- be relevant to the investigation, and the name and 
address of the reporter and where said reporter may be contacted, if the reporter \'tishes to 
provide said infonnation."). 
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al description. 111 
Appendix G summarizes the agency or agencies designated to re-
ceive reports of elder abuse or neglect and the response. Many states 
assign this task to more than one agency, especially where there are 
several applicable abuse laws. These include state social services, APS, 
and law enforcement agencies. 112 Column 3 sets out the legally re-
quired response, including the time allowed by statute for investigation. 
Column 6 also details the use of central registries, a centralized listing 
for abuse reports and infonnation to which only certain individuals may 
gain access. 113 These registries facilitate computerization of data, allow-
ing rapid access to, and retrieval of, relevant information. This is 
particularly useful in states where more than one agency is involved in 
the investigation and response to mistreatment. 
Appendix H surveys statutory protections for the reporter. Almost 
all states guarantee anonymity or confidentiality to reporters of 
abuse1 14 an important consideration given the chilling effect that fears 
of retaliation or violation of privacy may have on the willingness to 
report. A few states provide for disclosure of the reporter's identity 
during the subsequent investigation and/or court proceedings if consent 
or a court order is obtained. 115 Immunity, either absolute116 or for re-
111. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § S-28-206(a) (Michie 1997) ("A report of abuse, sexual 
abuse, or negligence of an abused or neglected adult may, pursuant to this chapter, be made by 
telephone and shall be followed by a written report within forty-eight (48) hours, if so request-
ed by the receiving agency."). See also GA. CODE. ANN. § 31-8·82(a) (Hanison 1997) ("Such 
person shall also make a written report to the Department of Human Resources within 24 hours 
after making the initial report"). 
112. See, e.g., GA. CoDE ANN. 30 .. S-4(a)(2) (Michie 1997) (requiring that reports of elder 
abuse be directed toward an "adult protection agency, .•. [or] an appropriate Jaw enforcement 
authority or district attorney''). · 
113. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. 415.103(1) (West 1997) (requiring that a "central abuse reg-
istry" be established to receive all reports of elder abuse). 
114. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §47.24.0SO(a) (Michie 1996) ("Investigation reports and reports 
of the abandonment, exploitation, abuse, neglect or self-neglect of a vulnerable adult filed under 
this chapter are confidential and are not subject to public inspection and copying . • . ."); CAL4 
WELF. & INST. CODE § 15634(a)-(b) (West 1991 & Supp. 1996) (uThe reports .•. sbnll be 
confidential and may be disclosed only as provided in subdivision {b). Any breach of the 
confidentiality required by this chapter is a misdemeanor • • . .'') (Subdivision {b) penn its dis· 
closure to authorized persons and agencies responsible for investigation of the alleged abuse.). 
115. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 320 20/4 {West 1997) ("(c) The identity of a person mak-
ing a report of . . . abuse or neglect under this Act may be disclosed . . . only with such 
person's written consent or by court order."); MICH. COMP. ANN. § 14.800 (723) (West 1996); 
\V ASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 1434.050 {West Supp. 1998) (uUnless there is a judicial proceeding 
or the person consents, the identity of the person making the report is confidential."). 
116. See ALA. CODE § 38·9-9 (1992) ("Any person, firm or corporation making ..• a report 
pursuant to this chapter . . . shall in so doing be immune from any liability, civil or criminal, 
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ports made in good faith, 117 is typically provided to protect reporters 
from legal liability for adherence to statutory commands. Many states 
presume reports are made in good faith unless proved othenvise by 
clear and convincing evidence.118 
VII. LEGAL ACilONS AGAINST PERPETRATORS 
A. Criminal Law 
Conceptually, almost every fo11n of elder mistreatment corresponds 
to a common law or statutory crime. Physical abuse, for example, 
could be assault, battery, or perhaps even attempted murder; financial 
exploitation may be theft, larceny, or eA1ortion. By criminalizing elder 
mistreatment; society proclaims that such violence is not acceptable, 
despite its prevalence. "[T]he criminal code reflects . • • some notion 
of the moral sense of the community .... ',119 Once the illegality of 
such behavior is recognized, the criminal la\v can be enforced aggres-
sively to protect the victim and to hold the offender accountable in a 
public \vay. Criminal (and other) courts can also protect victims by 
"no contact" orders, requiring the abuser to vacate the residence, order-
ing restitution for theft or medical expenses, and by a \vide variety of 
other measures. 120 Emergency orders are often available. 121 
~ 
that might otherwise be incurred or imposed."); see also Jones v. Living Ctrs. Holding Co .. 
695 So. 2d 1194 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) (section confers absolute immunity for mandatory rc· 
porters). 
117. See IDAHO CoDE § 39-5303(5)(4) (1998) ("Any person ,,.·ho makes any report pursuant 
to this chapter, or who testifies in any administrative or judicial proccding arising from such 
report, • . .. shall be immune from any civil or criminal liability on aceount of such report. 
testimony .•• except that such immunity shall not extend to perjwy, reports made in bad faith 
or with malicious purpose • . • !'). 
118. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.1036 (\Vest 1998) ("Any person v.·ho participates in making 
a report under § 415.1034 or participates in a judicial proceeding resulting therefrom is pre· 
sumed to be acting in good faith and. unless lack of good faith is shown by clear and con-
vincing evidence~ is immune from any liability, civil or criminal. that othen\·isc might be in-
curred or imposed • • • .). 
119. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRThm AND PUNlSW.fENT IN ~tERICAN HISTORY 125 (1993). 
120. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. §§ 107.700-107.720 (1998) (includes authority for courts to 
issue temporazy restraining orders, injunctions of different types; includes requirement for \\111'· 
rantless arrest upon probable cause of a person believed to have violated such an order); UTAH 
CODE ANN § 30-64.8 (1996) (Electronic ~fonitoring of Domestic Violence Offenders); 750 IlL. 
CoMP. STAT. 60/103 (West 1993). For a comprehensive overview of cnses nnd statutes on 
abuse of women, see Catherine F. Klein & Leslyc E. Orloff, Providing Legal ProtecJ/on for 
Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes & Case Lmv, 21 HOFSTRA L REv. 801 (1993). 
121. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 19A § 20(b) (\Vest 1994) ("If an emergency 
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Abuse, neglect, and financial exploitation of older persons have 
been made specific crimes in many states. 122 Statutes often make seri-
ous physical abuse or neglect a separate offense. 123 States which do 
not specifically criminalize abuse and neglect often have provisions 
requiring reports to be reported to the police for criminal investiga-
tion. 124 Most states allow the advanced age of a victim to be consid-
ered as an aggravating factor in sentencing because of the vulnerability 
to crime of older persons as well as the enhanced effect that crime has 
on them. 125 Others designate various crimes, including assault, battery, 
exists and the department, its designated agency, a -member of the immediate family or n -care· 
taker has reasonable cause to believe that an elderly person is suffering from abuse and lacks 
the capacity to consent to the provision of protective services, said department, designated a.gen· 
GY, member of the immediate family or caretaker may petition the court for nn emergency 
order of protective services!'); TEx. CODE ANN. § 48.061 (b) (\Vest 1998) ("If the department 
determines that an elderly o.r disabled person is suffering from aouse, exploitation, or neglect 
presenting a threat to life or physical safety, that the person lacks capacity to consent to re-
ceive protective services, and that no consent can be obtained, the department may petitlon the 
probate or statutory or constitutional county court that. has probate jurisdiction in the county in 
which the elderly or disabled person resides for an emergency order authorizing protective ser-
vices."). 
122. See, .e.g., TENN. CoDE ANN. § 71-6-117 (1995) ("It is unlawful for any person to \Viii· 
fully abuse, neglect or exploit any adult within the meaning of the provisions of this part. 
Any person who willfully abuses, neglects or exploits a person in violation of the provisions of 
this part commits a Class A misdemeanor"); Wvo. STAT. ANN § 35-20-l 09 (Michie 1997) ("A 
person who abuses, neglects, exploits or abandons a disabled adult is guilty of a misdemeanor 
and upon conviction shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars [$1000 .. 00]."). See also 
infra Appendix A. 
123. :See, e~g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 265 § 13K(e) (West 1997) ("Whoever. being n 
caretaker ... permits serious bodily injury to such elder or person with a_ disabUity, or wan-
tonly or recklessly permits another to commit an assault and battery upon such elder • • . shall 
be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than ten years or . . • in the 
house of correction for not more than two and one-half years ...• "). See also DEL. CODE 
ANN. tiL 31, § 3913 (1997) (intentional abuse causing bodily hann, pennanent disfigurement is 
a Class D felony); KY. REv. STAT~ ANN. § 209.990 (Banks-Baldwin l997) (knowing and will-
ful abuse causing _serious physical or mental injury is Class C felony). 
. . . 
124. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 19A § 18(a) (West 1994) ("If an assessment re• 
suits in a determination that the elderly person has suffered serious abuse, the department or 
designated agency shall report such detennination to the district attorney of the county where 
the abuse occurred within forty-ejgbt hours. The district attorney may investigate and decide 
whether to initiate criminal p_roceedings.'') See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § l7b-460 (\Vest 
1997); IDAHO CODE § 39-5310 (1997). 
125. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702(13) (West 1997) (enhancing culpability u[i)f 
the victim of the offense is sixty-five or more years of age or is a handicapped person''); DEL. 
CODE. ANN.-til 11 § 84l(c)(2) (1996) (enhancing liability if the-"victim is 60 years of age or 
older''); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. S/5-S-3.2(b){4)(ii) (West 1997) (augmenting punishment If 
the victim is "a person 60 yeats of age or older at the time of the offense,); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 193.167 (1·2) (Michie 1997) ("Certain crimes committed against persons 65 
years of age or older · ~ · . . shall be punished by imprisonment • • • for a tenn equal to and in 
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robbery, etc. as more serious offenses when committed against an elder-
ly person. 126 Moreover, if the victim of a crime is particularly vulnera-
ble, a judge may take that into account in imposing a sentence even 
without specific statutory authorization. As long as the sentence is kept 
within normal sentencing guidelines, there is little to prohibit a judge 
from imposing a greater sentence.127 
These criminal provisions reflect the special vulnerability of the 
elderly to crime. The physical, financial, and behavioral impacts of 
crime on the elderly, by caretakers or strangers, are much greater than 
upon younger victims. 128 According to the National Conference on 
Crime Against the Aging, the elderly are eight times more vulnerable 
to crime than are younger people, primarily because of their physical 
limitations and poverty.129 It has long been recognized that the elderly 
are among the groups especially vulnerable to crime.130 Perceived 
wealth and physical \veakness combine to make the elderly likely tar-
gets and their living arrangements often leave them dependent and 
isolated.131 Thieves know that elderly persons \Viii receive checks or 
addition to the tenn of imprisonment prescribed by statute for the crime."). 
126. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.08(2) (\Vest 1998): 
\Vhenever a person is charged with committing an assault or nggrnvnted nssnuJt or a 
battery or aggravated battery upon a person 65 years of age or older, regardless of 
whether he or she knows or has reason to know the age of the victim, the offense 
for which the person is charged shall be reclassified as folJO\\"S: 
(a) In the case of aggravated battery, from a felony of the second degree to a 
felony of the first degree. 
(b) In the case of aggravated assault, from a felony of the third degree to a 
felony of the second degree. 
(c) In the case of battery, from a misdemeanor of the fust degree to n felony 
of the third degree. 
127. See, e.g., People v. Jorgensen, 538 N.E.2d 758, 761 (Ill. App. Ct 1989) (holding that it 
was proper for the trial court to enhance the sentence of a defendant \\·ho \\115 convicted of 
home invasion and anned robbery because the victim was over the nge of sixty even \Vhen 
there was no specific stabJtol}' mandate to consider age because "a sentencing court has ,.,·ide 
latitude to conduct a broad inquiry into facts \\·bich may tend to mitigate or aggravate the 
offense •••. "); State v. Flowers, 394 S.E.2d 296 (N.C. Ct App. 1990) (fmding the advanced 
age of the victim a proper basis for enhancing the defendant's conviction for murder, burglary, 
kidnapping, larceny, anned robbel}', and breaking and entering because of the greater vulnera-
bility of the elderly victim). 
128. See ROBERT J. SMriH, CRl"tE AGAINST mE ELDERLY: 11-fPUCAnOSS FOR POUCYl.tAKERS 
AND PRACitllONERS 18-21 (1979). 
129. See JoanN. Scott, Senior Citizens Present a Special Case, JUDGES J._ Summer 19~ at 
19. 
130. See HANG VON HENne, 1HE CRI~UNAL AND H1S Vtcn~!: SlUDIES IN ntE 
SOCIOBIOLOGY OF CRIME 408-11 (1948). 
131. See Jordon I. Kosberg, Jlictimization of the Elderly: Cmuallon and Pre,·entlon, 10 
VICTIMOLOGY 376, 377 (1985). 
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carry large sums of cash on certain days. 132 
Despite the shocking prevalence statistics of elder abuse and neglect 
discussed earlier, elder abuse victims rarely report. 133 Some may feel 
abusive treatment is ordinary134 or that recourse through the law is 
unavailable or unavailing. 135 Others may be so thoroughly isolated or 
under the control of the caregiver that they have no opportunity to seek 
help. 136 Victims are often particularly reluctant to proceed against fami-
ly members because of embarrassment, shame, lack of third party emo-
tional support, and failure of the criminal justice system to accommo-
date victims' needs.137 The failure of mandated professionals to report 
suspected cases138 likewise means prosecutors are rarely involved. El· 
der abuse follows patterns similar to other fortns of family violence, 
especially spousal abuse.139 To be successful, the criminal justice sys-
tem must take the victim's situation and vulnerability into account 
Ultimate responsibility for arrest, charging, and .d·isposition of a criminal 
132. See id 
133. See, e.g., 1990 ELDER ABusE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 42 (estimating only one 
in every eight cases of .elder abuse is ever reported; Pillemer & Finkelhor, supra note 2 (estl· 
mating only one in fotJrteen cases of elder mistreabnent is reported to authorities). 
134. See, e.g., Linner W. Griffin, Elder Maltreatment Among Rural African-Americans, 6 J. 
OF ELDER AB. & NEGL. 1-29 (1994). 
135. See A. Paul Blunt, Financial Exploitation of the Incapacitated: Investigation and Relne· 
dies, S J. ELDER AB. & NEGL. 19, 28-31 (1993). 
136. See K.A. Pillemer, Social Isolation & Elder Abuse, 8 REsPONSE No. 4, 2-4 (1984). 
137. See Suzanne K. Steinmetz, Dependency, Stress and Jllolence Between Middle Aged 
Caregivers and Their Elderly Parents, in ABUSE AND MALTREATMENT OF niB ELDERLY 134-49 
(Jordon I. Kosberg ed.). Prof. M~a Minow has astutely commented on the complexity of 
these situations. 
Two important features are neglected in this familiar debate over assigning blame for 
family violence. The first is the real possibility that violence within a family in· 
volves a system of human interactions that should all be changed, rather than a sin· 
gle, sick, and malevolent \vrong-doer. The second is the family's embeddedness in 
larger social patterns of neighbors who look the other way, police and social work-
ers who do not respond to reports of violence, and public attitudes that tolerate or 
deny family violence. By neglecting these two features, debates over assigning 
blame for violence within the family contribute to the sense that the problem is 
abnonn~, private, and contained within that family. At the same time, these features 
may help explain why some people who engage in family violence believe it to be 
nonnal, publicly accepted, and not confined to their own family. 
Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language and Family Jllo-
/ence, 43 V AND. L. REV. 1665, 1682-83 (1990). 
138. See infra notes 205-16 and accompanying texl 
139. See, e.g., LENORE E. \VALKER, THE BA1.1"ERED WOMAN 52 (1979) (describing reasons 
battered women are unable to respond effectively); Mark Hansen, New Strategy in Ballerlng 
Cases, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1995, at 14 (analyzing increasingly violent cycle in domestic abuse cas· 
es). 
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case should rest with police and prosecution. Elder mistreatment is a 
matter of public concern, not a private or fan1ily matter. 
Given the ''hidden" nature of the events, there is no precise data on 
the number of unreported instances of geriatric mistreatment. There is, 
however, anecdotal and general infonnation available. Although Massa-
chusetts, _for example, has one of the most active progrmtls for identify-
ing elder abuse, a study conducted in that state concluded that only one 
case in fourteen comes to the attention of state authorities.14° Congres-
sional reports have noted that \Vhile elder abuse is at least as prevalent 
as child abuse, it is far less likely to be reported.141 In 1990, the 
House Subcommittee on Health and Long-Tenn Care sent question-
naires to all states in an effort to assess the extent of undeJieporting of 
elder mistreatment. All states concurred that significant numbers of 
elder abuse cases were never reported. 14-2 Some of the responses by 
state agencies are truly shocking; California estimated one in ten cases 
are reported; Wisconsin one in sixteen and Indiana responded that as 
few as one in fifty cases were reported. 143 
B. Civil Remedies 
Elder maltreatment often has a devastating impact on its victims. 
Because of their age, health, or limited resources, the elderly typically 
have fewer options for resolving or avoiding the abusive situation. 
Their physical frailty makes them more vulnerable to physical or other 
abuse, and poor health often accentuates the problem.144 Older persons 
may have less ability to recover from financial exploitation because of 
fixed incomes or short remaining life spans. The loss of a home lived 
in for many years may be particularly traumatic because of its famil-
iarity, memories, and the trauma of being moved. 
Since elder mistreatment 'is often a '~family affai-r" involving gro\vn 
children or spouses, doctrines of intrafmnilial and interspousal tort im-
140. See Pillemer & Finkelhor, supra note 2. 
141. See 1990 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPoRT, supra note 2, at Xl ("On the average .. • • 
roughly I of 8 elder abuse cases is ever reported •••• "); 1981 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE RE· 
PORT, supra note 29,- at xiv-xv {estimating one of six cases ls reported to nuthorities).-
142. See 1990 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPoRT,_ supra note 2, Table 8, n1 53. 
143. See id., Table 9, at 54. 
144. \Vhile it would be inaccurate to describe the vast population over sixty-five \'tith one 
generalization, physical decline eventually becomes an aspect of the aging process. See gener-
ally DAVID A. TOMB, GRO\VING OLD 15-40 {1984). Chronic hcaJtb problems increase dramati· 
. ' 
cally in this age group. See ROBERT C. ATCHLEY, SOCIAL FORCES AND AGING 91 (1988). 
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munity at one time blocked civil remedies. 145 Modern family and tort 
law concepts have swept away most of these barriers146 and civil dam-
ages are available in suits by parents against emancipated children and 
between spouses. 147 Provided that legal counsel is available and the 
legal process is accessible, traditional civil law remedies can sometimes 
be effectively utilized against many of the fonns of elder mistreatment. 
Physical or sexual abuse is civil battery. Misuse of the elder's funds 
may be remedied by litigation claiming conversion or fraud. There are 
particularly useful civil to,ols where the abuser occupied a fiduciary 
status such as trustee, guardian, ·conservator, or power of attorney. A 
"fiduciary'' relationship exists where ''special confidence is reposed in 
one who is bound in equity and good conscience to act in good faith 
with due regard to the interest of the p-erson reposing the confi-
dence."148 In addition, an attorney for the fiduciary has a duty to the 
beneficiaries or wards. 
In all matters connected with [the] trust a trustee is bound to 
act in the highest good faith toward all beneficiaries, and may 
not obtain any advantage over the latter by the slightest misrep-
resentation, concealment, threat, or adverse press_ure of any 
kind. An attorney who acts as counsel for a trustee _provides 
advice and guidance to all beneficiaries. It follows that when 
an attorney undertakes a relationship as an adviser to a trustee, 
he in reality also assumes a relationship with the beneficiary 
akin to that between trustee and beneficiary. 149 
145. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON nm LAWS OF ENOLAND 445 
(Cooley 3d ed. 1884) ("[H]usband and wife are ,one," so a married woman could not sue her 
husband in tort for physical or other mistreabnenl). 
146. See generally HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DoMESTIC RELATIONS IN niB UNIT· 
ED STATES 370-81 (1987). 
147. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Valdez, 427 P .2d 655, 659 (N.M. 1967) (recognizing suit by par-
ent against child); Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 244 S.E2d 338, 342 (W. Va. 1978) (allowing 
compensatory and punitive damages in assault suit brought by one- spouse ngainst the other). 
148. People v. Riggens, 132 N.E.2d 519, S22 (Ill. 1956). See generally JONA1llAN 
FEDERMAN & MEG REED, ABUSE AND THE DURABLE PO~ OF ATTORNEY: OPTIONS FOR RE· 
FORM (Government Law Ctr. of Albany Law Sch. ed., 1994). 
149. Morales v. Field, DeGoff, Huppert & MacGowan, 99 Cal .. App. 3d 307, 316 (1979); see 
also Weingarten v. Warren, 753 F. Supp~ 491, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ('•By alleging Warren 
acted as attorney for the trustee and that he violated his fiduciary duty to the bencflclaries, 
plaintiffs have stated a cause of action against Warren individually for breach of fiduciary du-
ty."); Estate of Halas, 512 N.E.2d 1276, 1280 (Ill. App. 1987) (attorney for the trustee owed 
both- a fiduciary duty directly to tbe beneficiaries, but also a "derivative fiduci~ duty • • • ."); 
Fickett v., Superior Court of Pima County, 558 P 2d 98,8, 990 (Ariz. App. 1976) ("[P]ubllc 
policy requires that the attorney exercise his position of trust and superior knowledge rcsponsi-
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Attorneys who participate in misconduct may have licensure sanctions 
imposed on them. 150 The :fiduciacy may be forced to provide an ac-
counting of the money and property that have been expended in order 
to determine whether improprieties have o-ccurred. Num-erous states 
have also provided statutory remedies for abuse by fiduciaries. 151 
Sometimes intervention may eliminate future abuse in straightfor-
ward ways. Power of attorney may be annulled in most states by \vrit-
ten revocation of the power. 152 Names on bank accounts -can be 
changed or a representative payee removed upon notice to the Social 
Security Administration. 153 
Even without formal legal appointment, a fiduciacy relationship may 
be found when ,a person has voluntarily undertaken the care of an el-
derly person, particularly if the elder is disabled. Courts may then find 
a ''guardian-like'' relationship and impose upon the caregiver a fiduciacy 
duty to safeguard assets. A "constructive', trust may be imposed if 
fraud or abuse has occurred within a confidential relationship.154 \Vhere 
bly" to the trustee.). 
150. See, e.g., In re Matter of Smi~ 572 N.E.2d 1280 (Ind. 1991) (upholding suspension 
ftom practice of two attorneys who drafted instruments used in fraudulent trnnsnctions). See 
also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCf RULE I.S(c). 
151. See, e.g, ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-454(0) (\Vest 1997) \If any person is found to 
be responsible for the abuse, neglect, or exploitation of an incapacitated or vulneroblc adult in 
a criminal or civil action, the court may order the perSon to make restitution as the court 
deems appropriate."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.102 (12)(a)(2) (\Vest Supp •. 1998) (action avail-
able against person who "[k]nows or should kno\V [action will] ••• deprive the disabled adult 
or elderly person of the use, benefit, or possession of the funds. assets, or property for the 
benefit of someone other than the disabled adult or elderly person}:: OR. REv. STAT. § 
124.110 (l)(a) (1995) {"An action may be brought • " • for fiducimy abuse in the fotlo\\ing 
circumstances: {a) \Vhen a pers,on, including but not limited to a person \•;ho has the cate or 
custody of an elderly or incapacitated person or who stands in a position of trust to an cldedy 
or incapacitated person, takes · or appropriates money or p,roperty of the elderly or incapacitated 
person for any wrongful use"). 
152. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN .. § 30·5~10·1 (\Vest 1998). 
153. See Representative payee status, 42 U.S.C. § 40S(j)(2)(A) (1997) \If the Commissioner 
of Social Securicy or a court of competent jurisdiction dctcnnines that a representative payee 
has misused any individual's benefit paid to such representative payee pursuant to this subseclll! 
tion or section 1383(a)(2) of this title, the Commissioner of Social Security shnJI promptly 
revoke certification for payment of benefits, to such representative, payee pursunnt ·to this subsec-
tion and certify payment to an alternative representative payee or, if the interest of the individ-
.. 
ual under this subchapter· would be served thereby, to the· individual."); 20 CJ='.R. § 404.2055 
("If a beneficiary receiving representative paym~nt sbo\\-s us that he or she is mentally and 
physically able to manage or direct the management of benefit payments, \\·c \\·ill make, direct 
payment"). 
154. See, e.g., Estate of Campbell, 704 A.2d 329, 330 (1\ie. 1997) (holding thnt a construc-
tive trust may be imposed to do equity, prevent unjust enrichment v.·hen title to property is 
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the aged person is dependent, and has allowed a third party to handle 
assets, a "constructive trust" requires the fiduciary to use resources only 
for the benefit of the older person.155 If funds or property were ex-
pended for something other than the elder's best interest, traditional 
common law remedies may be employed to recover the assets.156 
In appropriate circumstances, punitive damages may be assessed. 
Particularly where the abuser has resources, or the funds have been 
egregiously wasted, the requirements for ''criminal type" damages may 
be met. 157 Extra-compensatory liability is justified because of outra-
geous misconduct that is accompanied by malicious intent. 158 
C. New Statutory Remedies 
Mistreated elderly often find legal remedies inadequate. Many 
victims are unable to obtain an attorney, even when the abuse is obvi-
ous and shocking; there is little financial incentive for lawyers to be-
come involved. Because of the slow pace of litigation, many of the 
frail elderly do not survive long enough for a law suit to come to 
judgment. In some states the death of the abused elder person cuts off 
acquired by fraud, or when property is acquired in violation of a fiduciary duty}; Stnuffer v. 
Stauffer, 351 A.2d 236, 241 (Pa 1976} (constructive trust, shaped by the conscience of equity, 
unlike an express trust, is a remedy created to prevent unjust enrichment). 
155. See REsTATEMENT {IHIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt b (1996) (stating that "despite the dif· 
ferences in the legal circumstances and responsibilities of various fiduciaries, one chnracterJstic 
is common to all: a person in a fiduciary relationship to another is under a duty to act for the 
benefit of the other as to matters within the scope of the relationship,'); see also Kurtz v. Sol· 
omon, 656 N.E.2d 184, 190-91 (Ill. App. Ct 1995} (stating that factors in "detcnnining wheth· 
er a fiduciary relationship exists between parties, the breach of which would warrant n con· 
structive trust, include health, mental condition, education, and business experience . • . . The 
fiduciary is prohibited from seeking a selfish benefit during the relationship."). 
156. See, e.g., Wennerholm v. Wennerholm, 46 N.E.2d 939, 944 (Ill. 1943} (setting aside a 
transfer of property between family members after requiring that such a gratuitous transfer be 
not only free from fraud but also equitable to the grantor); Wiemer v. Havana Nat. Bank 385 
N.E.2d 340, 344 (Ill. App. Ct 1978) (holding that actions of trustee bank violated the fiduciary 
responsibilities owed to its customer to preserve the trust property). 
157. See generally 1 JAMES D. GHJARDI & JOHN J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW AND 
PRAcnCE tbl. 4.1 (1984 & Supps.} (noting most states recognize the supcrcompcnsntory nature 
of punitive damages). 
158. See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, DIE LAW OF REMEDIES, § 3.11(2), at 468 (1989); REsTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) cmt b (1979) (stating that "[p]unitive damages •.• can be 
awarded •.. for conduct [that is] ... outrageous, either because the defendant's acts arc done 
with an evil motive or because they are done with reckless indifference to the rights of oUt· 
ers"}; Martsch v. Nelson, 705 P .2d 1050, 1054 (Idaho 1985} (stating that courts would award 
punitive damages when conduct is "wanton, malicious or gross and outrageous or the facts 
imply malice and oppressionj. 
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recovery for pain, suffering, or disfigurement 159 Problems of proof are 
another disincentive to la\vyers' taking abused elderly clients; often 
victims suffer from diminished mental capacity, memory loss, or speech 
difficulties.160 In many instances of financial abuse, the misappropriated 
property may be the elder's life savings, but still amounts to a relative-
ly small sum in comparison to attorney fees and other costs of litiga-
tion. We thus need ne\v statutory remedies, and several states have 
become "Iaboratories"161 in \Vhich experiments in ne\v remedies are 
being conducted. 
In 1992, California enacted a ne\V statute covering abused elders or 
dependent adults. The Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protec-
tion Act162 begins with legislative findings: the infi11n elderly and de-
pendent adults are a "disadvantaged class," and fe\v civil cases are 
brought in connection with their abuse because of problems of proof, 
court delays, and the lack of incentives to prosecute these suits. 163 The 
legislative intent, clearly stated, is to enable abused, vulnerable persons 
to engage attorneys to take their cases. \Vhen it is proven by "clear 
and convincing" evidence that the defendant has been guilty of reck-
lessness, oppression, fraud or malice in the commission of abuse of the 
elderly, new remedies are created. These include postmortem recovery 
for pain and suffering, and mandatory attorney fees and costs.164 The 
Act allows fees for the services of a conservator litigating an elder's 
clairn and continuation of a pending action by the elder's personal 
159. See \V. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON lHE I.A\V OF TORTS § 126, nt 
942-43 (5th ed. 1984) ("The pain and suffering recovery on behalf of the cstntc • • • is clearly 
a windfall to the heirs and a respectable number of states explicitly exclude such damages in 
the survival action."). See also, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1~3110 (1997) rEvery cause 
of actio~ ... shall survive the death of the person entitled thereto ••• [but] damages for 
pain and suffering of such injured person shall not be allowed"); CAL av. PROC. Cooa § 
377 34 (1998) ("In an action or proceeding by a decedent's personal reprcscntntivc • • • • the 
damages recoverable • • • do not include damages for pain, suffering, or disfigurement}. 
160. See, e.g., Society '.s Secret Shame: Elder Abuse and Family l'lolence, Hearing Before .lhe. 
Senate Special Committee on Aging, 104th Cong. 27-30 (1995) (statement of uo J. Delienta, 
Esq.) (describing fear and impairment of victims and delay in litigation process ns factors deter• 
ring lawsuits). 
161. "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single cou.rogeous state 
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social nnd economic experi-
ments without risk to the rest of the country." New State Icc Co. v. Liebrruum. 28S U.S. 
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
162. CAL. \VELF. & INST. CoDE § IS600-1S6S7.3 (West Supp. 1997). 
163. See id. § IS6000)(h)(i). 
164. See id. § 15657. 
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representative or successor. 165 In addition, if a conservator has been 
previously appointed, the Act extends jurisdiction over the new civil 
action to the court that deals with probate conservatorships. 166 As a re-
sult, courts skilled in dealing with issues which often emerge with the 
elderly capacity, memory, undue influence, etc. will be the forum for 
such suits. 
Another group of innovative statutes deal specifically with financial 
abuse. Illinois' recent Financial Exploitation of the Elderly and Dis-
abled Act167 creates, in addition to criminal penalties, treble damages 
and attorney fees for a civil judgment deciding property has been con-
verted or stolen from a senior citizen by threat or deception. These 
enhanced remedies are available regardless of the outcome of the crimi-
nal case. In Maine, a statute allows an elderly, dependent individual 
who has transferred property as a result of undue influence to secure a 
court order forcing return of the property. If real estate, or 10% or 
more of such an individual's money or personal property, was taken for 
less than fair market value, and a confidential .or fiduciary relationship 
existed, a presumption is created that the elderly person has been undu-
ly influenced in making the transfer.168 Statutes like this make civil 
suits against the financial exploiter more ·feasible, and even attractive, 
for attorneys. In some states, civil remedies provide for punitive dam-
ages.t69 
Other jurisdictions have created additional means of relief. In the 
District of Columbia, a statute pennits the city's Corporation Counsel to 
secure a judicial order against the abuser, shifting the costs of conduct-
ing the investigation and providing protective services to the victims. 170 
Several states provide a civil cause of action against the perpetrator and 
shift plaintiffs attorney's fees to a losing defendant.171 
All states now have domestic violence laws designed to protect 
165. See id. § 15657.3( d). 
166. See id. § 1567.3(a). 
167. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16-1.3 (West 1995). 
168. See ME. REv. STATS. ANN., til 33, §§ 1021-1024 (West Supp. 1997). Examples of 
"confidential or fiduciary" relationships under this statute include family, accountants, brokers, 
individuals providing care and services to the elderly person, etc. See /d. § 1 022. 
169. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15657 (West Supp. 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
415.1111 (West 1998). 
170. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2510 (1997); see also WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 74.34.130(6) 
(West Supp. 1998) (respondent required to pay filing fees and attorney costs). 
171. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15657 (West Supp. 1998); OREG. REV. STAT. § 
124.100 (1998); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 74.34.130 (\Vest Supp. 1998); WJSC. STAT. ANN. § 
46.90 (West 1997). 
.. 
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victims of abuse.172 Although restricted in some jurisdictions to spouse 
or partner abuse cases, in other states these statutes provide for a judi-
cial "protection order'' for all family or household members threatened 
with physical harm. 173 Under these la\VS, the court may order the abus-
er to: (i) refrain from abusing the elder; (ii) move a\vay from, and stay 
out of, the residence shared \vith the victim; (iii) refrain from contact-
ing the victim; and (iv) provide alternative housing for the victim.174 
In addition, some domestic violence statutes protect "high risk adults'' 
(e.g., "vulnerable adults") from neglect and financial exploitation as 
well. 175 Prompt orders of an equitable nature can be used to enjoin 
other fotzns of mistreatment in the same manner as physical abuse. 116 
Often restraining orders can prevent future maltleatment. \Vhile the 
details of these statutes vary from state to state, the use of a "protec-
tion order'' can often spark police involvement and bring the case to 
the attention of adult protection and social service agencies. 
VIII. LEGAL AcnONS AGAINST PROFESSIONALS FOR F AlLURE TO 
AsSESS, TREAT, AND REPORT 
A. Background 
Mandatory reporting la\vs seek to create social and legal interven-
tions into elder mistreatment cases by (1) requiring certain profession-
als, or "any person" with "reasonable belief'' or ''suspicion," to report 
172. See, e.g., 725 ILL. CO~fP. STAT. ANN. 5/111-8 (\Vest 1989). A comprehensive discus-
sion on domestic violence cases and statutes is found in Cntherinc F. Klein & Lcslyc E 
Orloff: Providing Legal Protection for Battered JYomen: An Analysis of State Statutes & Case 
Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 801 (1993). 
173. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 2091\ §6 (\Vest Supp. 1998) f'\VhenC\·cr any 
law officer has reason to believe that a family or household member hns b«n abused or is in 
danger of being abused, the officer shall use all reasonable means to prevent further nbusc • • 
•• "); Aio. REv. STAT. § 455:035, :045, :085 (\Vest 1997) (providing judicial remedies for 
adults abused by present or former adult household members); NJ. STAT. §§ 2C-2S-28. 2C-25· 
32 (same). For discussion of the lawycr•s role in abuse and neglect, see Linda G. ~iills. On 
the Other Side of Silence: Ejfoctive LaHyering for Intimate Abuse, 81 CORNELL L REv. 1225 
(1996). 
174. See statutes cited supra note 173; see also 1\iE. REv. STAT. ANN. tit 19 § 4001 (\'lest 
1998) (temporary emergency protection orders available against family or household memb~; 
after one year, orders may be made final; defendant may be ordered to pay plaintiff's attorney 
fees). 
175. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 7434.110(2) (\Vest Supp. 1998). 
176. See, e.g .• 750 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 60/103 (\Vest 1998). 
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that infortnation to designated public authorities;177 (2) providing immu-
nity from liability for those reporting in good faith; 178 and (3) initiating 
investigative and treatment services by Adult Protective Services or 
other agencies. 179 Licensed health care and social service providers are 
likely to examine and treat injured elders and their caretakers, and are 
presumed qualified to identify the symptoms and to diagnose mistreat-
ment of the aged. The statutory inclusion of these groups as mandato-
ry reporters is legislative recognition of their access to, and relationship 
with, the elderly. Their strategic position in emergency rooms, physi-
cians' offices, clinics, social service agencies and other locales where 
the aged and their caregivers appear makes it logical to place a duty to 
report upon them. The professional nature of these relationships in-
creases the probability that an elder will confide in them if appropriate 
interviewing and screening techniques are used. 180 In addition, these 
professionals should be knowledgeable about community agencies that 
deal specifically with elder related problems. 
Mandatory reporting has always been controversial, and a long 
debate has raged regarding its propriety and efficacy. 181 The arguments 
of those opposed to mandatory reporting may be grouped under four 
headings. First, compulsory reporting is said to violate the elder's right 
to self-detennination and to constitute an ageist response to this social 
problem.182 The aged are presumed competent to manage their affairs, 
and victims of elder mistreatment have the capacity to control their 
own decision-making and seek assistance when, and if, they choose. 183 
• 
177. See infra Appendix E, columns 1-11. 
178. See infra Appendix H. 
179. See infra Appendix G. 
180. See infra notes 238-52 and accompanying text 
181. See generally U.S. General Accounting Office, Elder Abuse: Effoctiveness of Reporting 
Laws and Other Factors (Apr. 1991) and infra notes 182-203 and accompanying text. 
182. See generally Lawrence P. Faulkner, Mandating the Reporting of Suspected Cases of 
Elder Abuse: An Inappropriate, lneffictive and Ageist Response to the Abuse of Older Adults,_ 
16 FAM. L.Q. 69 (1982) (exploring ramifications of mandatory reporting laws and cautioning 
that moving too quickly to adopt such Jaws may actually worsen the situation for an already 
dependent elder); Ariella Hyman et al., Laws Mandating Reporting of Domestic Jllolence: Do 
They Promote Patient Well Being?, 273 JAMA 1781 (1995) (describing state reporting ln\VS, 
their effect and how physicians can minimize potential hann to patients); John Palincsnr & 
Deborah Crouse Cobb, The Physician's Role in Detecting and Reporting Elder Ab11se, 3 J. 
LEGAL MED. 413 (1982) (describing physician's role in addressing elder abuse and neglect tn 
infonn.al settings). 
183. See Faulkner, supra note 182, at 84-86; Katheryn D. Katz, Elder Abuse, 18 J. FAM. L. 
695, 710-11 (1980); Palincsar & Cobb, supra note 180, at 436; Vicki Gottlieb, Beyond Granny 
Bashing: Elder Abuse in the 1990's, 28 CLFARlNGHOUSE REv. 371 (1994). 
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Critics contend the aged are already disempo\vered and devalued in our 
society, and mandatory reporting perpetuates society's perception that 
they are helpless and childlike. 184 These \vriters often highlight the fact 
that for the elderly the loss of a caregiver (albeit an abusive and/or 
otherwise flawed caregiver) \Viii be perceived as leading to institutional-
ization and other negative consequences. 
A second attack leveled against mandatory reporting is that it vio-
lates the confidentiality which is inherent in a professional-patient/client 
relationship and disrupts the trust that professionals need to operate 
effectively.185 Moreover, the required reporting may publicize a situa-
tion which the elder has consciously chosen not to reveal. tS6 The atten-
dant humiliation and embarrassment may be particularly traumatic for 
the parent or spouse in such a family situation. A third common argu-
ment, building on the previous two points, posits that required reporting 
is counter-productive because it discourages elders from reporting abuse 
themselves and deters victims from seeking professional, especially 
medical, assistance.187 Fourth, opponents maintain that mandatory re-
porting \viii flood the existing social service system, prevent infortned 
decision-making distinguishing valid reports from those based on suppo-
sition and fear of legal consequences for not reporting, and ultimately 
engulf the overtaxed APS system.188 
Proponents of mandatory reporting respond 'vith equally strong 
arguments. The most important consideration, they maintain, is the 
physical safety and financial integrity of the aged person involved. 189 
184. See Faulkner, supra note 182, at 8+86; see also Hyman ct nl., supra note 182, at 1785 
(similar argument used regarding battered spouses). 
185. See, e.g., \Vanda G. Bcyant & Sondra Panico, Plty.slclans' Legal Responslbllille.s to J'lc-
tims of Domestic Violence, SS N.C. l\iED. J. 418, 420 (1994) (stating. in context of domestic 
violence, mandatory reporting will prevent relationship of trust bet\'feen doctor nnd patient); 
Robert M. Gordon & Susan Tomita, The Reporting of Elder Abuse and Neg/eel: },fandalory or 
Voluntary?, 38 CANADA'S f\.iENTAL HEALlH 1, 3 (1990). See also Jane R. ltiatla\V & Jane B. 
Mayer, Elder Abuse; Ethical and Practical Dilemmas for Social IYork, 11 HEALm & SOCIAL 
'VORK 85-94 (1986) (discussing dilemmas that result from multidisciplinruy intervention in abuse 
cases, including the decision to report, its ramifications, and the effect on the victim's right to 
self-detennination). 
186. See Palincsar & Cobb, supra note 182, at 429. 
187. See Gottlieb, supra note 183, at 371, 375; f\ietcalf, supra note SO, nt 753. 
188. See, e.g., David P. Matthews, Comment, 17ze Not-So-Golden Years: The Legal Response 
to Elder Abuse, 15 PEPP. L. REv. 653, 664 (1988). 
189. Examples of serious misbeatrnent fill congressional n:por1S nnd academic studies. A fC\v 
examples, as recounted by the 1990 Elder Abuse House Repo~ arc included here as illustrative 
of abuse encountered by older Americans in domestic situations. 
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Elder abuse is often a "family affair" in which wrongful behavior is 
In New Jersey, a 70-year-old woman was beaten by her 32-year-old son, who did 
not contribute to the household expenses and whom she suspected of abusing alcohol 
and drugs. She said she was terrified of his unprovoked attacks and that he had 
broken her glasses and once attacked her in bed while she was sleeping. A social 
worker saw her badly bruised left breast, the result of the son punching her. 
In Massachusetts, an elderly couple's alcohol-addicted son went on a rampage, break-
ing windows, ripping lights from the ceiling, strjking his father, spitting in his moth· 
er's face and threatening to kill both because they would not give him money. 
In Texas, a 61-year-old woman with Alzheimer's disease and diabetes was being 
neglected by her daughter. They lived in a house which was dirty and cluttered. 
Th.e older woman had a large, 4" deep decubitus ulcer on her buttocks and numer-
ous other decubiti. She had pulled out her feeding tube, had an elevated tempera· 
ture and her blood pressure was very lo\v. Her alcoholic sister was supposed to be 
assisting in her care but did not bathe the client or dress her wounds. A second 
daughter who lived nearby used part of the client's Social Security check to pay her 
own household expenses. The family would not permit the elderly woman to enter 
a nursing home because they then wouldn't have access to her Social Security. 
An elderly woman in Vennont was found frozen to death in her home. Court pa· 
' 
pers indicate that her younger brother, her legal guardian, was empowered to oversee 
her finances, her care and her medical attention. This 82-year-old woman had been 
living in a house without running water or toilet facilities, and had been forced to 
heat the house herself by stoking a coal stove, which required great physical stamina. 
When the police arrived, they found piles of frozen human excrement, no food and 
no heal Authorities became aware of the situation when the brother petitioned to 
complain about the tax assessment for the home, which he referred to as "nothing 
but a shell." 
An 80-year-old Texas man lived alone in a small house, his only family a stepson 
who lived nearby. The client suffered a massive stroke which left him totally inca-
pacitated. His stepson left the older man alone in the house with no food or water 
for three days and would not allow him to be hospitalized for fear of being held rc· 
sponsible for the medical bills. Without the intervention of State caseworkers, the 
man would have died. He was finally admitted to the hospital. 
An 8 I ·year-old woman from Texas suffered a broken hip when her husband '•fell" 
on her. He refused to allow her to go to a doctor for 4 days after this accident 
This 5'8" woman had gone from "obese," according to social workers' reports., to 
weighing a mere 78 pounds in 4 months. The husband refused to allow a provider 
to bathe or othenvise help his wife. When a caseworker visited the woman at 
home, she found her naked, lying on a green rubber sheet She was covered with 
urine and feces, and was unable to speak or to move without assistance. Her bus· 
band insisted she remain naked so she wouldn't dirty her clothing. \Vhen the wom· 
an was finally seen by a doctor, she was seriously malnourished. She lived for only 
three weeks after being removed from this situation. 
1990 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 2-9. 
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not revealed to outsiders. 190 The aged person may desire to "save face" 
and thus be un\villing to create or exacerbate intrafamilial conflicts. 
Moreover, victims do not self report because of dependency, fear of 
institutionalization, feelings of po,verlessness, or other deterrents.191 
Non-reporting on the part of the victim may thus be a co:erced deci-
sion, either objectively or subjectively. Moreover, although the aged 
are typically competent and may decide most issues for themselves, 
autonomous decision-making al\vays takes place \vhen the person is in a 
social context. Abused and neglected elderly people tend to be socially 
isolated, with fewer contacts and \Veaker support -systems than non-mis-
treated elders. 192 This means victims of elder abuse are unlikely to 
have the support they need to make a free choice about self-reporting. 
In most instances, the mistreatment is a crime, 193 sometimes violent 
against those who are not able to protect themselves. Many· non-elder-
ly victims wish that public authorities are not alerted, and that the 
crime would not be prosecuted. Similar arguments have been made 
with respect to whether battered \Vomen have the right to prevent pros-
ecution of their batterers.194 The prosecutor, ho,vever, represents the 
state, not just the victim; the victim's choice is not the only criterion 
used in deciding whether ,a public response is activated.195 Moreover, 
190". See, e.g., Kosberg & Nahmiash, supra note S, at 42 •. 
191. See Matthews, supra note 188, at 662 (positing that many abused elders do not come 
forward on their own and that only mandatory reporting \Viii help them); Blunt, supra note 
135, at 2S (reporting that in cases of financial exploitation. elderly victims may· not be reliable 
sources of information due to illness, unwillingness to discuss their rmances and reluctance to 
testifY against family members). 
192. See Pillemer, supra note 136; Pillemet & Finkelhor, supra note 2. nt S4 (discussing latk 
of support systems); .see also Ruth Gavison. Feminism and the Publlc/Prh·ate Dlstlncllon, 4S 
STAN. L. REv .. 1, 35-38 (1992) (strung that the inherent private nature, ,of family relations leads 
to presumption that a family should be free from external interference); Elizabeth 1-1. Schneider, 
11re Violence of ,Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REv. 973. 974 (1991) (specifically addressing battered 
women and recognizing the "dark and violent side of privacy"). "Police traditionally managed 
violence in the home, very differently from violence on the street. They tried to mediate do-
mestic "disputes" • • • [t]hc message was that assaults in the home \\·ere permissible; victims 
were not afforded adequate protection and assailants \\~ere not subject to consequences." 
Howard Holtz & Kathleen Furniss, The HealJh Care Provider's Role in Domestic J'lolence, 8 
TRENDs IN HEALTH CARE, L. & Ennes No.2, 47, SO (1993). 
193. See statutes collected in infra Appendices A & D. 
194. See generally Donna R. l\1ooney & 1\iichael Rodriguez, 1\iD, Cal!fomltz Heallhcare· 
Workers and Mandatory Reporting of Intimate Jliolence, 7 liASTINGS \VO~fEN•s W. 85 (1996) 
(arguing mandatory reporting and public decision-making abo,ut criminnl enforcemen-t removes: 
autonomy from women and may v.·orsen abuse in many situations). 
195. Many victims of elder abuse arc spouses or p3l1ners, so the categories often overlap. 
See, e.g., Metcalf, supra note SO, at 775; (1986) (estimating 20~~ of elder abuse otcurs in mar-
ried couples); FaulknerlJ supra note 182, at 86. 
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often services may be offered to victims without unnecessary intrusion 
into their lives. In many states, aged persons may refuse consent to an 
investigation by APS. 196 Public control of such investigation may be 
reasserted if an emergency exists or there is reasonable cause to believe 
the aged person refusing consent is incapacitated. 197 Here, as in many 
legal issues concerning the elderly, societal values of personal autono-
my and protection of the individual exist in uneasy tension. 
Further, while there has been a long tradition of safeguarding the 
confidentiality of infonnation gathered in the professional-client rela-
tionship, exceptions have always been made when the public interest 
outweighs the private interest. 198 There is no realistic possibility of 
liability where infonnation is disclosed by a professional pursuant to 
court order199 or legislative command. Every state bas a statute that 
provides some type of immunity for rep,orters of elder mistreatment. 
The form of these statutes varies. The majority provide immunity from 
liability if the report is made in "good faith,"200 while others protect the 
professional unless he acted ''maliciously;" in "bad faith,'' or knew the 
report was false.201 Such immunity is recognized even where the report 
196. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.24.017(d) (Michie 1996) (requiring consent of alleged 
victim or court order to investigate); UTAH Cone ANN. § 62A·3-304(1). (1997) (same); WISC. 
STAT. ANN. § 46.90(g) (1997); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 209.030(6) (Michie 1998), 
197. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 47.24.016 (Michie 1996). 
198. See, _e.g., StQrch v. Silvennan, 186 Cat App. 3d 671 (1986) (absolute immunity granted 
mandatocy reporter under California child abuse statute); Hope v. Landau, 486 N.E. 2d 89, 91· 
92 (Mass. 1985) (holding in the context of child abuse that a writer or a report required by 
statute is immune from liability regardless of correctness of beliet). See generally Robert F. 
Danelen, Statutory Immunily Under the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act: From First 
Impression to Present Day, 12 J. Juv .. L. 16 (1991) (discussing absolute immunity for mandato-
ry reporters under the CaJifo_mia Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act); Dorothy Ann Gil· 
bert, The Ethics of Mandatory Elder Abuse Reporting Statutes, 8 ADV. NURS. SCI. St (1986) 
(discussing mandatory reporting of elder abuse by nurses and immunity from liability ·fr reports 
are made in good faith)._ 
199. See, e.g., Arnett v. Baskous, 856 P_2d 790, 791 (Alaska 1993) (holding physician not 
liable for breach of patient -confidence for releasing a patient's medical records pursuant to n 
court order); Bryson v. Tillinghast, 749 P~2d I 10, 113 (Okla .. 1988) (holding a doctor's disclo-
sure of patient infonnation leading to conviction did not violate the physician-patient privilege 
and benefited the public at large). 
200. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT .. §' 47.24.120(a) (M'ichie 1996) ("A person who in go-od faith 
makes a report under AS 47.24.010, regardless of whether the person is required to do so, Is 
immune from civil or criminal liability that might othenvise be incurred or imposed for making 
the report"). 
201. See, e.g., GA. CoDE ANN.. § 30-5-4 (1997) ("[A]nyone who makes a report ••• shnU 
be immune from any civil or criminal liability ... unless such person acted in bad faith or 
with malicious purpose~"); IDAHO CODE § 39-5303 (Michie Supp. 1997) (same);- MONT. CODE 
. . 
ANN. § 52-3-814 (1997) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § .lOSA-102 (1997) (same). 
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turns out to be incorrect.202 Moreover, since patients \viii be infonned 
that the report to authorities is statutorily required, disclosure is unlike-
ly to reduce trust in the relationship, and in fact may give the client 
more confidence in the professional \Vho cares enough to attempt to 
protect him or her. Nor is it likely that elders \'lill not seek medical or 
other help when they need it, given the exigent nature of such needs. 
Despite considerable debate in the professional literature, no consen-
sus has emerged regarding the wisdom or the efficacy of mandatory 
reporting.203 Existing studies provide no clear ans\ver. The lack of 
rigorous control of variables in studies that have been conducted, to-
gether with inconsistent definitions in the various states, makes it un-
likely any conclusion to this debate \Viii emerge in the foreseeable 
future. More significantly, however, legislatures in forty-t\vo states and 
the District of Columbia204 have manifestly decided this question by 
enacting mandatory reporting laws. These la\VS represent the state's 
assessment of the gravity of the problem and the pivotal role profes-
sionals play in case finding. Non-reporting and non-enforcement flouts 
legislative choice, creating discretionary situations such statutes are 
meant to obviate. The near unanimity in favor of mandatory reporting 
requirements also reflects the relative isolation of at-risk elders. Many 
aged adults have few social engagements and emerge from their homes 
infrequently or not at all. 
There is much evidence of failure to comply \Vith the mandatory 
reporting statutes. In 1991 the House of Representatives Subcommittee 
on Health and Long-Tet1n Care evaluated questionnaires returned by all 
state agencies to Congress to detennine the extent of underreporting. 
The subcommittee found that the states \vere unanimous in responding 
that a significant number of elder-abuse cases are never reported.205 
Doctors are the most frequently named professional group \Vith a 
202. See, e.g., Zamstein v. Marvasti, 692 A2d 781 (Conn. 1997) (no duty on part of manda-
tory reporters to accused abuser, because potential liability '"·ould discouroge rcJWrtinS); 
Simonson v. Swenson~ 177 N.\V. 831, 832 (Neb. 1920) (physician not liable to patient for 
disclosing a contagious disease when the physician acts in good faith, even if mistaken diagno-
sis made). 
203. See, e.g., Karen I. Fredriksen, Adult Protecth·e Services: Changes Hilh the lntroducJ/on 
of Mandatory Reporting, 1 J. ELDER ABUSE & NEGLECf 59-70 (1989) (calling for more re-
search on effectiveness of mandatory reporting in elder abuse). 
204. See generally infra Appendix E (cataloging mandatory reporters and penalty for non-
compliance). 
205. See Elder Abuse: What Can be Done? Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Human Servic-
es of the House Select Cornrn. on Aging. 102d Cong. 46 (1991); .see also supra notes 142-43 
and accompanying text 
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duty to report, 206 but evidence indicates substantial non-compliance. An 
Alabama study, conducted eleven years after the passage of that state's 
mandatory reporting law, reported 60% of doctors believed an experi-
enced physician could accurately diagnose cases of elder abuse. How-
ever, the study also showed that 77% expressed doubt about the defini-
tion of abuse; over one-half reported they were not sure that Alabama 
had procedures for dealing with abuse, and 60% were unc_ertain of the 
procedure for reporting abuse cases. Many doctors reported they were 
deterred from reporting by the necessity of court appearances, by fear 
. . 
of arousing the anger of the abuser, and by concern about loss of con-
fidentiality.207 Another study found the overwhelming majority (84%) 
of physicians in North Carolina and Michigan were uninfonned about 
the existence of their states' mandatory reporting laws.208 In a more 
recent study in Michigan, of I 7,238 cases of possible elder abuse re-
ported to authorities during 1989-93, physicians reports were only 2% 
of the total. Nor are doctors more accurate in their diagnos_es. Com-
parison of substantiation rates showed no significant differences between 
physician reports and other professional reporting sources.209 Many 
victims are treated at hospital emergency departments, but physicians 
are often unsure even about the mechanisms for reporting.210 
Numerous other observers confirm that elder abuse laws have had 
little impact on physicians' failures to report.211 Studies regarding the 
mistreatment of the aging rank physicians as the professionals most in 
need of training on elder abuse.212 Under federal law, local area Agen-
cies on Aging must identify public and private entities in their geo-
206. See infra Appendix E, col. 2. 
207. See R. Stephen Daniels et al., Physicians' Mandatory Reporting of Elder Abuse, 29 
GERONTOLOGIST 321 (1989). 
208. See James G. o•anen, Elder Abuse and the Primary Care-Physician~ MED. TIMES, Dec. 
1986, at 60·64; Elder Abuse: Ba"iers to ldent!fication, and Intervention (paper presented at the 
1985 Annual Meeting of Gerontological Society of America). 
209. See .Donie_ E. Rosenblatt et al., Reporting Mistreatment of Older Adults: The Role of 
Physicians, J. AMER. GERIATRICS SOCJEI'Y Jan. 1996, at 65-70. 
210. See C.L. Clark-Daniels et al., Abuse and Neg/eel of the Elderly: Are Emergency Depart· 
men.l Personnel Aware of Mandatory Reporting Laws?, 19 ANN. EMERG. MED. 970-77 (1990). 
211. See generally Mark Lachs, Preaching to the Unconverted: Educating Physicians About 
Elder Abuse, 7 J. ELDER ABUSE & NEGLECT 1 (1995) (listing possible reasons why physicians 
fail to report); C. Cochran & S. Petrone, Elder Abuse: The Physician's Role In Identlflcatlon 
and Treatment, 111 ILL. MED. J. 241-46 (1987) (suggesting elder victims of domestic violence 
tend to be overlooked by physicians). 
212. See B.E. Blakely et al.~ Improving the Responses of Physicians to Elder Abuse and 
Neglect: Contributions of a Model Program, 19 J. GERONTOLOGICAL SOC. WORK 35, 37 
(1993). 
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graphic areas which are engaged in the prevention, identification and 
treatment of elder abuse and neglect.213 \Vorkers in these agencies 
initiate and maintain face-to-face contacts \Vith seniors to assess cases 
and advocate on their behalf. A national survey of these direct practice ~ 
workers examined their perceptions of the usefulness of fourteen occu-
pational groups in the discovery and treatment of elder mistreatment. 
Generally, doctors were rated bet\veen "not very helpful" and "no help 
at all" in the discovery of cases, and bet\veen "some\vhat helpful" and 
"not very helpful in treatment"214 Physicians, in fact, \vere ranked near 
the bottom of the list of occupations in discovery and treatment. 
It is unlikely that other professionals \Vith a statutory duty to report 
are complying at a dramatically higher rate than physicians. In the 
same survey of fourteen occupations by direct service \Yorkers, not one 
group achieved even a rating of "some\vhat helpful" in the discovery or 
treatment of cases. The groups rated included visiting nurses, hospital 
social workers, mental health \Vorkers, nursing home personnel, and 
many others.215 Recent testimony before the Senate's Special Commit-
tee on Aging highlights the problem. 
I took an informal poll this morning of about I 0 emergency 
department staff at Maine Medical Center, \vhich sees about 
45,000 patients a year, 10,000 of whom are pediatric. So in a 
35,000 adult population, you can imagine a good many of those 
are dependent adults. I asked the staft in the last year, h0\'1 
many adult protective DHS referrals they made, and the an-
s\vers were from zero to one each. And I think that some of 
the ones who said "one" were probably trying to please me and 
may have been stretching back more than a year.216 
A common fear is that reporting would be a breach of the 
professional's duty of confidentiality for infonnation gathered in the 
course of a professional relationship. This legally enforceable duty is 
of ancient origin217 and may indeed provide a cause of action for its 
213. See Older Americans Act of 196S, Pub. L. No. 89-73. 79 Stat. 218 (codified as amend-
ed in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
214. B.E. Blakely & Ronald Dolon, The Relalr:e Contrlbullons of Occupation Groups in the 
Discovery and Treatment of Elder Abuse and Neglect, 11 J. GERONIOLOOICAL Soc. \VORK. 
183" 189-94 (1991 ). 
215. See id. 
216. HEARING BEFORE nm SENATE SPE.CIAL CO~U.f. ON AGING, 104th Cons., 1st Sess., 39 
(Portland, Maine, April 11, 1995) (statement of Emmy Hunt, Head Nurse, Emersency Depart-
ment, Maine Medical Center). 
217. The Hippocratic Oath provides, in part: "\Vhatsoever things I see or hear concerning the 
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breach in some circumstances.218 There is no possibility of liability, 
however, when reporting is in compliance with statutory command. 
The reporting laws represent a decision that public knowledge and 
intervention is of higher social value than confidentiality in these cir-
cumstances.219 In d·iscussing this duty in an analogous child abuse re-
porting case, a Missouri appellate court noted: 
[W]hen the cost of imposing this duty and the economic burden 
upon the actor are balanced against the magnitude of prevent-
able injury suffered, the outcome overwhelmingly weighs in 
favor of imposing a duty . . . . The burden imposed on an 
individual in fulfilling this duty is greatly outweighed by the 
potential or actual harm suffered as a result of failure to fulfill 
this duty. 220 
The statutory immunity clauses for mandatory reporters of elder abuse 
make it abundantly clear that disclosure outweighs confidentiality in 
such circumstances, 221 and case law is uniform ·in upholding this legisla-
tive choice.222 Some states explicitly abrogate any claim of professional 
life of men, in my attendance on the sick or even apart therefrom, which ought not to be 
noised abroad, I will keep silence thereon, counting such things to be as sacred secrets/' 1 S 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, A HISTORY OF MEDIC~ 199 (14th ed. 1959). Today, the Amerl· 
can Medical Association's Privileges of Medical Ethics provides: 
Confidentiality. The information disclosed to a physician during the course of the 
relationship between physician and patient is confidential to the greatest possible 
degree. The patient should feel free to make a full disclosure of infonnation to the 
physician in ·order that the physician may most effectively provide needed services. 
The patient should be able to make this disclosure with the knowledge that the phy· 
sician will respect the confidential nature of the communication. The physician 
should not reveal confidential communications or infonnation withou.t the express 
consent of the patient, unless required to do so by law. 
218. See, e.g .• Home v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824 (Ala. 1973) (finding disclosure of m'cdlcal 
infonnation to be breach of implied contract); Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Or., 696 
P .2d 527 (Ore. 1985) (canvassing various theories explaining origin of duty to keep medlcnl 
information confidential). See generally Almeta E. Cooper, The Physicians Dilemma: Protection 
of the Patient's Right to Privacy, 22 ST. LoUIS U. LJ. 397, 412-19 (1978). 
219. See generally Ralph Slovenko, Child Abuse and the Role of the Physician In the Proof 
of a Case, 11 J. PSYCmATRY & LAw 477, 480-81 (1989) (discussing social value of reporting 
in instances of child abuse); Hope v. Landau, 486 N.E.2d 89 (Mass. 1985) (giving weJght to 
policy). 
220. Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302, 310 (Mo. Ct App. 1995). 
221. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.1036 (West 1998) ("Any person who participates In 
making a report under § 415 .. 1034 or participates in a judicial proceeding resulting therefrom is 
presumed to be acting in good faith and, unless lack of good faith is shown by clear wtd 
convincing evidence, is immune from any liability, civil or criminal, that otherwise might be 
incurred or imposed • . . ."). 
222. See, e.g., Arnett v~ Baskous, 856 P .2d 790, 790 (Alaska 1993) (holding that a physician 
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privilege. 223 
B. Criminal Liability 
Failure to report elder mistreatment to public authorities is typically 
a criminal offense.224 Although education and voluntacy compliance 
might be the preferred methods for encouraging professionals and oth-
ers to report, a majority of states make such an omission a misdemean-
or.225 The use of criminal penalties is obviously designed to provide a 
deterrent to~ and punishment for, noncompliance. Often, though, to 
produce criminal liability the failure to report must be '\villful,"226 
''knowing,"227 or a similarly elevated standard. 
Although reporting of suspicious cases is thus statutorily required, 
criminal enforcement of these reporting laws is typically nonexistent. 
Few actual cases of prosecution against professionals can be found. A 
computer search of published court decisions in all fifty states bet\veen 
cannot be held civilly liable for releasing the medical records of a patient, pursunnt to a valid 
court order, for use in his criminal trial for sexual abuse of a child); Bryson v. nJJingbast, 
749 P .2d 110, 113 (Okla. 1988} (finding that there was no common law or ethical basis to 
hold a doctor civilly liable for furnishing information to police thllt ultimately led to his pa· 
tient's arrest and conviction for rape, and that the doctor-patient privilege does not extend ~­
yond trial testimony). 
223. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.109 (\Vest 1998): 
The privileged quality of communication bem·een ~ • • any professional person and 
his patient or client, and any other privileged communication • • • , as such commu· 
nication relates to both the competency of the witness and to the exclusion of confi-
dential communications~ does not apply to any situation involving kno\\n or suspected 
adult abuse, neglect, or exploitation and does not constitute a ground for failure to 
report as required by § 415.103, for failure to cooperate with the department in its 
activities . • • , or for failure to give evidence in any judicial proceeding relating to 
abuse, neglect, or exploitation of an aged person or disabled adull 
224. See infra note 225. 
225. See infra Appendix C, coJ. 12; see also ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-4S4(J) (\'lest 
1997) ("A person who violates any provision of this section is guilty of a class 1 misdemean· 
or.); CAL. \VELF. & INST. CODE § 15634(d) (\Vest 1991) ("Any person \Vho fails to report an 
instance of elder or dependent adult abuse, as required by this article, is guilty or a misde· 
meanor .... • ). 
226. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-S-111.1(4) (Supp. 1998) ("A person \\·ho is required 
to report suspected . • • abuse, neglect, or exploitation of a disabled or elder ndutt • • .. tllld 
who willfully fails to do so, is guilty of a class B misdemennor."). See also VT. STAT ~. 
tit 33 § 6913(e) (Supp. 1998). 
227. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 38-9-10 (Michie 1992} ("Any physician or other practitioner of 
the healing arts who shall knowingly fail to make the report required by this chnptcr shall be 
guilty of a misdemeanor •••. "); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:403.2(J)(l) (\Vest 1986) rAny 
person who knowingly and willfully fails to report as provided by Subsection C, shall be fmed 
•.. or imprisoned ••• or both."); see also infra Appendix E, col. 12. 
118 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:77 
1994-1997 found only one prosecution based on a failure to report 
elder mistreatment statute, and even that case did not directly involve a 
failure to report. 228 The ratio of reported cases to all instances of mis-
treatment is impossible to calculate; however, when estimates of the 
number of reported cases are compared to prevalence studies, it is clear 
that the threat of criminal penalties has done little to ensure reporting. 
Prosecutors are rarely aware of the failure to report; therefore, lack 
of criminal enforcement is not surprising. Even when they do become 
aware, prosecutors are loathe to proceed against white collar profession-
als. Moreover, difficulties in securing evidence for these cases, te., the 
victim.'s reluctance to testify or a disability that renders testifying diffi-
cult, likewise makes criminal prosecution unlikely. 
C. Civil Liability 
1. Introduction 
Since there have ·been few criminal .Prosecutions of mandated re-
porters, it is logical to tum to the civil law system as a more effective 
vehicle for encouraging professionals to diagnose and report elder mis-
treatment. The relationship between law and professional conduct in-
volves several intersecting subjects, -including malpractice litigatio-n, 
federal and state regulatory initiatives, and peer and institutional self-
governance. The civil law has often been the catalyst creating change 
in professional behavior.229 Physicians surveyed in the famous Harvard 
study-on iatrogenic medical injuries in New York felt that the threat of 
civil litigation was efficacious in maintaining standards of care.-230 Both 
malpractice suits and licensure sanctions may be more effective than 
criminal prosecutions in enforcing reporting laws. Although both are 
often inconsistently applied,231 their primary purpose is to hold provid-
228. See People v. Heitzman, 886 P.2d 1229 (Cal. 1994). A Westlaw computer search, un-
der the "All-States" database library, revealed only the Heitzman case. 
229. See, e:g., Harold L. Hirsch, New Developments in Health Care, 20 LoY. U. CHI. L.J, 
713, 713 (1989) (noting that medical negligence actions cause the modification of process_es and 
procedures, and enhance that categocy of quality assurance referred to as "risk management-
successfully reducing patient injury by controlling_ exposures to risk"). 
The power of Jaw to change behavior regarding the elderly is illustrated in the dramatic 
reduction of various practices in nursing homes. Since the Nursing Home Reform Act of 
1987, the use of physical restraints has declined by SO%; inappropriate use of anti-psychotic 
drugs has declined by 25%. See Bruce C. Vladeck, The Past, Present and Future of Nursing 
Home Quality, 215 JAMA 425 (1996) (presenting overview of statistics and articles). 
230. See HARVARD MEDICAL PRACI'ICE StuDY, PATIENTS, DocTORS AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL 
INJURY, MALPRACTICE LtnGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK, 9·1 (1990). 
231. See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman, Dr. No, Review of Medical Malpractice on Trial by 
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ers accountable for deviations from the standard of care and thus deter 
injury-producing b-ehavior~232 In principle~ malpractice cases produce an 
incentive structure designed to induce professionals to i.nvest ti'aining 
and time in injury prevention. One economist has estimated that the 
"current . . . non-trivial incidence of' injury due to negligence \Vould be 
at least 10 percent higher, were it not for the incentives for injury 
prevention created by the one in ten incidents of malpractice that result 
in a claim. "233 The possibility of civil litigation, \Vith its inherent costs 
and potential jury damage a\vards, is a threat all contemporary profes-
sionals can readily appreciate. 
The shocking prevalence of elder ,mistreatment, discuss,ed earlier, 
and the potentially lethal consequences of such behavior should alert 
professionals to the need for competent assessment of clients for possi-
ble abuse or neglect The ability to make an accurate assessment re-
quires sensitivity to the sometimes subtle indications, of abuse as \Veil 
as general knowledge of, and orientation to, the problem. Professionals 
in family service agencies, hospital emergency departments, primary 
care clinics or offices, and other institutions serving the aged must be 
able to recognize the signs and symptoms of various fonns of elder 
mistreatment and act appropriately. 
Elder abuse and elder neglect are recognized diagnoses. National 
organizations have acknowledged the need for adequate assessment. 
For example, the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Health 
Organizations, (JCAHO) is the leading accrediting organization for 
American ,health care facilities, especially hospitals.234 JCAHO stan-
Paul C. Weiler, 58 U .. CHI. L. R£V. 1499, 1500-02 (1991) (rcvic\ving PAUL C. \VEJLER, MEDI-
CAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL (1990)~ estimating that only SO,OOO patients claim compensation 
out of 400,000 injured each year in American hospitals). 
232. See generally SYLVIA A. LAW & STEVEN POLAN, PAIN &. PROFIT: THE Pouncs OF 
MALPRACTICE (1978) (analyzing relationship betv;ccn professional licensure and malpractice). 
233. Patricia M. Danzon, Ph.D., An Economic AtWiy.sls of the Afedlca/ ,A{alpracllce System. 1 
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 39, 53 (1983); see also Randall R. Bovbjerg, }.fed/cal Afalpracllce on Trial: 
Quality of Care Is the Important S/atU/ard, 49 LAw & CONm.tP. PROBS., Spring 1986. at 321. 
234. Accreditation by JCAHO is critical because most states incorporate this private accredita· 
tion into their hospital licensure standards. See, e.g .• ALAsKA STAT. § 18.20.080(a) (Michie 
1996); OHIO REv. CODE § 3727.02(a) (\Vest 1997). In addition, JCAHO accredited hospitals 
are "deemed" to meet almost all f\1edicarc certification requirements, a critical contemporary 
source of income for most hospitals. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 139Sx(c), 1395bb (\Vest 1992); 42 
C.F.R. § 488.5 (1996). 
(a) Deemed to meet Institutions accredited as hospitals by the JCAHO or AMA arc 
deemed to meet all of the Medicare conditions of participation for hospitals, except-
(I) The requirement for utilization review as specified 'in section 1861(c)(6) of 
the Act in §48230 of this chapter; 
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dards require hospital emergency departments and ambulatory care ser-
vices to have written policies and procedures for identifying possible 
victims of abuse and neglect, including the elderly.235 In addition, hos-
pitals must have specific plans for educating _professional staff about 
criteria for identifying, and procedures for treating, possible victims of 
mistreatment.236 The American Medical Association ( . · ) has also 
established guidelines for physicians which suggest elder abuse as a 
possible diagnosis in many cases.237 
The AMA recommends that every clinical setting have a protocol 
for the detection and assessment of elder mistreatment.238 "All person-
(2) The additional special staffing and medical records requirements that arc 
considered necessary for the provision of active treabnent ill psychiatric hospitals 
(s.ection 1861 (f) of the Act) and implementing regulations; and 
(3) Any requirements under section 186l(e) of the Act and implementing regu-
lations that HFC~ after consulting with JCAHO or AOA, identifies as being 
higher or more precise than the requirements for accreditation (section 
1865(a)(4) of the Act). 
' ' ' 
42 C.F.R. § 488.5 (1996). 
235. See JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTH 0RGAN1ZA110NS, COMPREHENSIVE 
ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS: THE OFFICIAL HANDBOOK (1998) (hereinafter JCAHO 
Standards]. These policies and procedures address the following issues: 
PE 1.8 Possible victims of abuse are identified using criteria developed by the hos· 
pitals. · 
Intent of PE.l.8 • • • The hospital has objective criteria for identifying and 
assessing possible victims of abuse and neglect, and they are used throughout the 
organization. Staff are to be trained in the use of these criteria. 
The criteria focus on observable evidence and not on allegation alone. They 
address at least the following situations: 
a. Physical assault; 
b. Rape or other sexual molestation; 
c. Domestic abuse; and 
d. Abuse or neglect of elders and children. 
When used appropriately by qualified staff' mambers, the criteria prevent any action 
or question that could create false memories of abuse in the individual being us· 
sessed. 
Staff members are able to make appropriate referrals for victims of abuse and 
neglect To help them do so, the hospital maintains a Jist of private and public 
community agencies that provide help for abuse victims. 
236. See id at HR.3. HR.3 requires that '"[t]he leaders ensure that the competence of all 
staff members is. assessed, maintained, demonstrated, and improved continually." !d. 
237. See SARA C. ARAVANJS, AMERICAN MED. AsS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND TREATMENT GUIDE• 
LINES ON ELDER ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1992) [hereinafter AMA ELDER ABUSE GUIOBLINES]. 
See also Teri Randall, AMA, Joint Commission Urge Physicians Become Pari of Soltlllon Jo 
.Family Violence Epidemic, 266 JAMA 2524 (1991). 
238. See AMA ELDER ABusE GUIDELINES, supra note 237, at 8. See also Mark S. Lochs & 
Terry Fulmer, Recognizing Elder Abuse & Neglect, 9 CLINICS IN GERIATRIC MEDICINE 66S, 
665-81 (1993) (discussing need for written protocols and better training of stafl). 
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nel who come in contact with older patients, including nurses, nursing 
assistants, social workers, and physical therapists should be familiar 
with the protocol and should be alert to the various types of mistreat-
ment and possible risk factors."239 The foitn of the protocol may vary; 
a narrative, a checklist, or many other means \Viii enable doctors, nurs-
es, and other care providers to rapidly assess the patient for elder abuse 
and neglect and to document it.240 Abusers often bring the patient to 
the health care site and could be reluctant to leave the victim alone 
with the professional. Because of this, the intervie\v and examination 
of the patient should nonnally be conducted a\vay from the caregiver or 
suspected abuser.241 The protocol should screen for specific types of 
mistreatment about which the professional has been previously educated. 
It should include direct questions to the patient dealing \vith physical, 
psychological, and financial abuse, and neglect242 Affinnative ans\vers 
should be follo\ved up to deter1nine ho\v and \vhen the mistreatment 
occurs, who perpetrates it, and the patient's attending feelings and cop-
ing mechanisms. 
Immediate efforts are required to ensure patient safety and to pre-
vent the behavior from recurring. The clinician must have infonnation 
on state reporting requirements, protective seiVices, and other communi-
ty resources. Physicians are specifically advised to educate patients 
about different fottns of abuse and neglect, the older person's right to 
be free from mistreatment, and ho\v to access local resources.243 \Vrit-
ten materials on elder abuse should be routinely provided to patients.244 
When mistreatment is detected or reasonably suspected, the professional 
must ensure the safety of the victim, and report to the appropriate state 
239. AMA EIDER ABUSE GUIDEIJNES, supra note 237, at 9. 
240. See AMA ELDER ABUSE GUIDELJNES, supra note 237, at 8. 
241. See Judy S. Bloom et al., Detecting Elder Abuse: A Guide for Pllyslclans, GERIATRICS 
June 1989, at 40, 43. 
242. The AMA Elder Abuse Guidelines suggest questions such as: 
Has anyone at home ever hurt you? 
Has anyone ever touched you without your consent? 
Has anyone ever made you do things you didn't want to do? 
Has anyone taken anything that was yours without asking? 
Has anyone ever scolded you or threatened you? 
Have you ever signed any documents that you didn't understand? 
Are you afiaid of anyone at home? 
Are you alone a lot? 
Has anyone ever failed to help you take care of yourself ·when you needed help? 
AMA ELDER ABUSE GUIDELINES, supra note 233, at 9. 
243. See id. 
244. See id. 
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agency in accordance with laws that govern elder abuse and neglect.245 
If personnel are not trained, proper questions not asked and investi-
gations not undertaken, cases will be undiagnosed and undetected. 
Lack of detection may result in additional injury because elder abuse, 
like spouse and child abuse, often follows cyclical patterns, with the 
victim being mistreated again often more severely.246 "Mistreatment is 
likely to escalate in frequency and severity over time . . . . The long-
tertn trajectory of abuse is such that if intervention is not initiated after 
abuse is first observed in a clinic or examining room, the chances are 
good that it will continue."247 Physicians are cautioned by the AMA 
that if they treat abused elders and do not report suspected mistreat-
ment, they may be civilly or even criminally liable.248 Numerous pro-
tocols and other tools for assessing mistreatment reflecting professional 
standards are also available to nurses, 249 social workers and caregiv-
ers,250 health care workers,251 and law enforcement professionals.252 
Where questioning, examination, or other infonnation provides the 
basis for reasonable suspicion or belief that mistreatment has occurred, 
follow-up is required by the professional.253 Thorough, well-document-
ed records are essential.254 The verbal statements of the patient, his 
245. See id at 9, 23. 
246. See COUNCIL ON SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MED. AsS'N., Elder Abuse and Ne• 
glee/, 251 JAMA 966-71 (1987); H. O'MALLEY ET AL., ELDER ABUSE IN MASSACHUSE'J*fS: A 
SURVEY OF PROFESSIONALS AND PARAPROFESSIONALS (1979) {Legal Research and Services for 
the Elderly, Boston, Mass.) (estimating 70% of reported cases involved repeated instances of 
abuse). 
247. Lorin A. Baumhover & S. Colleen Beall, Prognosis: Elder Mistreatment In Health Care 
Settings, in ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND ExPLOITATION OF OLDER PERSONS: STRATEGIES FOR AS· 
SESSMENT AND INTERVENTION 241, 248 (Lorin A. Baumhover & S. Colleen Beall cds., 1996) 
[hereinafter Baumhover & Beall]. 
248. See AMA ELDER ABUSE GUIDELINES, supra note 237, at 20. 
249. See, e.g., Sue Haviland & James O'Brien, Physical Abuse and Neglect of the Elderly: 
Assessment and Intervention, ORTHOPAEDIC NURS. July-Aug. 1989, at 11; Jeanne Floyd, Collect· 
ing Data on Abuse of the Elderly, J. OF GERONTOL. NURS., Dec. 1984, at 11. 
250. See, e.g., MARY JOY QUINN & SUSAN K. TOMITA, ELDER ABUSE AND NEGLECT: 
CAUSES, DIAGNOSIS AND INTERVENTION STRATEGIES (1986). 
251. See, e.g., TERRY T. FULMER & TERRANCE A. O'MALLEY, INADEQUATE CARE OF TilE 
ELDERLY: A HEALTII CARE PERSPECTIVE ON ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1987); l-1. Ramsey· 
Klawsnik, Recognizing and Responding to Elder Mistreatment, 12 PRIDE INST. J. OF LoNG 
TERM HOME CARE, No. 3, 12-20 (1995). 
252. See, e.g., ROGER NASH, ILL. DEP'T OF AGING, ELDER ABUSE: INFORMATION FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS (1986). 
253. See AMA ELDER ABUSE GUIDELINES, supra note 237, at 13-14 (detailing recommcndn· 
tions for intervention and case management). 
254. The AMA Guidelines, for example, recommend the following be documented: 
Chief complaint and description of the abusive event or neglectful situation, using the 
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affect, etc. must be recorded. In addition to complete \vritten records, 
photographs and other imaging studies are particularly valuable.255 
Time gaps and subsequent changes should be avoided and nonnal pro-
cedures follo\ved. This documentation provides protection for both 
professional and client, and may be used in subsequent legal proceed-
ings. For records to be admissible in court, they must have been con-
temporaneously made during the "regular course of business" in accor-
dance \vith routinely follo\ved procedures, properly stored and se-
cured.256 Contemporaneous medical records may be used at trial to 
prove the physical condition of the elderly patient at the time of treat-
ment.257 
The required response may vary depending on \Vhether the patient 
resides at home or in an institution. In cases of abuse or neglect in 
the community, the professional should be a\vare of the variety of ser-
vices available, including, for example, respite care, visiting nurses, and 
social \Vork evaluations. In institutional settings~ state Ja,vs typically 
patient's own words whenever possible rather than the physician's assessment 
Complete medical history. 
Relevant social history. 
A detailed description of injuries, including type, number, size, location, stages ,or 
healing, color, resolution, possible causes, and explanations given. \'/here applicable, 
the location and nature of the injuries should be recorded on a 'body chart or dra\V· 
• In g. 
An opinion on whether the injuries \\·ere adequately explained. 
Results of all pertinent laboratoey and other diagnostic proced.ures. 
Color photographs and imaging studies, if applicable. 
If the police are called, the name of the investigating officer nnd any nctions taken. 
AMA. ELDER ABUSE GUIDELINES, supra note 237, at 18. 
'255. The AMA Guidelines suggest: 
\Vhen possible, take photographs before medical beatment is given. 
Use color film, along with a color standard. 
Photograph from different angles, full body and close-up. 
Hold a coin, ruler, or ,other object to illustrate the size of nn injury. 
Include the patient's face in at least one picture. 
Take at least two pictures of every major trauma area. 
Mark photographs precisely and promptly with the patient's name, location of injury,, 
date, time of day, and names of the photographer and others pn:senL 
Id at 19. 
256. FED. R. Evio. 803(6), Hearsay Exceptions • •• Records of Regularly Conducted A.clivl-
ties. See also In re Estate of Poulos, 229 N.\V .2d 721, 727 (I0\\"3 1975) \\Ve have long held 
that medical and hospital records are admissible, upon proper foundation, as an exception to the 
hearsay rule.1; Hytha v. Schwendeman, 320 N .. E.2d 312. 316 (Ohio CL App. 1974) 
("[M]edical diagnosis, made by a qualified physician and contained in nn othen'tisc duly au· 
thenticated record, is admissible .••• "). 
257. See, e.g., United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54, 60-66 (7th Cir. 1911) (hospital records 
used to prove "appearance, conduct and reactions" of ,patient on arrival at hospital). 
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mandate that admissions to residential facilities be made by a physician 
and, after the admission, patients must be under the supervision of 
specified medical or nursing personnel.258 As a result, instances of mis-
treatment in these institutions should be identified, treated, and reported. 
State laws often specifically provide for reporting of elder mistreatment 
in long-tertn care facilities. 259 
2. Malpractice Liability 
Malpractice is legal fault, a breach of the standard of care in the 
profession.260 It involves unreasonable risk of hann to others, measured 
by the utility of the behavior compared to the probability and gravity 
of the hann it presents.261 Professionals who fail to diagnose, treat, and 
report reasonably identifiable cases of elder maltreatment should be 
civilly liable if the failure subsequently leads to further damage.262 
Plaintiffs in such cases might be the elderly victim who has escaped 
from an abusive situation, a relative acting as "next friend," a guardian, 
or a public agency. 
Civil actions have a number of important advantages over criminal 
enforcement of mandatory reporting laws, which is why malpractice is 
a valuable avenue for curing this epidemic. First, previously noted, 
criminal prosecutions are virtually nonexistent. 263 Private civil actions 
.. 
are under the control of the individual and not subject to prosecutorial 
discretion. Second, a liability detennination provides the opportunity to 
compensate a victim for injury suffered as the result of the unreported 
abuse, while providing a financial deterrent to noncompliance with 
applicable reporting statutes in other cases. Third, the lower standard 
258. See, e.g., \VIS. STAT. § 50.04(2m) (West 1994 & Supp. 1996) ("No nursing home may 
admit any patient until a physician has completed a plan of care for the patient and the patient 
is assessed or the patient is exempt .... "}; TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-804(29) (West 1996) 
("The nursing home must have an agreement with a physician and a hospital that will care for 
a patient who does not have a private physician or hospital of choice."). 
259. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § S-28-203(b)(2} (Michie 1997) ("A report for endangered 
adults residing in long-term care facilities shall be made immediately to the local Ja\V enforce· 
ment agency in which the facility is located, and to the Office of Long-Tenn Care of the 
Division of Economic and Medical Services of the Department of Human Services pursuant to 
regulations of that office."); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.5093(2)(i) (Michie 1997) (Reports of abuse 
are mandated from "[a]ny person who maintains or is employed by a facility or establishment 
that provides care for older persons."). 
260. See, e.g., Bardessono v. Michels, 478 P .2d 480, 484 (Cal. 1970}. 
261. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965}. 
262. See, e.g., Landeros v. Flood, SSt P .2d 389 (Cal. 1976) (see discussion infra notes 354· 
65 and accompanying text). 
263. See supra note 228 and accompanying text 
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of proof and wider discovery possibilities in civil litigation like\vise 
make it a more attractive path than criminal prosecution. To succeed 
in such a suit, the plaintiff must establish the elements of malpractice 
and counter possible defenses. Each of these \viii be d'iscussed individ-
ually. 
:a. Duty 
The plaintiff in a negligence action must prove that the defendant 
owed him a duty to exercise due care to protect his interests.2M The 
existence of a duty of care is a legal question to be decided by judges, 
weighing a variety of considerations.265 These considerations include, 
in addition to foreseeability, 
the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the 
closeness of the connection benveen the defendant's conduct 
and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the 
defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future hann, the 
extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences· to the 
community of imp·osing ,a duty to exercise care \Vith res,ulting 
liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of 
insurance for the risk involved.266 
Once the plaintiff demonstrates a duty \Vas O\Ved to him, the ques-
tion becomes \vhat the appropriate standard of care is, and \Vhether the 
defendant's conduct fell belo\v that standard. In contrast to the often 
more stringent requirements for prosecution of non-reporters under 
some criminal statutes,267 individuals and: institutions are required to 
report even if they simply have a "reasonable basis" or a "reason to 
264. See KEEToN ET AI..., supra note 159, § 30, at 164; see also RFSJI\1£!-.fENT (SECO~'D) OF 
TORTS § 281 cmt c (1965) (stating that "in order for the actor to be negligent \\tith respect to 
the other, his or her conduct must create a recognizable risk of hnrm to the, other individually, 
or to a class o.f perSons of which the other is a member} .. 
265. See KEEToN ET AL., supra note 159, § 37,. at 236; see also RESTAWIENT (SECO~'D) OF 
TORTS § 328B cmt e (1965) (stating that "it is the further function or the court to determine 
whether the law imposes upon the defendant any legal duty to act. • • • -. This decision is al· 
ways for the court"). 
266. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P .2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968). 
267. Criminal liability in such an instance is often dependent on a '\\·illful" or "kno\'fing'" 
failure to report, see supra notes 226-27 and App. E, col~ 12. See also ALAsKA. STAT. § 
47.24.010(c) ("A person who •• , • because of the circumstances, should have had reasonable 
cause, to believe that a wlnerable adult suffers from abandonment, c."<ploitation. abuse, neglect, 
or self-neglect but who knowingly fails to -comply with this section is guilty or a class B miS-
demeanor."). 
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believe" that an individual has been abused or neglected.268 Protocols, 
guidelines, and other assessment tools provide specific examples of 
what constitutes reasonable cause for the professional in clinical settings 
to believe or suspect maltreatment has occurred.269 JCAHO standards 
have been used to establish liability against .hospitals using a corporate 
negligence theory.270 A hospital's breach of such standards is generally 
accepted as evidence of negligence.271 
1) Standard 
Mandated reporting is not conditioned on actual knowledge of mal-
treatment; rather the statutory test is an objective one whether a pru-
dent professional would have reasonable cause to believe mistreatment 
may be occurring if confronted with the same totality of factual cir-
cumstances as that presented to the defendant profess'ional.272 Statutes 
calling for reporting based on "suspicion" or "reasonable suspicion';273 
268. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 38..:9-S(a) (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1996) ("All physicians and 
other practitioners of the healing arts having reasonable cause to- believe that any adult protect· 
ed under the provisions of this chapter has been subjected to physical abuse, neglect or explol· 
tation shall report or cause a report to be made .• , •• ''); ALAsKA STAT. § 47.24.010(a)(10) 
(Michie 1995) ("[T]he following persons who, in the perfonnance of their professional duties, 
have reasonable cause to believe that a vulnerable adult suffers from abandonment, expJoitntion, 
abuse, neglect, or self-:neglect shall ••. report the belief to the department,s central infonnation 
and referral service for vulnerable adults •.. .''); Ariz. Rev. Stat Ann. § 46-4'4 (West 1998) 
("A physician, hospital intern or resident, surgeon, dentist, psychologist, social worker, pence 
officer or other pers.on who has responsibility for the care of an incapacitated or vulnerable 
adult and who has a reasonable basis to believe that abuse or neglect of the adult has occurred 
. • . shall immediately report or cause reports to be made • • • • "). 
269. See J. Jones et al., Emergency Department Protocol for the Diagnosis and Evaluation of 
Geriatric Abuse, 17 ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MED. 191 (1988); The Role of the Emergency 
Phy-sician in the Prevention of Domestic Jliolence, ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MED., OcL 1987; 
see also supra notes 249-52 and accompanying text 
270. See, e.g~, Darling v. Charleston Community Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (111 . .1965) 
(using JCAHO standards and state licensing regulations to establish hospital's standard of care). 
271. See id. See-also Blanton v. Moses H. Cone-Mem11 Hosp., 354 S.E.2d 455, 458 (N.C. 
1987) (holding that although the doctor was not an agent of the hospital, the hospital was 
negligent for allowing an unqualified physician to perfonn operations). 
272. See, e.g., statutes cited at supra note 268 and accompanying text See also Op. Mass. 
Att'y Gen. 139, 140 (1974-75) (construing identically worded duty to report suspected child 
abuse as not requiring documentation of abuse or neglect allegations; "reasonable cause''' stan-
dard was intended to increase, not restrict, reporting). 
273. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § S-28-203(a)(l) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995) ("Whenever 
any physician, surgeon, coroner, dentis~ osteopath, resident intern, registered nurse, hospital 
personnel,, who are eng_ag~d in the administration, examination, care, or treatment of persons, 
has reasonable cause to SU$pect that an endangered adult has been subjected to conditions or 
circumstances which would reasonably result in abus,e, he shall immediately report or cause n 
report to be made in accordance with the provisions of this section.,') (emphasis added). See 
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Iike,vise incorporate objective standards.274 The reasonable belief or 
suspicion may derive from the professional's personal exantination, 
interview or infonnation, or credible hearsay. The statutes evidence a 
purpose to have the investigating state authorities filter substantiated 
cases of mistreatment from the unsubstantiated. No state requires a 
mandatory reporter to have "clear and convincing" evidence or a simi-
larly elevated evidentiaxy standard to trigger the duty.275 Mandatory 
reporting statutes are thus consistent \Vith negligence principles that at-
tempt to ensure professional competence. 
2) Sp-ecial Relationships 
While the common la\v has been traditionally reluctant to recognize 
affirmative duties, 276 courts have often recognized a duty to act \Yhere a 
special relationship is present Such relationships have included com-
mon carriers and passengers,277 innkeepers and guests,178 shopkeepers 
and business visitors,279 jailors and prisoners,280 and a host of others. A 
common carrier, for instance, may have a duty to protect its passengers 
also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17(b)-451 (1997) (quoted Infra note 286). 
274. See BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1297 (Slh ed. 1979) ("suspicion" dcfmcd as having "a 
slight or even vague idea concerning;" "not necessarily involving kno\\·Jcdgc or belief or likeli-
hood •• • }. See also Op. Mass. Att'y Gen. 157 (197+-75) (equating "reasonable- cause" to 
known and "suspected" instances of child abuse and neglect); Op. ~1nss. Att'y Gen. 175 (1974-
75). 
275. See, e.g., \Voodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1986) (requiring government to prove denatu· 
ralization case by "clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence}. ., 
276. See generally KEEOON ET AL., supra note 159, § 56; ~i.ARSHALL S. SUAPO, ntE DtiiY 
TO ACT: TORT LAW, POWER, AND PUBUC POUCY (1977) {describing ~o duty to rescue" prin· 
ciple as based on moral vision of individualism and autonomy): Chastain v. Fuqua Indus. Inc., 
275 S.E2d 679 (Ga Ct. App. 1980) (holding that an aunt had no duty to \\11m 11-year old 
nephew of loose seat on riding mower). 
277.. See, e.~. Gilstrap v.. Amtrak, 998 F .2d SS9 (8th Cir, 1993) (reversing sununary judg-
ment for Amtrak and remanding to detcnninc if the heightened duty that the common carrier 
owed passenger was breached when a sexual assault occuned on the train). See also Lopez v~ 
Southern Cal. ·Rapid Transit DiSt, 710 P.2d 907 (Cal. 1985). 
278. See, e.g~, Coyne v. Taber Ptms. I, 53 F 3d 454 (1st Cir. 199.5) (finding that a hotel had 
a duty to protect a guest from the violent attack of strikers). See also Kveragas v. Scottish 
Inns, Inc~ 733 F .2d 409 (6th Cir. 1984). 
279. See, e.g., Figueroa v~ Evangelical Covenant Church, 879 F.2d 1427 (7th Cir~ 1989) (stat-
ing_ that there is an exception to the general rule that a party has no duty to protect a person 
from the criminal attacks of another unless there is a special relationship like th3l of n business 
invitorfmvitee). See also Maguire v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 899 P.2d 393 (Ha\V. 1995). 
280. See, e.g., Iglesias v. \Veils, 441 N.E.2d 1017 (Ind. Ct App. 1982) (holding that the 
sheriff had a duty not to release a prisoner who was too drunk to protect himself from the 
severe winter '"1'eather). See also Thomas v. \Villiams, 124 S.E.2d 409 (Ga Ct. App. 1962); 
Smith v. Miller, 40 N.\V .2d 5.97 (Iowa 1950); Fanner v. State,. 79 So. '2d 528 (Miss. 1955); 
Dunham v. Village of Canisteo, 104 N.E2d 872 (N.Y~ 1952). 
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from third parties who have threatened criminal actions.281 This duty 
can even extend to warning a passenger who seeks to leave the bus or 
train in a dangerous area.282 · 
The common thread linking these cases is that one party had spe-
cial means with which to prevent the hann to the other, or that their 
interaction surpasses what is common or usual. In J.A. W. v. Roberts, 283 
a victim of child molestation sued several defendants, including clergy, 
who knew about the continuing abuse, but did nothing to intervene. 
The court held that in order to impose an affinnative duty to act a 
special relationship must be present. It examined the following factors 
to determine if such a relationship existed: 1) the relationship between 
the abused individual and the person who could report it, 2) the rea-
sonable foreseeability of hann, and 3) public policy concems.284 An 
essential element of malpractice, a branch of negligence, is the relation-
ship between the professional and the patient/client. The duty of care 
arises out of that relationship, and is based upon both the level of ex-
pertise of the professional and the level of dependence of the pa-
tient/client. 285 
< • 
In the context of elder abuse, these factors are accentuated dramati-
cally. In enacting the mandatory reporting statutes, legislatures were 
very clear in naming specific professionals who bear a duty of care to 
report suspected cases of mistreatment to public authorities.286 Some 
281. See McPherson ~ Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 183 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1967) (driver 
heard threats against an African-American passenger who sat in the front of a bus). 
282. See Wemdli v. Greyhound Corp., 365 So .. 2d 177 (Fia Dist Ct. App. 1978) (holding 
that a bus driver had a duty to warn a passenger who wished to disembark that the area was 
known for its frequent criminal activity and its danger). 
283. 627 N.E.2d 802 (Ind. Ct App. 1994)~ 
284. See id. at 808, 813. The court found that three of the defendants had no special rein· 
tionship with the plaintiff, but additional evidence was necessary to determine if a fourth defen· 
dant had a relationship that created a "level of interaction or dependency" that would give rJsc 
to a special relationship. 
285. See id. at 809. 
286. See, e~g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 17b451 (1997): 
(a) Any physician or surgeon licens~d under the provisions of chapter 370 or 371, 
any resident physician or intern in any hospital in this state, whether or not so Ji. 
censed, any registered nurse, and nursing home administrator, nurse's aide or orderly 
in a nursing home facility, any staff person employed by a nursing home facility. 
any patient's advocate and any licensed practical nurse, medical examiner, dentis~ 
osteopath, optometrist, chiropractor, podiatrist, social worker, clergyman, police officer, 
phannicist or physical therapist, who has reasonable cause to suspect or believe that 
any elderly person has been abused, neglected, exploited or abandoned, or is in n 
condition which is the result of such abuset neglect, exploitation or ~bandonment, or 
who is in need of protective services, shall within five calendar days report such 
.. 
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states even place such a duty to report on "any person."281 The abused 
and neglected individual is often physically and emotionally po,verless 
to defend himself; his safety is in jeopardy. The professional kno\VS or 
should know that a system for reporting, investigating, and stopping 
suspected elder abuse or neglect is in place. Often -the victim 'viii not 
be aware of this system or that the abuse or n-eglect is illegal and can 
be redressed. 
The professional relationship thus gives rise to affirtnative duties, 
minimally to diagnose and report. Professionals have, or should have, 
been trained in diagnosis or treatment of abuse or neglect; established 
protocols or guidelines should be in place. A \vritten contract is un-
necessary to create such a relationship, and indeed, is not customary in 
relationships with medical, mental health, social \Vork, and other profes-
sionals. An implied contract may be created by a physical exa•nina-
tion, an interview, or some other means of therapeutic intervention.288 
The standard of care that is applied in professional negligence cases 
is derived from professional journals, protocols, and other peer discus-
sions.289 Over time, these coalesce to folnl a clinical policy, \Vhich 
becomes "standard practice."290 Today, databases are available in ,a]l 
clinical practices.291 Professionals may consult articles and proto~cols on 
elder mistreatment :from countless sources. Computerized research al-
lows access to case reports, books, articles, and other infonnation. The 
standard of care derived from these sources provides guidance to judge 
or jury on ho\v a reasonable professional \Vould respond to the individ-
ual facts presented.- Of course,- such material may also be used defen-
sively by a professional-defendant to demonstrate confonnity to accept-
infonnation or cause a report to be made • • • • 
Id. See also infra Appendix E (listing reporting statutes and mandatory reporters in -each 
state). 
287. See, e.g., FIA STAT. ch. 415.1034 {\Vest 1996) \(a) Any person, .~ •• \•;ho knoY.-s, or 
has, reasonable cause, to suspect, that a disabled adult or an elderly person has been or is being 
abused, neglected, or exploited shall immediately report such kno\vledgc or suspicion • • • .}. 
288. See, e.g .. , Daly v. United States, 946 F.2d 1467, 1470 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding radiolo-. 
gist liable for non!"(fisclosure of abnonnalitics in chest x-ray disco,.·cred in pre-crnployment phys-
ical); Green v. \Valker, 910 F.2d 291, 296 (5th Cir. 199,0) (fmding doctor had duty to disclose 
findings emerging from workplace examination); \Vcaver v. Universlty of ~iich. Bd. or Regents, 
506 N.\V .2d 264, 267 (Mich. Ct App. 1993) (unplying contractwil obligation from medical ad-
vice given by phone to patient if patient specifically seeking such ndvicc). 
289. See generally David Eddy, Clinical Policies and lhe Quail/)' of Clinical Pracllce, 301 
NEW. ENG., J. MED. 343 (1982). 
290. See id. 
291. MEDL~ for example, which has- more than six million references and articles from 
thousands of journals. 
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ed practice. Professionals are also bound by a fiduciary duty to their 
clients/patients, which is one of the defining characteristics of their 
work. The duty is recognized by the law92 and by the professionals' 
codes of ethics, which safeguard the integrity of the practice and care 
and safety of the client/patient.293 
3) Expert Witness 
The plaintiff will typically use a qualified expert witness to estab-
lish the standard of care and to provide an opinion that the defendant's 
behavior- whether of omission or commission breached the standard. 
Expert witnesses may testify based on their '"knowledge, skill, experi-
ence, training or education"z94 and render opinions on whether the de-
fendant-professional, confronted with the injuries or facts presented, 
should have diagnosed the mistreatment and rep-orted the incident to the 
appropriate public authorities. If assessment and diagnosis were reason-
ably possible, the at-risk elder should have received the intervention 
that the reporting statutes are designed to trigger, thus preventing future 
hann. Protocols and guidelines by professional authorities295 provide a 
particularized standard that an expert may use as a measuring device 
against which to test the defendant's conduct. Experts may also base 
opinions on their own practice and experience, 296 and research litera-
ture.297 
4) States with Explicit Statutory Liability 
Only four states explicitly set out civil liability for non-reporting 
292. See, e.g., Norton v. Hamilton, 89 S.E.2d 809, 812 (Ga~ Ct. App. 19SS) (stressing that a 
physician's obligations emerge not only from contract but also from his fiduciary obligations 
and other considerations "inseparable from the nature and exercise of his calling''). 
293. See~ e.g., AMERICAN NURSES Ass'N, CODE FOR NURSES 'No. 3.1 (1985) ("The nurse's 
primary commihnent is to the health, welfare, and safety of the client.''). 
294. E.g .• FED. R. EVID. 702. 
295~ See, e.g., AMA ELDER ABUSE GUIDELINES~ supra note 237 and protocols described 
supra notes 249-52 and accompanying text 
296. See, e.g., Peiffer v. State Farm Mul Auto. Ins. Co., 940 P .2d 967,- 970 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1996) (finding in an insurance bad faith case that expert testimony, based on the expert's own 
knowledge and practice in the, insurance industry, should have been admitted); Dominguez v. 
St John's Hospital, 632 N.E.2d 16, 19 (Ill. Ct. App.) (allowing expert testimony about a possi-
ble genetic defect that caused birth defects, instead of malpractice based on the experience and 
specialized knowledge of the expert). 
297. See, e.g., Young v. Horton, 855 P .2d 502~ 504 (Mont 1993) (allowing expert testimony 
based on medical journals -on how much surgical patients remember about the risks related to 
them by their surgeons);; Capps v. Manhart, 458 N.W .2d 742, 746 (Neb. 1990) (upholding the 
use of research literature as a proper basis for expert testimony in a dental malpractice action). 
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professionals.298 The remaining mandatory reporting statutes do not 
explicitly provide a civil remedy against mandatory reporters for failure 
to report.299 Typically, these statutes include criminal penalties for 
violation.l00 The Restatement of Torts, ho\vever, provides: 
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable 
man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an adminis-
trative regulation whose purpose is found to be exclusively or 
in part 
(a) to protect a class of persons \Vhich includes 
the one whose interest is invaded, and 
(b) to protect the particular interest \Vhich is in-
vaded, and 
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of 
harm which has resulted, and 
(d) to protect that interest against the particular 
hazard from \Vhich the hann results.301 
The reporting statutes, as \Veil as protocols and guidelines, thus define 
the standard of care of professionals \vho tre<~t elderly clients/patients. 
5) Civil Use of Criminal Statutes 
The fact that the reporting statute is penal in nature does not negate 
its use in negligence litigation.302 The criminal sanction does not make 
a civil duty unnecessary; to the contrary, it provides a legislative judg-
ment that protection of the elderly is of such importance that it de-
serves the expenditure of public prosecutorial and judicial resources. 
There has long been a tradition that courts \viii create civil remedies to 
protect individuals whom the legislature sought to protect \Vhen passing 
a statute.303 Indeed, such a tradition dates back to the very develop-
ment of English common la\v.304 Professor Foy quotes Sir Ed\vard 
298. See ARK. CODE ANN. § S-28-202{b) {1\iichic 1997); IOWA CODE § 23583(10) (1998); 
MICH. Co~W. LAws § 16.411e {1997); :f\iiNN. STAT. § 626.557(7) (1997). 
299. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 415.1034 (\Vest 1997); l\.fD. CODE ANN., FMf. LAW § 14·302 
(1997}. 
300. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2512(a)(l) (1997) ("Any person required to rcp()rt under 
[the mandatory elder abuse reporting statute] who willfully fails to do so shull be guilty of a 
misdemeanor and, upon conviction, subject to a fmc not exceeding $300."); ALAsKA STAT. 
47.24.010(c) (Michie 1997). 
301. REsTA18tENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965). 
302. See KEEToN ET AL., supra note 159, § 36, at 220. 
303. See id at 222. 
304. See, e.g., Caroline Forell, The Statutory Duty Acllon In Tori: A Stalulory/Common Law 
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Coke, the famous English banister and jurist: "[E]very act of Parlia-
ment made against any injury, mischiefe [sic], or grievance doth either 
expressly, or impliedly give a remedy to the party wronged, or grieved 
,,305 
• • • • 
On the other hand, courts will not create such a cause of action if 
the statute was enacted to protect the- interests of the public, protect a 
class of persons other than the one whose interests are sought to be 
vindicated in the civil suit, or was intended to protect against other 
hazards than that from which the harm has resulted.306 A court's inves-
tigation of the legislative intent is likely to be detenninative. In ascer-
taining such intent, particularly where legislative history is ambiguous 
or nonexistent, courts will consider various factors: a law's relative 
specificity; the adequacy of existing remedies; the impact of creating a 
statutory tort action against a defendant; the significance of the legisla-
tive purpose at issue; how current law will be affected by recognizing 
new implied private torts; and the burden such causes of action will 
create for the judicial system.307 The hann suffered must be of the 
Hybrid, 23 IND. L. REv. 781 (1990) (examining the sources and tYpes of statutory duty actions 
and proposing analysis for judges to apply when presented with statutory duties); H. MUes Foy, 
III, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication and Implied Private Actions In the State and 
Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REv. SOl~ 524-32 (1986) (tracing English and American im· 
plied private actions back as far as the fifteenth century); Thomas J. Andre, Jr., The Implied 
Remedies Doctrine and the Statute of Westminster 11, 54 TUL. L. REv. 589 (1980) (tracing ori· 
gins of implied remedies doctrine in early English Common Law) .. 
305. Foy, supra note 304, at 524 (quoting EDWARD COKE, niB SECOND PART OF ntE lNSTJ· 
1lJTE OF 1liE LAWS OF ENGLAND 55 (1642) (emphasis added)). 
306. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288 (1965)! 
The court will not adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the require-
ments of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose purpose is 
found to be exclusively 
(a) to protect the interests of the state or any subdivision of it as such, or 
(b) to secure to individuals the enjoyment of rights or privileges to which they arc 
entitled only as members of the public, or 
(c) to impose upon tlle actor the perfonnance of a service which the state- or any 
subdivision of 'it undertakes to give the public, or 
(d) to protect a class of persons other than the one whose interests are invaded, or 
(e) to protect another interest than the one invaded, or 
(t) to protect against other harm than that which has resulted, or 
(g) to protect against any other haz.ards that from which the bann has resulted4 
307. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 159, § 36, at 222-29~ See also Credit Mnn· 
agers Ass'n v. Kennesaw Life & Accident Ins. Co., 809 F.2d 617, 624 (9th Cir. 1987) (ex-
plaining that courts will imply a private cause of action when statute protecting a class of 
persons exists, the remedy will further legislative intent, and private remedy will promote the 
effectiveness of statute); Lally v. Copygraphics, 413 A.2d 960, 968 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1998] SAYING GRANNY FROAI THE WOLF 133 
kind the statute was intended to prevent?08 In the absence of exclu-
sions, the statute should be assumed to include all risks that reasonably 
may be foreseen .as likely to follo\V from its violation.309 
The issue is thus whether courts should imply a civil cause of ac-
tion derived from a criminal statute which requires specified profession-
als to report reasonably suspected elder mistreatment cases to public 
authorities. In child abuse cases, courts have rendered decisions. both 
ways. In Landeros v. Flood,310 the Supreme Court of California ap-
proved both common law and statutory negligence elabns against a 
non-reporting physician. At least two federal courts have opined that 
they would imply a cause of action from state reporting statutes. In 
Ham v. Hospital of Mo"istown,311 the court noted that "[t]he reporting 
statute creates a legal obligation to report suspected brutality, neglect or 
physical or sexual abuse of children and failure to report 'can give rise 
to liability. "'312 A Kansas federal coutf13 stated that it \Vould be in-
clined to follow the reasoning in Landeros114 if a similar question \vere 
presented to it?15 In addition, the S.upreme Court of Arkansas, in First 
Commercial Trust Company v. Rank,316 found that the failure to diag~ 
nose and report suspected child abuse could create a medical malprac-
tice action?17 
A number of courts, ho\vever, have declined to recognize a civil 
1980), aff'd, 428 A.2d 1317 (NJ. 1981) (holding that v.·berc an administrative remedy is pro-
vided to an aggrieved employee, but the remedy is nol adequate to address nll damages. a 
judicial remedy must ccrexist so that the employee can proceed in either system); CPC Int'J. 
Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 514 N.E2d 116 (N.Y .. l987) {holding that there is no private cause 
of action under the Martin Act for corporate fraud because the right of n'tion is meant to 
benefit the state•s Attorney-General, not private citizens); RFSl~l£\tENT (SECO~'D) OF TORTS § 
874A cmt h (1979) ("The primary test for determining whether the courts should provide a 
tort remedy for violation of the legislative provision is whether this remedy is consistent \\ilh 
the legislative proviSion, appropriate for promoting its policy-and needed to assure its effccti,vc-
ness."). 
308. See generally Clarence 1\iorris, 17te Relation of Criminal Statures to Tort Liability, 46 
HAR.V. L. REv. 453; 473 (1933)~ 
309. See KEEToN ET Al..., supra note 159, § 36, at 227. 
310. 551 P.2d 389 (Cal. 1976), discussed infra notes 3S4-6S and accomp3nying text. 
311. 917 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Tenn. 1995) .. 
312. /d. at 537. 
313. See Doran v .. Priddy, 534 F. Supp. 30 (D. Kan. 1981). 
314. See infra notes 354-65 and accompanying tcxl 
315 .. See Doran, 534 F. Supp~ at 33 ("[Landeros] seems a well reasoned cast;- and this_ Court 
would be inclined to follow it if it were necessary."). 
316. 915 S.,V.2d 262 (Ark. 1996), modified on reh'g denied, 911 S.\V.2d 167 (Ark. 1996). 
317. See id. The Arkansas Medical l\ialpracticc Act "encompasses a cause of action for fail· 
ure to diagnose child abuse under the facts of this case." ld at 267. 
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cause of action against professionals for failing to report suspected 
child abuse.318 Some of these cases hold that such reporting laws are 
intended to protect the gen~ral public rather than a specific class of 
children.319 Most have used reasoning similar to that of a 1989 Florida 
appellate case, Fischer v. Metcalf.320 In that case, a psychiatrist was 
treating an adult because of the patient's physical and mental abuse of 
his children, and failed to report his alleged knowledge or suspicions of 
the maltreatment to state authorities. The court held that there was no 
civil liability on the part of the psychiatrist to the child-victims because 
the legislature intended the statute to protect the public, not a specific, 
limited class of victims. 
The subsequent history of [the reporting statute] ... evidences 
a legislative intent to increase the number of classes protected 
by the legislation. The young, the aged, and the infim1 all find 
shelter under the statutory provisions. It strains credulity to 
presume the legislature intended so broad a result as that a 
private right of action be available, by implication only, to 
classes which comprise half of our population.321 
318. See, e.g., lsely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138, 1145 (E.D. Mich. 1995) 
(holding that Michigan reporting statute does not create a statutory negligence action); Lctlow v. 
Evans, 857 F. Supp. 676, 678 (W.O. Mo. 1994) (holding that Missouri statute requiring school 
officials to report suspected child abuse does not create a statutory negligence action); Cechmnn 
v. Travis, 414 S.E.2d 282, 285 (Ga. CL App. 1991) (finding a doctor breached no lcgnl duty 
by failing to discover and report a case of possible child abuse); Borne Northwest v. Allen 
County Sch. Corp, 532 N.E.2d 1196, 1203 (Ind. Ct App. 1989) (holding legislature did not ln· 
tend a cause of action against school district or school personnel for failure to report suspected 
abuse of student, and the common law also did not recognize one); Kansas State Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Specialized Transp. Servs., Inc., 819 P .2d 587, 592 (Kan. 1991) (holding that statute did 
not create a statutory negligence action for psychologist's failure to report suspected child 
abuse); Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302, 312-14 (Mo. Ct App. 1995) (indicating that statuto 
did not create statutocy negligence action for psychologist's failure to report suspected chUd 
abuse); Scott v. Butcher, 906 S.W .2d 16, 20 (rex. Ct App. 1994) (at common law a non-
family member had no duty to prevent or report suspected child abuse and the court thus de· 
clined to create one). But see Kansas State Bank & Trust, 819 P.2d at 611·13 (Lockett. J., 
concurring in part) (disagreeing with majority opinion that Kansas legislature did not Intend n 
statutory negligence action). 
319. See, e.g., Doe "A" v. Special Sch. Dist, 637 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (E.D. Mo. 1986), 
alf d, 901 F .2d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 1990) (refusing to recognize a statutory negligence action 
for violation of a child abuse reporting statute because the statute created a duty owed to the 
general public, rather than to individuals); Freehauf v. School Bd. of Seminole County, 623 So. 
2d 761, 764 (Fla. Disl Ct App. 1993) (stating that the Florida child abuse reporting statute Is 
meant to protect the general public, not any individual or particular class of people and does 
not create a private cause of action). 
320. 543 So. 2d 785 (Fla. Disl Cl App. 1989). 
321. /d. at 790. 
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The Fischer court, ho\vever, failed to ask the appropriate question. 
That question is: did the Florida child abuse reporting statute create a 
legal duty on the part of the psychiatrist to report suspected child abuse 
or neglect to the specified public authority? The language of the stat-
ute, ("Any person . . . who knows, or has reasonable cause to suspect, 
that a child is an abused or neglected child shall report such kno\vledge 
or suspicion .... ")322 and the total statutory scheme indicate the an-
S\ver to that question sh-ould be yes, and there is no need for the Iegis_-
lature to explicitly create a cause of action \Vhere it creates a legal 
duty. 
When a statute provides that under certain circumstances partic-
ular acts shall or shall not be done, it may be interpreted as 
fixing a standard for all members of the community, from 
which it is negligence to deviate . . . . The fact that the legisla-
. . 
tion is usually penal in character, and carries a criminal penalty, 
\viii not prevent its use in imposing civil liability, and may 
even be a prerequisite thereto.l23 
The legislatures that have enacted these la\vs have expressed the 
intent to create a legal duty. The Fiscl1er court ackno\Vledged the 
evident legislative purpose: ''[t]hat the thrust of the legislation is to help 
those who are abused, neglected or exploited; to preserve family life, 
where possible; to deal with the impact of such abuse on siblings, fam-
ily structure, and the citizens of Florida; and to intenene, treat and 
rehabilitate to forestall further harm. ,,24. These purposes are undoubt-
edly better served if civil liability for failing to report is imposed on 
professionals in appropriate factual instances. It is \Yidely ackno\vl-
edged that there is significant underreporting of elder abuse and ne-
glect.325 Allowing private causes of· action does not th\vart legislative 
intent as is suggested in Fischer; rather, it allo\vs legislative intent to 
find its fullest expression. Using these statutes to imply a civil cause 
of action for elders against non-reporting professionals \viii help moti-
vate them to take action that facilitates the protection of victims the 
very protective purpose that motivated the legislature to create these 
statutes. 
322. FLA. STAT. ch. 415.504 (\Vest Supp. 1998). 
323. KEEToN ET AL., supra note 159, § 36, at 220. 
324. Fischer; 543 So. 2d at 789-90 {emphasis added). 
325. See supra notes 205;..16 and accompanying texl 
• 
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Mandatory reporting laws delineate socially responsible behavior for 
the protection of the aged and the vulnerable. It is difficult to envision 
such statutes as simply protecting the general public. In creating such 
a cause of action the court furthers what one writer, discussing child 
abuse reporting, described as the "almost universal assumption through-
out the English-speaking world. . . . that . . . abuse reporting laws are a 
necessary and integral part of a protective . . . abuse legislative pro-
gram."326 Accepted negligence principles thus allow the statute to es-
tablish the standard of care.327 
Public health laws mandating professionals and others to report a 
variety of medical conditions and incidents are not unusual. Typical 
statutes require such reporting in the case of communicable diseases,328 
wounds inflicted by violence,329 poisonings and industrial accidents.330 
326. Susan Maidmont, Some Legal Problems Arising Out of the Reporting of Child Abuse, 31 
LEGAL PROBS. 149, 150-51 (1979). 
327. See source cited supra note 301 and accompanying text; see also Gabel v. Hughes Air 
Corp., 350 F. Supp. 612, 617 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (Finding the Federal Aviation Act created a 
duty for the benefit of passengers on aircraft, the district court stated: "The fundamentals here 
are that a duty is imposed by law; that the complaint alleges that defendants violated that duty; 
and that the plaintiffs were injured by that violation. Those three things are, and always have 
been the essential elements of tort liability."). 
328. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. REALm LAw § 2101 (Consol. 1997) (''Every physician shall imme-
diately give notice of every case of communicable disease required by the department to be re-
ported to it, to the health officer of the local health district where such disease occurs."). 
329. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 38-1-101 (Michie 1997): 
(a) All hospitals, clinics, . . . doctors, . . . nurses, . . . or other persons called upon 
to tender aid to persons suffering from any wound or other injury inflicted by means 
of a knife, pistol, gun, or other deadly weapon, or by other means of violence, or 
suffering from the effects of poison, or suffocation, shall report the same immediately 
to the chief of police . . . . 
See also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 146.995 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994): 
(2)(a) Any person licensed, certified or registered by the state ... \Vho treats a 
patient suffering from any of the following shall report . . . 
2. Any wound other than a gunshot wound if the person has reasonable cause to be· 
lieve that the wound occurred as a result of a crime. 
3. Second-degree or 3rd-degree bums to at least 5% of the patient's body or, due to 
the inhalation of superheated air, swelling of the lamyx or a burn to the patient's 
upper respiratory tract, if the person has reasonable cause to believe that the burn 
occurred as a result of a crime. 
330. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.34 (\Vest 1996). 
Any physician having under professional care any person whom the physician be· 
lieves to be suffering from poisoning from lead, phosphorus, arsenic, brass, silica 
dust, carbon monoxide gas, wood alcohol, or mercury, or their compounds, or from 
anthrax or from compressed-air illness or any other disease contracted as a result of 
the nature of the employment of such person shall within five days mail to the de· 
partment of health a report stating the name, address, and occupation of such patient 
• • • • 
.. 
1998] SAVING GRANNY FROJ.f THE IJ'OLF 137 
These statutory duties are analogous to legislation requiring profession-
als and others to report suspected elder mistreatment in order to avoid 
future injury to the elderly victim. 
Liability may result from violation of such a statute. An illustra-
tive example is De"ick v. Ontario ComnJunity Hospita/,331 a negligence 
action based, in part, on California statutes \vhich required physicians to 
report infectious diseases to the department of health. The plaintiff; a 
patient in the defendant hospital, contracted such a disease from another 
patient, allegedly because the defendant doctors failed to report the 
condition to the local health officer as required by statute.l32 This fail-
ure to report prevented the health officer from taking appropriate mea-
sures to avoid contagion333 and therefore contributed to the plaintiff 
contracting the disease. The court held that the plaintiff could maintain 
a suit based on the disease reporting statute because a duty \Vas creat-
ed. 
It thus appears that Health and Safety Code, sections 3110 and 
3125 were enacted to protect the public against the spread of 
contagious, communicable diseases and that section 3125 does 
impose upon Hospital a duty to plaintiffs to report kno\vn in-
fectious, contagious or communicable diseases to the local, 
health officer.334 
Since liability can be imposed for the failure to make reports of this 
type, it should likewise be imposed for the failure to make a report of 
suspected elder abuse/neglect. 
b. Breach of Duty 
Whether a defendant has breached his duty is a mixed question of 
law and fact.335 The professional's failure to diagnose and/or treat 
identifiable elder abuse or neglect should constitute a breach of his 
duty, most especially \Vhen subsequent injucy or damage results. Mal-
331.. 120 Cal. Rptr. 566 (Ct App. 1975). 
332. See id.. "All physicians, nwses, .. • .. in any • • • building, • .. • or other ptnce \\·here 
any person is ill of any infectious, contagious, or communicable disease, sh3ll promptly report 
that fact to the health officer •... " CAL. HEALlH & SAFETY CODE § 3125 (\Vest 1995). 
333. See De"ick, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 569-71. See also CAL. HEALnt & SAFETY CODE § 
120175 (\Vest 1996) ("Each health officer knowing, or having reason to believe, that any case 
of . . . contagious, infectious. or communicable disease exists, • • • shall tnke such measures as 
may be necessary to prevent the spread of the disease or occurrence of ndditional cases."). 
334. De"ic~ 120 Cal. Rptr. at 570. 
335. See Kf£ION ET AL., supra note 159, § 37, at 235. 
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practice is unskillful practice, resulting in injury to the client/patient 
caused by a failure to exercise a "reasonable degree of skill, knowl-
edge, and care" under the unique factual circumstances of that case.336 
Professional competence is measured by the "standard of care." In the 
case of doctors, for example, this non-delegable duty is typically de-
scribed as: 
given the circumstances of each patient, each physician has a duty 
to use his or her knowledge and therewith treat through maximum 
reasonable medical recovery, each patient, with such reasonable 
diligence, skill, competence, and prudence as are practiced by 
minimally competent physicians in the same specialty or general 
field of practice throughout the United States .... 337 
Malpractice liability of other professionals follows these same basic 
principles. 338 
A long line of malpractice cases involves the failure of a profes-
sional, typically a physician, to reveal a foreseeable danger arising from 
the patient's condition or illness to the patient, his or her family, or to 
public authorities. Often, these cases are based on statutory duties, as 
in the elder abuse context, to report to public agencies specific diag-
nosed conditions creating danger.339 These obligations are analogous to 
the duty to report suspected elder mistreatment to public authorities in 
order to avoid future injury to the victim or third parties, and liability 
is imposed for breach. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides 
that a professional may be liable to a third person for harm resulting 
from his failure to exercise reasonable care if the "harm is suffered 
because of reliance of the other or third person upon the undertak-
ing."340 The cases tend to involve specific, identifiable third persons.341 
336. Bardessono v. Michels, 478 P .2d 480, 484 (Cal. 1970). 
337. Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 872-73 (Miss. 1985). 
338. See generally D. Eddy, Clinical Policies and the Quality of Clinical Practice, 301 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 343 (1982). 
339. See, e.g., Gammill v. United States, 727 F2d 950, 954 (lOth Cir. 1984) (physician may 
be found liable for failing to warn a patient's family, treating attendants, or other persons likely 
to be exposed to the patient of the nature of the disease and the danger of exposure); Jones v. 
Stanko, 160 N.E. 456, 463 (Ohio 1928) (wrongful death action based on Ohio statutes \Vhlch 
required physicians to report enumerated contagious diseases to public authorities); Bradshaw v. 
Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Tenn. 1993) (physician liable to non-patient for failure to \Vam 
of risk of exposure to noncontagious disease). See generally Tracy A. Bateman, Liability of 
Doctor or Other Health Practitioner to Third Party Contracting Contagious Disease from Doc-
tor's Patient, 3 A.L.R.Sth 370 (1992); 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians and Surgeons § 88 (1987). 
340. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965). 
341. See, e.g., DiMarco v. Lynch Homes-Chester County, 583 A.2d 422, 425 (Pa. 1990) 
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Another line of cases involves affinnative obligations imposed upon 
professionals by the common law to disclose even confidential infonna-
tion in order to protect third parties against hazards created by their 
patients. Kno\vn threats from a dangerous psychiatric patient is the 
prototypical case. The first successful instance of liability for failure to 
wain in this situation was Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of Ca-
lifomia.342 In Tarasoff, a psychotherapist \Vas counseling a patient \Yho 
had thre3:tened a woman \Vho \Vas readily identifiable as a fonner girl-
fiiend.343 The defendant.;..therapist took a number of affirtnative 
steps ·asking the police to detain the patient (\Yhich they briefly did) 
and initiating commitment proceedings, \Vhich \Vere later stopped.344 
Ho\vever, the defendant never \Varned the young \Voman, and she \Vas 
subsequently murdered. Her parents sued, alleging that failure to \Vam 
constituted malpractice.345 The California Supreme Court held that a 
therapist treating a mentally ill patient O\Ves a duty of reasonable care 
to warn identifiable third persons against foreseeable danger created by 
the patient's condition.346 The duty to act to protect such an endan-
gered third person emerged from the relationship bet\veen the physician 
or therapist and the patient, and \Vas breached by the failure to act.347 
(doctor liable_ to sexual partner of patient exposed to hepatitis B for fnilwc to '"-am patient to 
refrain ftom sexual relations with partner; court relied on RESii\lt::r?.tENT (SEC0!-.1>) OF TORTS § 
324A). See also Shepard v. Redford Community Hosp., 390 N.\V .2d 239. 243 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1986) (treating physicians held negligent in failing to \Vam mother of risk of transmission 
of spinal meningitis to her young son, who died of the disease). But see Knier v.. Albany 
Med. Ctr. Hosp., 500 N.Y.S2d 490, 492 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (no duty to \\-am public tlml person 
has contagious disease). 
342. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) .. 
343. See id. at 341. 
344. See id. 
345. See id • 
346. See id. at 340. 
347. See id at 343. "[I]he common law has traditionally imposed liability only if the de-
fendant bears some special relationship to the dangerous person or to the potential victim. • • • 
[T]he relationship between a therapist and his patient satisfies this requirement •••• " /d. 
See also Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F._ Supp. ISS (D. Ncb .. 1980) (holding that 
therapist-patient relationship is sufficient to impose an afrunuitivc duty to control conduct of 
patient for benefit of third persons)~ But see Boynton v. Burglnss,_ 590 So. 2d 446 (Fla. Dist 
Ct App. 1991) (rejecting Tarasoff duty to warn). 
There is a vast body of caselaw and literature on Tarasoff tmd its implications. See gen-
erally Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.\V .2d 302, 306..09 ~fo. Ct. App. 1995) (listing jurisdictions im-
posing a TarllSojf-type duty to warn or control); Estates of t.forgan v. Fnirfield Family Coun-
seling Ctr., 673 N.E.2d 1311 (Ohio 1997) (psychiatrist-outpatient relationship justifies duty to 
protect third parties); Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.\V .2d IS9 (\Vis. 1988) (upholding claim 
based on psychiatrist's failure to warn patient's family and failure to seek commitment); Tuno-
tby E. Gammon & John K. Hulston, 'Ihe Duty of Afenral Health Care Prmt'ldcn to Restrain 
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The justification for this obvious breach in confidentiality by a profes-
sional is the state's interest in protecting public safety and potential 
victims.348 The therapist need not predict such violence with absolute 
accuracy, but only needs to exercise reasonable skill and care, as de-
fined by the standard of practice in that profession.349 
The Tarasoff reasoning is applicable-to elder abuse or neglect. If a 
professional should have identified elder mistreatment, or learns of the 
abuse or neglect through treatment of the abuser perhaps in marital or 
psychological counseling a duty to act to forestall future harm akin to 
the Tarasoff principle .. is created.- In this instance, however, a mere 
warning to the victim is likely to be ineffective in preventing further 
harm for several reasons. First, the aged person, of course, typically 
already knows of the threat; what is needed is action, not a warning. 
Second, the presence of state systems for investigating reports of abuse 
or neglecf50 makes intervention relatively easy for the professional. A 
report mandated by statute simply is made to the appropriate agency.351 
Moreover, in these cases, the professional is far more likely to discover 
abuse or neglect through contact with the victim than with the abuser, 
and the relationship between a treating professional and the victim of 
abuse is far closer than that which created the affirtnative duty in 
Tarasoff. The professional usually has examined and treated the victim, 
and often will have more concrete evidence of past and ongoing harm. 
The duty, though important, is not difficult to discharge. The profes-
sional need not control the actions of the abuser nor rectify the situa-
tion. It merely requires a reasonable professional to diagnose and treat 
the victim with the means available, which includes the established 
systems for reporting abuse or neglect. 
Tarasoff and its progeny strengthen this argument for other reasons 
as well. Confidentiality is more significant in the psychotherapist-pa-
• 
tient relationship than in other contexts because the psychotherapist gets 
his or her infonnation solely from the patient. Here, there are no x-
rays or other physical diagnostic tools available, other than intimate 
conversation. If the interest in confidentiality can be outweighed in 
such a situation, surely it can be outweighed in other relationships. 
Their Patients or Warn Third Parties, 60 Mo. L. REV .. 749 (1995); Peter Lake, Revisiting 
Tarasolf, 58 ALB. L._ REv. 97 (1994). 
348. See Tarasoj£ 551 P 2d at 346-47. 
349. See Estates ofMorgan, 613 N.E.2d at 325-29. 
350. See infra Appendix G. 
351. ld 
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Moreover, damage actions, or the threat of such actions, against health 
professionals can change behavior patterns. A survey of 2,875 psycho-
therapists conducted after Tarasoff \Vas decided revealed that most be-
gan to \Vam third part.ies \Vhen a patient uttered a threat; they felt 
themselves bound. by Tarasoff even though that case technically applied 
only to California therapists~352 These professionals believed they could 
assess the dangerousness of the patient and \Vere comfortable issuing a 
waming.353 
The best kno\vn instance of liability imposed on a professional for 
failure to meet statutorily required reporting is the California Supreme 
Court's 1976 decision in Landeros v. Flood. 354 A child \Vas brought to 
a hospital with a spiral fracture of the tibia and .fibula, apparently 
caused by a nvisting force for \Vhich there \Vas no natural explana-
tion?55 The child also had bruises and abrasions over her entire body, 
and exhibited other symptoms of "battered child syndrome.":s56· The 
physician failed to diagnos.e mistreatment and failed to report the case 
to the proper authorities.357 The child \Vas returned to her parents and 
severely beaten again, suffering pennanent, physical injury.358 Subse-
quently, the child's guardian ad litem brought a malpractice action 
against the physician and the hospital.359 The California Supreme Court 
held the physician could be liable for the child's subsequent injuries.360 
The court also upheld the claim on the theory that violation of the 
California statutes requiring reporting of suspicious injuries demonstrat-
ed the physician's failure to exercise due care.361 The ·fact that such 
reporting was not customarily done by doctors. \Vas. brushed aside by 
the court.362 
Whether the physician \vould have follo\ved the procedure of re-
porting plaintiff's injuries to the authorities, ho\vever, is not solely a 
question of good medical practice. The above-cited reporting statutes 
(Pen. Code, §§ 11160.-11161.5) \Vere in force in 1971. They evidence 
352. See Daniel J., Givelber et al., Tarasoj[. J.fylh and Reality: An Empirical Study of Prn·ate 
Law iJt Action~ 1984 \VISe. L. REv. 443, 473-74. 
353. Id. at 485 .. 
354. 551 p .2d 389 (Cal. 1976). 
355. See id. at 391~ 
356. Id. 
357. See id. 
358. See id. 
359. See id. at 390. 
360. See id. at 395-96. 
361. See id. at 396. 
362. See id. at 393-94 .. 
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a detennination by the legislature that in the event a physician does 
diagnose battered child syndrome, due care includes a duty to report 
that fact to the authorities. In other words, since the enactment of 
these statutes, a physician who diagnoses battered child syndrome will 
not be heard to say that other members of his profession would not 
have made such a report. The same is true of each of the persons and 
entities covered by this legislation. 363 
The court likewise rejected the doctor's defense that such a report 
would breach the doctor-patient privilege. 364 The plaintiff was entitled 
to attempt to prove that the doctor should reasonably have foreseen the 
resumption of abuse and further injuries to the child if returned to the 
status quo ante. 365 
In those jurisdictions which do now, or will in the future, allow a 
cause of action for failure to diagnose and report child abuse, the rea-
soning in Landeros can be applied to cases of unreported elder 
abuse/neglect. Although the aged are presumed competent and could 
self-report, the dynamics of many abusive situations prevent a free 
choice by the victim~366 Much elder abuse is cyclical, makin,g it rea-
sonably foreseeable that mistreatment will be repeated and increased 
injury suffered. As Professors Baumhover and Beall note, "(b ]ecause 
many victims of elder mistreatment are out of touch with the outside 
world, ,a clinical examination and subsequent intervention may be the 
only opportunity to prevent future abuse."367 The ·potential defendants 
363. See id. at 394 n~8. The statutes referred to by the court included: CAL. PENAL Coos § 
11160 (West 1970) ("Every person . . . to which any person suffering from any wound • • • 
where injuries have been inflicted upon any person in violation of any penal law of this state 
shall come or ,be brought, shall report the same immediately .• ~ .n); CAL. PENAL Coos § 
11161 (West 1970) ("Every physician or surgeon who has under his charge or care any person 
suffering from any wound or injuzy inflicted in the -manner specified in Section 11160 shall 
make a report of the kind specified in this article to the appropriate officials named in Section 
11160."); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161..5 (West 1970) (In any case in which a minor is under a 
physician's care or is brought to bim for diagnosis, examination or treatment, and uit appears 
to the physician" that the minor has physical injuries ''which appear to have been inflittcd 
upon him by other than accidental means by any person," the physician must report such inju-
ries). 
364 .. , See L<znderos, SSl P2d at 394 n.8 ("The statute also lays to rest defendant Flood's con· 
cern that if he were required to report his findings to the authorities he might be held liable 
for violation of the physician·patient privilege. (Evid. Code, § 992.) Section 11161.5 spccifi· 
cally exempts the physician from any civil or criminal liability for making a report pursuant to 
•ts te ") 
.I . nns. . 
365. See id at '396. 
366. See-supra note 191 and accompanying text 
367. Baumhover & Beall, supra note 247, at 250. 
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in cases of failure to diagnose or rep.ort include licensed professionals, 
such as doctors, nurses, and social \Vorkers, as \vel.l as others \Vho are 
statutorily required to report elder abuse. In addition, their employers, 
such as hospitals, clinics, nursing· homes, and community agencies, may 
also be liable under vicarious liability theories. 
Although some state courts have resisted allo\ving damage suits 
premised on violation of mandatory reporting statutes,368 others have 
embraced private causes of action against negligent social service agen-
cies that violate the same child protective statutes.369 Typically, these 
cases arise when a report of suspected abuse is made to the agency and 
the report is never investigated. If the child is banned. after the agency 
negligently failed to investigate, civil liability has been found.37° Courts 
usually have no difficulty finding legislative intent to allo\v private 
actions in these cases because, ''when the legislature has been suffi~ 
ciently specific in detailing both a duty on behalf of a particular gov-
ernment officer or employee and the identity of a particular class of 
persons in a particular situation to \Vhich the special duty is O\Ved there 
must be a remedy."371 
This reasoning should be applied to elder abuse cases and the fail-
ure to report by mandated reporters. The legislatures, by enacting man-
datory rep-orting Jaws, have imposed a duty on specific individuals and 
delineated the class of persons to \Vhom the duty is O\Ved. If the duty 
is breached, there should be a remedy. Under state licensure, a doctor 
or other professional is allo\ved to·· practice only upon the condition that 
he or she perfonn their statutory duties. The reasons for imposing civil 
liability on social service agencies like\vise apply to mandated reporters .. 
Imposing civil liability for failing to take action \Vbich might pre-
vent the criminal or tortious acts of another is neither ne\v nor novel. 
Similar cases are present in numerous areas. Liability for failure to 
protect a person from the criminal acts of third parties, ·for exatnple, 
368. See supra notes 318-21 and accompanying text 
369. See, e.g., Mammo v. State, 675 P.2d 1347 (~ App. 1983); Turner v. District of Co-
lumbia, 532 Ald 662 (D.C. 1987). 
370. See, e.g., 1\iammo v. State, 675 P~d 1347 (Ariz. App. 1983) (holding that a stntc ngen ... 
cy was under a duty to act with reasonable care after it received infonnntion about an abused 
child and could be held civilly liable for damages for failure to investigntc such a report); 
Turner v. District of Columbia, 532 A2d 662 (D.C. 1987) (fmding that the District of Colum-
bia could be held civilly liable for failing to remove children from their abusive fnther after a 
sp.ecific report of abuse was filed witb the Dis.trict); Jensen v. Anderson County Depl of Soc. 
Servs., 403 S.E.2d 615 (S.C. 1991) (stating that negligence in failing to investigate a. report of 
child abuse could give rise to a private v.rongful death action). 
371. Jensen, 403 S.E2d at 618. 
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has long been established in the landlord-tenant context. 372 If a crimi-
nal attack by an outsider is reasonably foreseeable and preventable, a 
landlord will be liable for injuries to his tenant, or others.373 Likewise, 
in a long series of cases, common carriers have been found negligent 
for injuries to passengers inflicted by third parties. 374 These lines of 
cases provide a useful analogy to the reporting of elder abuse or ne-
glect. The cyclical nature of abuse makes further harm foreseeable, 
and the professional who treats a victim of abuse or neglect knows, or 
should know, that further abuse is likely if there is no intervention. In 
addition, because various aids in diagnosing abuse are available, and 
public agencies can investigate and respond to mandated reports, further 
mistreatment of the aged victim is reasonably preventable. Even if 
future harm cannot be completely eliminated, at least the treating pro-
fessional should be required to take the minimal step of making a re-
port so that the needed services are made available to the abuse or 
neglect victim. 
c. Negligence Per Se 
It has previously been argued that mandatory reporting statutes 
generate a duty on the part of the professional to act when reasonable 
belief or suspicion should be aroused by injuries, the general condition 
of the patient,- inconsistencies between explanations and injuries, or 
other circumstances. Failure to report to designated state authorities in 
such a situation is common law negligence. A court, however, may 
find these circumstances do more than create an implied civil cause of 
action. Where such a protective statute was intended to protect the 
plaintiff against the -risk of harm which has in fact occurred as a res_ult 
of its violation, the breach can be conclusive on the issue of negli-
372. See, e.g., Kline v. ISOO Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970) 
(holding that where a landlord has notice of repeated criminal assaults on his property, there Is 
a duty to use preventive measures to protect tenants and guests from the criminal _attacks of 
others). 
373. See, e.g., Medina v. l87th St. Apartments, Ltd., 405 So. 2d 485, 486 (Fia, DisL Ct. 
App. 198 I) (owner of apartment complex could be held liable when a person was mugged in 
the complex's parking Jot because the owner had knowledge that similar crimes had been com· 
mitted there in the past). 
374. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Rapid Bus Co., 641 N.E.2d 886 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (stating 
that a bus company could be held liable for the sexual assault of one of its passengers by 
another passenger if it \Vas on notice of the attacker's violent tendencies); Hines v. Garret~ 108 
S.E. 690 (Va 1921) (railroad could be held liable for damages when it carried young girl past 
station and put her off near a "tramps' hollow'' where she was raped by two- unidentified per-
sons). 
• 
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gence, and the court should so direct the jury. In Thelen v. St. Cloud 
Hospita/,315 a case dealing with Minnesota's statutory civil liability for 
failing to report suspected abuse of a vulnerable adult, the court ex-
plained ho\v statutory duties affect a tort action. 
Generally the tort liability resulting from violation of a statute does 
not differ from ordinary negligence. The only difference benveen a 
statutorily imposed duty of care and a duty of care under common la\Y 
is that the duty imposed by statute is fixed, so its breach ordinarily 
constitutes conclusive evidence of negligence, or negligence per se, 
while the measure of legal duty in the absence of statute is detennined 
under common-law principles.376 
When the standard of care is detennined by the statute, '~urors 
· have no dispensing polver by \Vhich to relax 'it"377 On the other hand, 
some courts have held that a violation of the statute is only evidence of 
negligence, or prima facia evidence of negligence, \Vhich may be ac-
cepted or rejected by the jury.378 In either case, issues of causation, 
contributory negligence, and damages may still remain. 
d. Causation 
All negligence actions require that a causal connection bet\veen the 
negligent act and the resulting hann be proven.l79 The requisite causal 
connection bet\veen the professional's negligent failure to report and the 
actionable injucy to the aged person is arguably created \Yhen subse-
quent injury o,ccurs after the time \Vhen the report should have been 
made.3so-
The defendant-professional in such a malpractice suit \Viii argue that 
even if his behavior fell belo\v the standard of care, it did not create 
damage to the elderly person. Rather, that hann emanated from the 
perpetrator's tortious and/or criminal acts. To succeed, the plaintiff 
must thus establish that the defendant \vas both a cause in fact and the 
proxirnate cause of the elder's subsequent injuries.381 Proximate cause 
375. 379 N~\V 2d 189 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). 
376. See id. at 192-93. 
377. Martin v. HeJZOg, 126 N.B. 814, 815 (N.Y. 1920) (Cardozo, J.). 
378. See KEEToN ET AL., supra note 159, §' 36, at 230 & n.9 (citing Salinero v. Pon. 177 
Cal .. Rptr. 204 (1981) Oisting factors necessary under California Evidence Code tO create pre-
sumption of negligence)). 
379. See KEE"I"ON ET AL., supra note 159, § 41, at 263. 
380. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §' 281 (1'965) (explaining \\·hen an netor is liable 
for. an invasion of an interest of another). 
381. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 159, § 30, at 165. 
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requires a court to engage in a policy oriented examination of the fac-
tual situation and any statutes implicated. It often overlaps the discus-
sion of whether there is a duty to the plaintiff?82 
There are many instances when a close connection between the fail-
ure to report elder mistreatment and subsequent injuries can be per-
ceived even if the specific harm was inflicted by a third person. The 
plaintiff must prove that but for the professional's failure to report, the 
damage subsequent to the omission would not have occurred. It is well 
settled that intervening negligent and/or criminal acts ~-in this instance 
by a relative, caretaker or others whic,h the defendant might reason-
ably anticipate do not supersede or cut off the defendant's liability for 
his own act or omission.383 Elder abuse is typically not an isolated 
event, but part of a pattern of repeated mistreatment that continues and 
escalates until there is appropriate medical, social or legal interven-
tion.384 The dynamics are often similar to that found in partner abuse. 
There, the perpetrator may begin with psychological or financial abuse, 
progress to property destruction or animal abuse, and finally to physical 
assault385 Elder mistreatment may follow this "cycle of violence," or 
take different paths, resulting in violation of the aged person's civil 
rights, physical violence or other damage. 
The widespread adoption of reporting statutes attests to the fact that 
the enacting legislatures presumed and anticipated such cyclical behav-
ior. Therefore, once ,a professional suspects or has reason to believe 
that an older person has suffered abuse or neglect, he should also rea-
sonably anticipate future repetition, or, indeed, escalation. The premis-e 
of reporting legislation is that elders may b_e protected only by identify-
ing those at risk, and instituting protective and therapeutic measures. 
382. See~ e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (classic exposition 
of whether defendant should be liable for plaintiff's injury, in which the majority speaks in 
terms of duty rather than proximate cause). ,For more on the vast literature of proximate cau· 
sation hlW; see generally 4 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., 1HE LAW OF TORTS _§ 20J, at 8S·89, 
§§ 20.4-.6,. at 130-85 (ld ed. 1986 & Supp~ 1995); KEETON ET AL., supra note 1S9, §§ 42-44, 
at 272-319 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1995); Patrick J. Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence 
Law: History, Theory, and the Present Darkness, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 49 (1991). 
383. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449 (1965) ("If the likelihood 'that a third per· 
son may act in a particular manner is the hazard ot one of the hazards which makes the actor 
negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious~ or criminal does not 
prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby."). 
384. See COUNCIL ON SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, s11pra note 246,, at 966-71. See also supra notes 
246-47 and accompanying text 
385 .. See generally LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING. LoVE 42-47 (1990) (describing cycle of 
violence).. 
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The ameliorative systems, ho\vever, cannot be expected to \VOrk unless 
they are triggered. In many instances, consequences of the failure to 
report are quite certain; there \Viii be no detection by public authorities 
and the abuse will continue. At the very least, the failure to report 
may be viewed as a contributing or substantial cause of additional mal-
treatment, if it is not the sole cause.386 
In the \vell-kno\vn Landeros case,3'87 \Vhere a child \Vas returned by 
a physician to parents \Vho later beat the child repeatedly, the Califor-
nia Supreme· Court held that the subsequent beatings and injuries \vere 
proximately caused by the doctor's inaction, even though physically 
caused by the parents~388 The court utilized section 449 of the Restate-
ment to respond to defendant's causation defense: ''If the likelihood that 
a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of 
the hazards which makes the act negligent, such an act, \Yhether inno-
cent, negligent, intentionally tortious or crinzinal, does not prevent the 
actor from being liable for harm caused thereby.,389 
The principle stated in the Restatement is demonstrated in Stevens 
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,390 \vhere the 
plaintiff was beaten by a fello\v student.391 He then sued the school 
district for failing to properly supervise the attacker, a child \Vith 
known violent tendencies.392 The trial court found that the causal con-
nection between the school's negligence in failing_ to supervise and_ the 
injury to the plaintiff was broken by the intervening criminal attack of 
the student~393 The Supreme Court of lo\va, ho\vever, held that the 
causal link was not broken, because the risk of attack by the other 
student was the exact risk that the duty to supeiVise \vas- designed to 
prevent. 394 
Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the 
386. See KEEToN ET AL, supra note 159, § 41, at 268 ("If the dcfendn.nt's condu-ct \\1lS a 
substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injwy, it follo\\"S that he \Viii not be absolved from 
liability merely because other causes have contributed to the rcsull • • ."); \1/illiams v. United 
States, 352 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1965) (discussing contributory negligence nnd negligent nets of 
third parties). 
387. Landeros v. Flood, 551 P.2d 389 (Cal. 1976); see discussion supra notes 3S4~S and ac-
companying text 
388. See Landeros, SS 1 P .2d at 395. 
389. See id. (quoting REsTAlBtENT (SECOND) OF TORlS § 449). 
390. 528 N.\V.2d 117 (Iowa 1995). 
391. See id. at 118. 
392. See id. 
393. See id. 
394. See id. at 119. 
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fact that the risk, or a substantial or important part of the risk, 
to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed 
come to pass. Foreseeable inteiVening forces are within the 
scope of the original risk, and hence of the defendant's negli-
gence. The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening 
causes which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the 
defendant's responsibility. 395 
Applying this reasoning to the elder mistreatment context, if a mandat-
ed report of suspected abuse is not made, that failure would be a proxi-
mate cause of subsequent injuries. The intervening act of the abuser 
does not relieve the defendant professional of liability because ,this is 
the exact harm sought to be prevented by requiring that reports be 
made. . 
e. Damages 
Plaintiff claims for compensation should include any damages suf-
fered after the professional's failure to act, e.g., bodily hann, emotional 
distress, financial loss, medical expenses, and other injuries. All are 
compensable under nor1nal tort principles.396 On the other hand, loss of 
income from future employment and other elements of dama,ges will 
often not be recoverable for an aged person. In addition, b,ecause 
plaintiff's life expectancy is apt to be shorter than in a normal suit, 
loss of enjoyment and consortium may have less value than in the 
usual case. 
Suits on behalf of the elderly will present special litigation prob-
lems. The elderly bruise more easily, and suffer more falls and frac-
tures than younger people.397 Aged persons are apt to have chronic 
physical disabilities, diseases or impairments that diminish their health, 
strength and mobility. Defendants may attribute the results of abuse or 
neglect to the nonnal aging process, or a fact finder may confuse the 
two. Moreover, delays in the litigation proc,ess can have disastrous 
consequences for the elder's suit; in some states the action will not 
395. /d. (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 159, § 44, at 303-04). 
396. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 (explaining that compensatory damages 
that may be awarded for bodily harm or for emotional distress, without proof of pecuniary 
loss); see also id. § 924 (explaining that when an individual's personality has been tortiously 
invaded, that person may recover for, inter alia, past or future bodily harm and emotional dis· 
tress, loss or impairment of earning capacity and/or reasonable medical and other expenses). 
397. See, e.g., J. O'Brien, Elder Abuse, in PRIMARY CARE GERIATRICS, 466•72 (R.J. Hamm 
& P. Sloan eds., 1994). 
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survive the death of the plaintiff before trial.398 Often little or no so-
cial value is ascribed to older people, thus making jury verdicts prob-
lematic.399 When ageism is combined \Vith sexism, older female plain-
tiffs may be especially disadvantaged,400 and proving damages may be 
difficult. Some aged persons may be poor \Vitnesses because of speech, 
hearing, or other physical impairtnents. Poor memory, or fear and 
intimidation may make testimony difficult. If the action is brought by 
a competent elder, the issue of his or her ability to take steps to stop 
the abuse will again be relevant.401 
But such cases also present intriguing litigation possibilities. Judges 
and jurors are instinctively able to understand that older persons are 
less able to defend themselves or to escape from threatening situations. 
As a result, the failure of professionals to report and thus to initiate 
protective services may be vie\ved quite harshly. Evidence of physical 
or sexual abuse is apt to elicit a visceral response. Contemporary med-
ical documentation and photos may be used to sho\v bodily hann. 
Many injuries from which a younger victim recovers quickly may have 
long-te11n disabling effects on an ~lderly victim.402 Non-physical fonns 
of mistreatment may also have important and demonstrable consequenc-
es; they can cause demoralization and depression in aged victims,401 as 
398. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.20 (\Vest 1997) ("\Vhen a person~ injwy to the dece-
dent results in death, no action for the personal injury shall survive, and any such action ~nd­
ing at the time of death shall abate."). 
399. The tenn "ageism," coined in 1968 by Dr. Robert N. Butler, the fust director of the 
National Instirute on Aging, was originally defined as: 
a systematic stereotyping of and discrimination against people because they arc oJ~ 
just as racism and sexism accomplish this with skin color nnd sender. Old people 
are categorized as senile, rigid in thought and manner, old-fashioned in morolity and 
skills. . . . Ageism allows the younger generation to sec older people as different 
from themselves; thus they subtly cease to identify \Vith their elders as human be· 
• mgs. 
Robert N. Butler, Dispelling Ageism: 71te Cross..Cutling Inten·entlon, ANNALS /V.f. ACAD. POL. 
& Soc. SCI., May 1989, at 138, 139 & n.2. See also ROBERT N. BUTLER. \VHY SURVIVE?: 
BEING OLD IN MIERICA (1975) (Pulitzer prize-winning book \\'hich elaborates on ngei.sna). 
400. See generally Linda S. \Vhitton, Ageism: Paternalism and Prejudice, 46 DEPAUL L. 
REv. 453 (1997} (discussing paternalistic interventions that encourage the dependence of elderly 
women); LEO DRIEDGER & NEENA L. CHAPPELL, AGING & ErnNICJIY: TO\VARD AN INTERFACE 
(1987). 
401. See infra notes 416-32 and accompanying text 
402. See l\iORTON BARD & DAWN SANGREY, THE CRI~tE VICitt.t'S BOOK 24 {2d ed. 1986) 
("The elderly . . . feel the threat of a blow or of being knocked dO\\n more ncuteJy than a • 
. . younger person does. Old bones break so easily and mend so slo\\·Jy."). 
403. See Mary C. Sengstock & Sally C. Steiner, Assessing Non Phys/CQ/ Abuse, In ABUSE, 
NEGLECl~ AND ExPLOITATION OF OLDER PERSONS: STRA'IEGlES FOR. AssESS~tENT M'D INTER· 
VENTI ON 1 OS, 107-08 (Lorin A Baumhover & S. Colleen Beall eds., 1996). 
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has been demonstrated with battered women.404 The consequences of 
psychological or emotional abuse have been shown to be more severe 
for older people than for younger people.405 Appetite and sleeping pat-
terns may be disrupted, with loss of ability to function in daily life or 
to take prescribed medication.406 Many elderly persons depend upon 
fixed public or private pensions or benefits, so financial exploitation, 
even of small amounts, may prevent them from obtaining needed food, 
medicine, or utility services.407 Economic losses can reduce even finan-
cially comfortable elderly people to a state of dire need. Expert testi-
mony may highlight the physical or sexual abuse and its psycho-social 
consequences. Symptoms associated with post-traumatic stress disorder 
are frequent, including a re-experience of the trauma through night-
mares, intrusive thoughts, and other suffering. Psychological effects on 
elderly crime victims range from isolation and depression408 to sui-
cide.409 These are facts and consequences that judges and jurors can 
easily absorb and comprehend. 
Punishment for extreme behavior and deterrence of future harm 
resulting from a disregard for the safety of others are the bases for an 
award of punitive damages.410 In determining the amount of punitive 
damages which are appropriate to accomplish these goals, a jury may 
consider the potential harm to the victim and the possible harm to other 
victims if the behavior is not deterred.411 It is also free to consider the 
wealth of the defendant.412 
If a mandated reporter fails to report a case of suspected elder 
abuse or neglect, and the failure exceeds mere negligence, punitive 
damages may be appropriate. In situations where the professional is_ 
404. See Jacquelyn Campbell & Nancy Fishwisk, Abuse of Female Partners; in NURSINO 
CARE OF SURVIVORS OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 68-104. (J. Campbell & J. Humphreys eds., 1993). 
405. See Kosberg & Nahmiash, supra note S, at 33. 
406. See generally id. at 31. 
407. See Lois Herrington, Crime Has a Devastating; Tragic Impact on the Nation's Elderly, 
JUST. AsSISTANCE NEWS, Aug. 1983, at 2 (excerpted testimony before Senate Subcommittee on 
Aging). 
408. See After-Ejfocts of Crimes Against Elderly Said Intense, CRIME CONTROL, DJG., Dec. 8, 
197St: at 2-3. 
409. See Crime Fears Led to Suicides, CRIME CONTROL DIG., Oct II, 1976, at 9. 
410. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1977) ("(1) Punitive damages are dnmng• 
es, other than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded against a person to punish him for 
his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the fu· 
ture."). · 
4] 1. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources, 509 U.S. 443, 460 (1993) (discussing de-
terrence as a factor in awarding punitive damages). 
412. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1977). 
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unaware of the reporting requirement or reasonably believes_ that there 
is no real danger to the aged person, the failure to report \Vould not 
merit an award of super-compensatory damages. Punitive damages are 
appropriate, however, \vhen the mandated reporter's conduct in not 
reporting susp,ected abuse or neglect is, in the Restatement's \Vords, 
''outrageous" because of ''evil motive" or a ~'reckless indifference" to 
the rights of the patient~client.413 \Vhile evil motive \Viii be_ exceed.ing-
ly rare, several behaviors could demonstrate reckless indifference to the 
rights of the elder. For instance, if the reporter kno\VS there is a re-
porting requirement, knows that there is the good possibility of contin-
ued abuse and fails to report, such actions \vould tend to sho\v, at least 
a reckless, if not a kno\ving, disregard for the safety of the elder. 
In addition to assessing punitive damages against the mandated 
reporter, when a professional \vho fails to report is an employee acting 
in the course of employment e.g., a nurse in a hospital or clinic 
staff: punitive damages may be a\varded against the principal in ,certain 
situations.414 Also, if the hospital failed to institute pro-cedures to en-
sure reporting or supervise staff, punitive damages may be appropri-
ate.415 An award of sufficient punitive damages against a hospital or 
other care facility would. undoubtedly encourage that more comprehen-
413.. Section 908 reads in part 
(2) Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outmgeous, becnusc of :the 
defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others. In as-
sessing punitive damages, the trier of fact can properly consider the cbarneter of the 
defendant's act, the nature and extent of the hann to the plaintiff that the defendant 
caused or intended to cause and the v.·eaJth of the defendanL 
414. See id. § 909. Section 909 reads as follov,-s: 
Punitive damages can properly be awarded againSt a master or other principal be-
cause of an act by an agent i~ but only if, 
(a) the principal or managerial agent authorized the doing and the manner of 
the act or 
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial agent \\'US reckless in 
employing or retaining h~ or 
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and \\'US acting in the 
scope of employment, or 
(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or ,approved the 
act 
415. See United \V. Med .. Centers v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 682 (Ct. App. 1996) 
(holding that, if statutory provisions regarding the pleading of punitive damages nrc complied 
with, it is possible to recover punitive damages from a hospital for the negligent- or intentional 
failure to supervise its employees that results in the sexual assault or a patient); Fnrogo v. 
Sacred Heart Gen. Hosp., 562 A2d 300 (Pa. 1989) (stating that \Villful misconduct or gross 
negligence in failing_ to provide· a safe and secure environment for a patient \\·ho \\11S raped by 
another patient at the hospital could result in an award of punitive damages). 
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sive training and sup-ervision procedures be instituted, thereby prevent-
ing future injuries. 
3. Defenses 
Even if a professional is found to be negligent in the failure to 
diagnose and/or report suspected elder abuse or negle_ct, defenses such 
as contributory and comparative negligence or assumption of risk may 
be used by the defendant to avoid liability. However, for each of these 
defenses, there are sound rebuttals which allow recovery 'by the victim. 
If the fact-finder detennines that the plaintiff-elder's conduct fell 
below the standard of care which he or she should have confonned to 
for his or her own protection, contributory negligence (sometimes re-
ferred to as "plaintiff's negligence") was traditionally a complete bar to 
recovery.416 The defendant-professional, in a suit for failure to report, 
will likely raise this defense, or its more modern counterpart~ compara-
tive negligence; which is not a complete bar but apportions damages 
according to relative fault.417 It may be argued that the failure of the 
elder to report the abuse himself; or to take some other action to end 
or avoid it, is negligence. However, the failure to report or perfonn 
those acts is not legal negligence unless a reasonable person under like 
circumstances would report, and like circumstances .must include an 
analysis of the role that age, experience, and actual circumstances play 
in the decision not to report.418 
If a reasonable elderly person 'in the same circumstances would not, 
or could not, have taken steps to report the abuse, then the plaintiff 
was .not negligent.419 There will often b-e a well-founded fear of the 
consequences of reporting, such as retaliatory abuse. Moreover, as one 
expert has noted: 
Elder abuse victims commonly experience strong feelings of 
shame and humiliation, particularly if the ·abuse has included 
sexual or extensive physical assault. The sense of shame can 
416. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 465, 467 (1965). See generally \Vex S. 
Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REV. 151 (1946) (discussing 
early contributory negligence cases with an emphasis on jury control). 
417. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 159, § 67, at 470. 
418. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 464 (1965) ("Unless the actor is a child or an 
insane person, the standard of conduct to which he must confonn for his own protection is thnt 
of a reasonable man under like circumstances.") (emphasis added). 
419. See, e.g., Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Stewart, 228 U.S. 351 (1913) (taking account of 
circumstances and the age of plaintiff in determining that her actions did not constitute contrib-
utory negligence). 
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be exacerbated if the offender is a family member. Ambivalent 
feelings are common in victims of family abusers because they 
may simultaneously love and resent their offenders. Elder 
abuse victims may have difficulty accepting intervention, espe-
cially if they have strong affective relationships \vith offenders, 
such as spouses and adult children or grandchildren.420 
153 
Today most states employ comparative, rather than contributory 
negligence; even a finding of some measure of plaintiff negligence \viii 
not usually be a complete bar to recovery._ There are three different 
types of comparative negligence: "pure'., systems, \Vhich apportion 
awards strictly according to fault;421 "modified'~ systems, \Vhich appor-
tion damages if plaintiff's negligence \Vas not as great as the defen-
dant's;422 and "slight-gross" systems; \Vhich apportion damages if the 
plaintiff's negligence was "slighf' in comparison to the defendant's.423 
If the elder's failure to report abuse or neglect or take other steps to 
protect himself is found to be only slightly negligent, or less negligent 
420. Holly Ramsey-Kiawsnik, kses.sing Physical and Sexual Abuse In Health Ctzre Settings, 
in ABUSE, NEGLECr AND ExPLOITATION OF OLDER PERSONS: STRA1EGIES FOR ASsESSMENT 
AND lNTER.VENllON 67; 73-74 (Lorin A Baumhover & S. Colleen Beall eds., _1996). 
421. See, e.g., Hoffinan v~ Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973) {".lf plaintiff and defen-
dant are· both at fault, the fonner may recover, but the amount of his recovery may be only 
such proportion of the entire damages plaintiff sustained as the defendantts negligence bears to 
the combined negligence of both the plaintiff and the defendanl "). 
422. See, e.g., CoLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-111 (\1/cst 1998): 
(1) Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in any action by nny person or 
his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in 
injury to person or property, if such negligence M'tU not tu great as the negligence 
of the person against whom recovery is sought, bul any damages aliO\\·cd shall be 
diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person for 
whose injury, damage, or death recovery is made. 
(Emphasis added). See also OR. REv. STAT. § 18.470 (1996): 
(1) Contributocy negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or the 
legal representative of the person to recover damages for death or injury to ~rson 
or property if the fault attributable to the claimant 1sw not greater tltDii th·e com-
bined fault of all persons specified in subsection (2) of this section, but any damages 
allowed shall be diminished in proportion to_ the p~ercentnge of fault attributable to 
the claimant 
(Emphasis added.) 
423. See, e.g., S.D. C0DIF1FD LAws ANN. § 20•9·2 ~iichic 1997): 
In all actions brought to recover damages for injuries to a person or his property 
caused by the negligence of another, the fact that the pluinillf may have been guilty 
of contributocy negligence shall not bar a recovery when the contributory negligence 
of the plaintiff was slight in comparison with the negligence of the defendant, but in 
such case~ the damages shall be reduced in proportion to the mnount of plaintifrs 
contributory negligence .. 
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than the fault of the professional mandated to report, recovery will be 
allowed. Once again, as with contributory negligence, the plaintiff's 
focus must be on demonstrating that any failure on the part of the 
victim was reasonable, given age and situation. If this can be proven, 
comparative negligence, as well as contributory negligence, will not 'bar 
recovery against one who had a duty to report suspected abuse or ne-
glect. 
Assumption of risk is another defense a defendant is likely to raise, 
but it cannot realistically be maintained that an elderly person assumes 
the risk of abuse. To establish such a defense, defendant ·must ·prove 
that plaintiff voluntarily and freely assumed the risk that he would be 
harmed through the negligence of another.424 Where the elder knows 
of the threat of further abuse and does not leave the situation or report 
it, there is no assumption of risk unless there is a reasonable altema-
tive.425 Elderly abuse victims will often perceive no other option than 
to remain in the abusive situation. They may be dependent on the 
abuser for food, medical assistance, shelter, and other caregiving neces-
sities; may fear continued or worse abuse as retaliation for reporting; 
and often do not know that services are available to them. There is 
nothing voluntary or freely chosen about remaining in an abusive situa-
tion under these circumstances. Where there is only a choice of evils, 
there is no assumption of risk.426 
Moreover, in such an implied statutory action the court is creating a 
new tort against which traditional common law defenses, e.g., contribu-
tory negligence, assu·mption of the risk, comparative fault1 shou'ld play 
no role at alL The Restatement provides that a court, in deciding 
which defenses may apply in an action implied from a statute, should 
424. KEETON ET AL., supra note 159, § 68, at 487. 
425. See id at 490-91. See; e~g., Neal v. Prince George's County, 700 A.2d 838 (Md. App. 
1997) (overruling the granting of a summary judgment motion on the basis that an applicant 
who was seeking to obtain medical benefits for her son may not hav,c assumed the risk of 
falling on an icy sidewalk because there may have been no reasonable alternative by which she 
could obtain the needed care for her son); Mack v. Kranz Farms, Inc~, 548 N.W.2d 812 (S.D. 
1996) (remanding for trial because there was an issue of fact as to whether a fann worker 
voluntarily assumed the risk of being injured while removing frozen silage from a feed trough 
when the only other alternatives would have caused a greater risk to his safety than the melh· 
od he chose)~ 
426. See KE~E'I'ON ET AL., supra note 158, § 68, at 40-41. See also York v. Winn·Dixic At· 
lanta, Inc., 459 S.E.2d 470 (Ga. App. 1995) (finding that delivecyman who had the cho1cc of 
using a slippery platfonn or losing his job may not have voJuntarily assumed the risk of fall-
ing); Marshall v. Ranne; 511 S.W .2d 255 (Tex. 1974) (holding that there was no assumption o£ 
risk for a homeowner to leave his home knowing that there was a dangerous animal kept by 
his neighbor loose where the- only other choice was to re-main a prisoner in his own home). 
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look for guidance to the statute from \vhich the claim arises.427 \Vhere 
the statute reflects the legislature's desire to protect those \Vho cannot 
adequately guard themselves, such defenses should not be applicable. 
One of the reasons for the enactment of mandatory reporting statutes is 
that many elderly victims are unable to protect themselves adequately.428 
In cases involving defendants who violate special safety, juvenfle, or 
other laws protecting vulnerable groups, courts have held these statutes 
to be essentially strict liability provisions requiring defendants to safe-
guard such individuals from foreseeable hann. To allo\V common la\V 
defenses would undennine the legislative purpose in enacting these 
Iaws.429 One court held exactly that in its interpretation of the Minne-
sota Vulnerable Adult Act, which mandates the reporting of suspected 
abuse or neglect: 
427. REsTA1EMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874(A) emL j (1979) \Defenses to the action may 
be suggested by the legislative provision itself."). 
428. In the battered woman context, see LENORE E.. \VALKER. THE BAl"IERED \VO~fAN SYN· 
DROM£ 42-54 (1979); Naomi Hilton-Archer, Note, Battered IYomen and the Legal System: Post, 
. . 
Present, and Future, 13 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 14S, 147-49 (1989). 
429. See Thelen v .. St Cloud Hosp., 379 N.\V.2d 189, 193-94 ~1inn. Ct. App. 1985) (impos-
ing absolute liability for failing to report suspected abuse of a vulnerable adult as required by 
statute and stating that affutnative defenses such as contributory or compamti\'c negligence arc 
not available when a statute is intended to protect one 'vho cannot protect heJSc:U). See also 
\Vren v. Sullivan Elec., Inc., 797 F.2d 323, 326-27 {6th Cir. 1986) (subcontrnctor \Vhich did 
not install adequate temporazy lighting at construction site, in violation of state and federal 
safety statutes and regulations, could not assert assumption of the risk or contributory negli· 
gence defenses against injured construction v;orker); Boyles v. Hamilton, 4S Cal. Rptr. 399 
(Cal. Dist Ct App. 1965) (holding that assumption of risk and contributory negligence could 
not be used as defenses to an action based on the violation of child labor la\\-s); Tmnimni Gun 
Shop v. Klein, 116 So. 2d 421, 422-24 (Fla. 1959) (store \\·hich sotd rifle to minor in viola· 
tion of state statute and municipal ordinance could not assert contributory negligence defense 
against minors); Slager v. H\VA Corp., 435 N.\V .2d 349, 352-SS (I0\\11 1989) (lavern \\'hicb 
served alcohol to minor in violation of state dram shop statute could assert neither contributory 
negligence nor comparative fault defense against minor); Lomayestc\va v. Our Lady of ~1ercy 
Hosp.:. 589 S.\V .2d 885, 887 (Ky. 1979) (hospital \'ihich violated state regulation requiring 
detention screen could not assert contributory negligence defense ngninst patient \Vho fell from 
window); Boyer v. Johnson, 360 So. 2d 1164, 1169-70 (La. 1978) (defendant \Vho employed 
15-year old boy to drive commercial motor vehicle in violation of state child labor la\\'S could 
not assert contributory negligence defense against claim by boy•s survi,.·or); Zerby v. \'lanen. 
210 N.\V .2d 58, 62-63 (Minn. 1973) {retailer \vh.ich sold glue to minor in violation of state 
anti-glue sniffing statute could assert neither assumption of the risk nor comparative negligence 
defense against claim by trustee of another minor who shared the glue \vith its actual purchas-
er); Larabee v. Triangle Steel, Inc., 451 N.Y .S.ld 258 (App~ Div. 1982) (finding that eontnou-
tory or comparative negligence and assumption of risk should not be aJIO\\"Cd ns defenses in an 
action based on the failure to follow safety regulations relating to excavation and demolition 
sites); cj. KEEToN ET AL., supra note 159, § 36, at 227-28; § 36, nt 230; § 65, nt 461-62 
( discussing safety laws and assumption of risk). 
156 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEJY (Vol. 31:77 
The doctrine of absolute liability applies to preclude affirmative 
defenses when the legislature intends by enacting the statute to 
place the entire responsibility for the injury on the individual 
who violated it . . . We agree with the trial court and hold 
that the Vulnerable Adult Act imposes absolute liability upon 
one who violates its provisions. To allow affirmative defenses 
would defeat the purpose of the statute. The legislature must 
therefore have intended that no defense would displace the 
responsibility imposed by the statute.430 
The Restatement describes this situation as follows: 
There are . . . exceptional statutes which are intended to place 
the entire responsibility for the hann which has occurred upon 
the defendant. A statute may be found to have that purpose 
particularly where it is enacted in order to protect a certain 
class of persons against their own inability to protect them-
selves. Thus a statute which prohibits the sale of fireanns to 
minors may be clearly intended, among other purposes, to pro-
tect them against their O\vn inexperience, lack of judgment, and 
tendency toward negligence, and to make the seller solely re-
sponsible for any hann to them resulting from the sale. In 
such a case the purpose of the statute would be defeated if the 
contributory negligence of the minor were pennitted to bar his 
recovery. 431 
To allow defenses to a suit alleging violation of a mandatory reporting 
la\v on the basis of the elder's O\vn vulnerability would negate the 
purposes of these Jaws to protect elderly victims of mistreatment and 
to remove the discretion to report from the professional. 
Although it is not a defense, the professional who fails to report 
suspected elder abuse or neglect may implead the perpetrator in an 
attempt to lessen his own comparative fault and financial responsibili-
ty.432 At first glance, anything that lessens the professional's potential 
430. Thelen, 379 N.W.2d at 193-94; see also discussion supra note 375 and accompanying 
text 
431. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 483 cmt. c (1965). See also REsTATEMENT (SEC~ 
OND) OF TORTS § 496(F) cmts. d-e (1965); KEETON ET AL., supra note 159, § 68, at 493. 
432. See, e.g., Nikolous_ v. Superior Court, 756- P.2d 925 (Az. 1988) (holding that the defcn· 
dant, who was in an auto accident with the plaintiff, could implead the City because it was 
aJieged that a fire truck negligently caused the accident and the City may ultimately be linblc 
to the defendant); Smith~ Kline & French Lab. v. Just, 191 S.E.2d 632 (Ga. App. 1972) (find· 
• 
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liability may seem to be contrary to the goal of encouraging increased 
reporting of abuse or neglect. Ho\vever, that goal is simply the means 
to the reduction of elder abuse; the larger goal may b.e better served by 
allowing the professional to bring the abuser into court and assessing 
damages against him as \Veil. The professional still retains an incentive 
to report because defending such an action and impleading the abuser is 
costly, and imposing liability ··criminal or civit . directly on the abuser 
furthers public policy. If the professional is not held responsible for 
• • 
his failure to report, there will be no action in \Yhich to ·implead the 
abuser. 
4. Express Statutory Liability 
A civil cause of action for failing to report suspected elder abuse or 
neglect as required by la\V has been created by statute in four states-
Arkansas, lo\va, Michigan, and Minnesota. 433 These statutes have not 
been tested in litigation involving elder abuse an·d neglect~ The duty 
and breach of duty elements needed to establish liability under these 
statutes vary, but in all four states the damages must have bee.n proxi-
mately caused by the failure to report.434 
One area in \Vhich the statutes differ is the mental state required for 
recovery. Minnesota imposes civil liability for a failure to report that 
is "negligent or intentional.,.43s In Michigan any individual required to 
report (including any person '\vho is employed, licensed, registered, or 
certified to provide health care • • • ") \Vho "suspects or has reasonable 
cause to believe that an ·adult has been abused" is liable for breach of 
ing that a physician sued for prescribing the \Vrong drug could implead a drug manufacturer 
because the physician claimed that the drugs \Vere unsafe nnd not fit for the intended usc); 
IND. TRIAL RULE 14 (1997) \A defending party, as a third p3rty plaintiff, may cause a sum· 
mons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the netion \\ho is or may ~ 
liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against hiRL ]. 
433. See ARK. CODE ANN. § S-28-202(b) (1\iichie 1997)' t'AnY person or caregiver required 
by this chapter to report a case of suspected abuse. neglect, or exploitation \\·ho. purposely falls 
to do so shall be civilly liable for damages proximately caused by the failure."); IO\tJA CODE § 
23583(10) (\Vest 1998) \A person required by this section to report a SUSpected case of de-
pendent adult abuse who knowingly fails to do so is civilly Unblc for the damages proxinmtely 
caused by the failure.,"); MICH. CO~w. LA\VS § 16.411e(l) (\V~t 1997) ("A person required to 
make a report pursuant to section lla \vho fails to do so is liable civilly for the damages 
proximately caused by the failure. to repo~ and a civil fmc of not more th3.R S.SOO.QO for each 
failure to report."); MINN. STAT. § 626.557(7) (\Vest 1997) \A mandated reporter '~ho negli-
gently or intentionally fails to report is liable for damages caused by the failure."). 
434. See MINN. STAT. § 626.557(7) (\1/est 1997). 
435. /d. 
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the statutory command.436 Michigan's statute contains no specific 
mental state needed for liability.437 A case interpreting Michigan•s 
child abuse reporting statute,438 which is almost identical to the elder 
abuse statute, held that negligence sufficient to support civil liability 
oan be inferred if the child abuse reporting statute is violated.439 In 
such a state, a variety of evidence could be used to establish the stan-
dard of care.440 The standard of care could also be established by ex--
pert testimony regarding standard training and practice in the particular 
field of the defendant. 
The Arkansas and Iowa statutes both require an elevated level of 
mental culpability to support civil liability.441 Arkansas requires that 
the failure to report be "purposeful,'' and Iowa requires that the failure 
to- report be "knowing.'~42 Presumably these statutes require actual 
knowledge of the reporting requirement and a conscious choice not to 
report. Holding a mandated reporter liable under these circumstances 
would be difficult.443 Also, the existence of a statute allowing civil 
liability and specifying the necessary mental state might preclude using 
a common law malpractice theory. 
Though statutes creating civil liability for failure to report exist in 
these four states, litigation has b,een rare. In Arkansas, Iowa, and 
Michigan, there are no reported or unreported cases interpreting or 
applying these laws.444 One state supreme court decision dealt with the 
436. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 16.4lla{l) (West 1997). 
437. See MICH. COMP. LAws § l6.4lle(l) (West 1997) .. 
438. See MICH. COMP. LAws ,§ 722.633(1) (West 1997) (''A person who is required by this 
act to report an instance of suspected child abuse or neglect and who fails to do so is civilly 
Hable for the damages proximately caused by the failure."). 
439. See Williams v. Coleman, 488 N.W .2d 464, 472 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding a 
jwy instruction which allowed the jury to infer negligence on the part of the defendants if they 
found the reporting statute had been violated). See also People v. Caviani, 432 'N.\V.2d 409, 
413 (Mich. Ct App. 1988) (holding a "reasonable suspicion" triggers obligation to report child 
abuse). But see Marcelletti v. Bathani, 500 N.W 2d l24, 130 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (holding 
that the failure of a mandated reporter to report suspected child abuse by a babysitter imposed 
liability only for the ·injuries of the- child examined and not for the injuries of a child later 
abused by the same person). 
440. See supra notes 289-97 and accompanying text 
44l. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5..;28-202(b) (Michie 1997); IOWA CODE ,§ 23S B.3(10) (\Vest 
1998). 
442. See- ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-28-202(b) (Michie 1997); IOWA CODE § 2SS B.3(10) (West 
1998). 
443!1 But see First Commercial Trust Co. v. Rawls, 915 S.W .2d 262 (Ark. 1996) (approving 
of medical malpractice, action against physician who failed to report suspected child abuse}. 
444. Computer search usirig both Lexis and Westlaw databases and utilizing the cites of these 
statutes as search terms revealed no cases on point 
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Minnesota statute, peripherally mentioning, and seemingly approving, 
statutory civil liability.445 In order to encourage reporting of suspected 
elder abuse or neglect, courts should find liability and assess damages 
as they are authorized to do by statute. Litigation in these four states 
could provide the catalyst for a more \Videspread acceptance of damag-
es actions for failing to report suspected elder abuse. 
D. Respondeat Superior 
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior ("let the mas.ter ans\ver'') 
a principal (e.g., an employer) is held liable for the negligent acts of 
his agent (e.g., an employee) acting. \Vithin the scope of employment446 
or within the legitimate scope of the agent's authority.447 Recognizable 
examples of agents in failure to diagnose, report and treat actions 
would include psychologists and social \Yorkers in mental health clinics 
or social service agencies, and staff (e.g., interns,. residents, nurses, etc.) 
at hospitals. The basis for vicarious liability is that the employee's 
actions are presumed to be on behalf of the employer.448 
In some settings, most notably hospitals, professionals such as doc-
tors are ''independent contractors" rather than employees; thus the insti-
tution may argue it is legally relieved of vicarious Uab,ility for the 
negligence of a non-employee physician. Often, ho\vever, \vhen courts 
have considered the range of situations in \Vhich doctors provide care in 
hospitals, agency principles have been extended to limit this indepen-
dent contractor defense. In some deparbnents, such as the emergency 
room, the hospital has increasingly been perceived as directly offering 
services to the patient through the doctor, even though the latter is not 
445. See Hoppe v. K.aniyohi County, 543 N.\V .2d 63S. 638 {lt1inn. 1996) ("\'lc note that de-
spite the mandate to agencies and individuals to both report suspected abuse or neglect and 
then to investigate those reports, the legislation itself only defines the consequences of a failure 
to report as mandated-a criminal penalty is imposed for an intentional failure nnd civil lia-
bility is imposed for both negligent and intentional failure."). 
446. See, e.g., Mid-Continent Pipeline Co. v~ Crauthers, 267 P.2d 568. 571 (Okla. 1954) 
(finding that agen~ of the defendant company that allowed oil to escape into a stream acted 
within the scope of employment and that the company could hnvc been held liable for the 
resulting damages~ but for a valid release of liability that had previously been exc~ted). 
447 .. See, e.g., Roger.; v. Town of Black J\.fountain, 29 S.E.2d 203. 205 (N.C. 1944) (holding 
that a driver who deviated from his employer's instructions and drove a ccmpany vehicle on a 
personal errand was not acting within the scope of :the authority granted by his employer so as 
to give rise to vicarious liability). 
448 .. See. e.g .• Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310~ 324 n.t6 (Colo. r993) (distinguish· 
ing the tort of negligent hiring from vicarious liability and finding thnt the defendant \\415 not 
vicariously liable, but may be liable for negligent hiring). 
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an employee. 
Where a hospital holds itself out to the public as providing a given 
service, in this instance, emergency services, and where the hospital 
enters into a contractual arrangement with one or more physicians to 
direct and provide the service, and where the patient engages the ser-
vices of the hospital without regard to the identity of a particular physi-
cian and where as a matter of fact the patient is relying upon the hos-
pital to deliver the desired health care and treatment, the doctrine of 
respondeat superior applies and the hospital is vicariously liable for 
damages proximately resulting from the neglect, if any, of such physi-
cians .. 449 
E. Professional License Sanctions 
While lawsuits against mandated reporters may encourage increased 
reporting of elder mistreatment, sanctions regarding professional licenses 
have the potential to cause even greater changes in behavior. All 
members of licensed professions, as a condition of practice, are subject 
to disciplinary control by a legislatively designated Agency or Board.4'0 
Since health care and other professionals are usually in the best -posi-
tion to discover and treat abuse, the threat of licensure sanctions may 
provide the best means to encourage reporting.451 Professionals may 
' 
insure against damages for malpractice liability, but suspension or revo-
449. H~u'dy v. Brantley, 471 So. 2d 358; 371 (Miss. 1985) (emphasis added). 
450. Licensure of professionals in the United States has a lengthy history. Professional nsso· 
ciations, such as the-American Medical Associationt sponsored state licensing statutes during the 
late nineteenth century. The Supreme Court gave impetus to this in Dent v. West Jlirglnla, 
129 U.S .. 114 (1889), which upheld the constitutionality of the Wes.t Virginia Medical Practice 
Act By 1930 all states had some fonn of mandatory medical licensure. See generally RoB-
ERT DERBYSHIRE, MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE IN 11m UNITED STATES (1978). Many 
other health care workers, such as dentists, optometrjsts, phannacists, veterinarians, practical and 
registered nurses, and psychologists and social workers are currently Ucensed in aU SO states. 
See NEIL WEISFELD, NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCJENCESt LICENSURE OF PRIMARY CAR£ P-RACTlTIO. 
NERS 8 (1977). 
The Supreme Court has traditionally deferred to state regulation and licensing of profes· 
sions: 
We recognize that the States have a compelling interest in the practice of professions 
within their boundaries and that as part of their power to protect the public health,_ 
safety, and other valid interests they have broad power to establish standards for 
licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of professions. 
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bart 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975) (citations omitted). 
451. See, e.g., In Re Schroeder, 415 N.W .2d 436 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (failure of mental 
health professional to file mandatory report of suspected child abuse upheld as basis for lleen· 
sure sanction). 
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cation of their licenses directly threatens their livelihood and standing 
in the community and in their profession. Statutes \Vhicb enumerate 
the grounds far license discipline of a professional can be applied to 
the failure to report elder abuse or neglec_t The District of Columbia 
Code is explicit: 
Any health~care administrator or health professional licensed in 
the District who willfully fails to make a report required by § 
6-2503(a)(l) [reports of suspected elder abuse or neglect], or 
willfully makes a report under § 6-2503 containing infonnation 
that he or she knows to be false, shall be guilty of unprofes-
sional c_onduct and subject to any sanction available to the gov-
ermnental board, commission, or other authority responsible for 
his or her Iicensure.452 
The portion of the Dela\vare Code \Yhich deals \Vith long tenn care 
facilities that seiVe the elderly population is also very specific in this 
regard. 
Upon a finding of abuse, mistreatment, or neglect, or failz1re to 
report such instances by a licensed or registered' professional, 
the Department or the Attorney General shall notify the appro-
priate licensing or registration board. If, _after a hearing, a 
licensed or registered professional is found to have abused, 
mistreated or neglected -a patient or resident or Jzas failed to 
report such instance, the appropriate board shall suspend or 
revoke such person's license.453 
Some states require that licensure boards be notified of professionals-
convicted of failure to report elder abuse.454 The vast majority of 
states, however, do not have license discipline statutes \vbich specifical-
ly reference the failure to report elder abuse/neglect. 
Even without such a specific provision, other statutes may be used 
as the basis for discipline. Physicians may serve as an illustrative 
452 .. D.C. CoDE ANN. § ~2512{5) (l\iichic 1997). 
453. DEL CODE. ANN. til 16, § 1137 (1\iichic- 1996) (emphasis ndded). 
454. See, .e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 47.24.010(c) (\Vest 1998) ("If a person convicted under this 
section is a member of a profession or occupation Utat is licensed, certified, or regulated by 
the state~ the court shall notify the appropriate licensing, certifyin~ or regulating entity of the 
conviction."). 
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example. Five jurisdictions (Florida, Maryland, Rhode Island, Vermont, 
and West Virginia) make the failure to file "any report required by 
law'' grounds for revocation of a doctor's professional license.455 Since 
a report of suspected elder abuse is mandated in the vast majority of 
states, a failure to make such a report could 'be grounds for discipline. 
Twelve states (Alabama, California, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Louisi-
ana, Massachusetts, Missouri, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Utah)456 
allow sanctions against physicians who violate a law that relates to the 
practice of medicine. Georgia's civil code, section 43-1-19, for exam-
ple, provides: 
(a) A state examining board shall have the authority to refuse 
to grant a license to an applicant therefor or to revoke the 
licence of a person licensed by that board or to discipline a 
person licensed by that board, upon a finding by a majority of 
the entire board that the licensee or applicant has: 
(8) [v]iolated a statute, law, or any rule or regulation of 
this state, any other state, the state examining board regu-
lating the business or profession licensed under this title, 
the United States, or any other lawful authority (without 
regard to whether the violation is criminally punishable), 
which statute, law, or rule or regulation relates to or in 
part regulates the practice of a business or profession 
licensed under this title ... . 451 
455. See~: e.g., ltl. GEN. LAws § S-37-S.l (Michie 1995). The statute provides: 
The tenn "unprofessional conduct'' as used in this_ chapter shall include but not be 
limited to the following items or any combination thereof and may be further defined 
by regulations established by the board with the prior approval of the director • • . 
• • • 
(9) Willful omission to file or record, or willfully impeding or obstructing a filing 
or recording, or inducing another person to omit to file or record medical or other 
reports as required by law . . . 
ld See also FLA. STAT. ch. 455.227 (West 1996); MD. CODE ANN., HEALru Occ. § 14-404 
(Michie 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 26; § 1354 (1996); W. VA. CODE § 30-14-11 (Michie 
1996). 
456 .. See ALA. CODE § 34-24-360 (Michie 1996); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 490 (West 
1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 43~1-19 (Michie 1996); HAW. REv .. STAT. §, 4368-19 (1996); IND. 
CODE § 25~1-94 (West 1996); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37.1285 (West 1996); MAss. GEN. 
LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 5 (West 1996); Mo~ RE.V. STAT. § 334.100 (1995); OHIO REV. CODB 
ANN. § 4731.22 (West 1996); 63 PA. CONS. STAT. § 422.41 (West 1996); TEx. REV. CIV. 
STAT. art 4495b {West 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-61-401 (Michie 1996). 
451. GA. CODE ANN. § 43-1-19 (Michie 1996). 
• 
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The criminal nature of most of the mandatory reporting statutes makes 
these licensure laws particularly useful in the effort to encourage report-
ing. A violation of the reporting statute \Vould subject the professional 
to both criminal and licensure sanctions. 
An additional twelve states (Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Maine, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, \Vashington, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming) allo\v discipline if the physician is found to 
have engaged in ''negligent practice.,458 The Michigan statute, for ex-
ample, provides: 
[T]he disciplinary subcommittee shall proceed under section 
16226 if it finds that 1 or more of the follo\ving grounds exist: 
(a) A violation of general duty, consisting of negligence or 
failure to exercise due care, including negligent delegation 
to or supervision of employees or other individuals, \Yheth-
er or not injwy results, or any conduct, practice, or condi-
tion. which impairs, or ·may impair, the ability to safely 
and skillfully practice the health profession.459 
This standard relates very closely to the previous discussion of private 
causes of action against those \vho fail to report. The principles \vhich 
support a negligence suit could be used derivatively to impose license 
sanctions in these states. More generally, almost all statutes \vhich 
govern discipline of· a professional license holder include a generic 
prohibition against "unprofessional conduct," as a basis for discipline. 
The Kansas statute is representative of this group of la\vs: 
A licensee's license may be revoked, suspended or limited, 
or the licensee may be publicly or privately censured, or an 
application for a license or for reinstatement of a license may 
be denied upon a finding of the existence of any of the follo\v-
ing grounds: 
• • • 
(b) The licensee has committed an act of unprofessional or 
45'8. See CoLO. REv. STAT. § 12-36-117 (\Vest 1996). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-13c 
{West 1994);_ IDAHO CODE § 5+1814 ~1ichic 1996); ft{E. REv. STAT. ANN. tiL 32, § 3282-A 
(West 1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.16221 (\Vest 1996); ~iQ\'N. STAT. § 147.091 (\Vest 
1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-3·323 (\Vest 1995); NEB. REV~ STAT. § 71·148 (1996); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 90-14 (1997); \VASH. REv. CODE § 18.130.160 (\Vest 199.6); \VIS. STAT. § 
448.02 (\Vest 1995); and \VYO. STAT. § 33026-402 (lt.iichic 1996). 
459. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.16221 (\Vest 1996). 
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dishonorable conduct or professional incompetency~460 
All these statutory criteria may be applied in appropriate cases to fail-
ure to assess, treat, and report suspected elder abuse or neglect. Public 
licensing boards which oversee doctors, nurses, social workers, and 
other professionals need to be more aggressive in ensuring that practi-
tioners are complying with the reporting requirement and the standard 
of care in their jurisdictions. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
After the leaves have fallen, we return 
To a plain sense of things. It is as if 
We had come to an end of the _imagination, 
Inanimate 1n an inert savoir. 
It is difficult even to choose the adjective 
For this blank cold, this sadness without cause. 
The great structure has become .a minor house. 
No turban walks across the lessened floors.,461 
' 
-Wallace Stevens, at seventy-three 
Elder abuse and neglect is a complex phenomenon, without unitary 
causation or simple solution. Maltreatment of older persons can, how-
ever, be substantially reduced. There are opportunities for many pro-
fessionals to make a significant contribution to its treatment and pre-
vention. When these opportunities are missed or ignored, further dam-
age to older persons and to our communities is the result. Criminal 
and civil legal processes can be invaluable resources in the effort to 
ameliorate this great American tragedy. To ignore that potential is to 
acquiesc.e in individual and social injustice. 
460. KAN. STAT .. ANN. § 65-2836 (1995). 
461. Wallace Stevens, The Plain Sense of Things, in COLLECTED POEMS (1952), reprinted In 
nm. ART OF GROWING 0LDE&: WRITERS ON LIVING AND AGING 288 (Univ. of Chicago Press 
1996)~ 
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Appendix A 
STATUTES PROTECTING OLDER PERSONS 
ALA. CODE §§ 38-9-1 to -11 (1992 & Supp. 1997). 
ALAsKA STAT. §§ 47.24.010 to .900 (Michie 1996). 
ALAsKA STAT. § 11.81.900 (Michie 1996). 
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 46-451 to -454 {West 1997). 
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-28-101 to -306 (Michie 1997). 
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CAL. WELF. & !NST. CODE§§ 15600 to 15660 (West 1991 & Supp. 1998). 
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-3.1-101 to -106 (West 1998). 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17b-450 to -461 (West 1998). 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, §§ 3902 to 3913 (1997). 
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2501 to 6-2513 (1995 & Supp. 1998). 
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 415.101 to .113 (West 1998). 
GA. CODE ANN._ §§ 30-5-1 to -8 (Harrison 1994 & Supp. 1997). 
GA. CODE ANN. § 31-8-80 (Harrison 1994 & Supp. 1997). 
HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 346-221 to -253 (1993 & Supp. 1996). 
IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5301 to -5312 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1998). 
320 ILL. COMP. STAT. 15/0.01 to 15/10 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998). 
320 ILL. Co:MP. STAT. 20/1 to 20/12 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998). 
720 ILL. Co:MP. STAT. ANN. 5/12 to 5/21 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998). 
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 12-10-3-1 to -31 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 1998). 
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 235B.1 to .6 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998). 
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-1430 to -1442 (1993 & Supp. 1997). 
• 
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KY. Rsv. STAT. ANN. §§ 209.010 to .160 (Banks-Baldwin 1997). 
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:403.2 (West 1986 & Supp. 1998). 
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:2009.13 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998). 
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ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 3470 to -3487 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997). 
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-359 (1995 & Supp. 1997). 
MD. CODE ANN., PAM. LAW §§ 14-101 to -404 (1991 & Supp. 1997). 
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 19A, §§ 14 to 36 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998)~ 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 400.11a to .11f (West 1997 & Supp. 1998). 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.557 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998). 
Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 43-47-1 to -37 (1993 & Supp. 1998). 
Mo. ANN .. STAT. §§ 660.250 to .. 320 {West 1988 & Supp. 1998)._ 
. . 
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 52-3-801 to -825 (1997). 
MoNT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-212 (1997). 
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-348 to -387 (1995 & Supp. 1996}. 
NBV. REV. STAT. §§ 200.5091 to .5095 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 1997) . 
N.H. REV .. STAT. ANN. §§ 161-F:42 to :57 (1994 & Supp. 1997). 
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-406 to -425 (West Supp. 1997). 
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-7-14 to -31 (Michie 1997). 
N.M. STAT. ANN, .. § 28-17-9 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1998). 
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 473 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1998). 
' . 
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 108A-99 to -111 (1997). 
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 50-25.2-0 to -14 (1989 & Supp. 1997). 
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OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5101.60 to .72 (Anderson 1998). 
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5101.99 (Banks-Baldwin 1995 &_ Supp. 1998). 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, §§ 10-101 to -110 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998). 
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 124.050 to .140 (Supp. 1996). 
20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5608 (West Supp. 1998). 
35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 10225~101 to .103, 10225.301 to .310, 
10225.312 (West Supp. 1998) 
R.I.-GEN. LAws § 42-66-1 (1995). 
R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-4-7 (1996). 
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 43-35-5 to -90 (Law. Co-op. 1997). 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-46-1 to -6 (Michie 1988). 
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 71~101 to -119 (1995 & Supp. 1997). 
TEx. HUM. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 48.001 to .103 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998). 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 62A-3-301 to -312 (1997 & Supp. 1998). 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 6901 to 6941 (1991 & Supp. 1998). 
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.1-55.2 to -55.1 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1998). 
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 18.51.060 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998) (repealed). 
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 74.34.010 to .901 (West Supp. 1998). 
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 26.44.010 to .160 (West 1997 & Supp. 1998). 
W. VA. CODE §§ 9-6-1 to -15 (1998). 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 46.90 (West 1997 & Supp. 1997). 
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-20-101 to -109 (Michie 1997). 
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AppendixB 
STATUTES · ATING PROFESSIONALS AND/OR OTHERS 
TO REPORT SUSPECTED ELDER ABUSE/NEGLECT 
ALA. CODE' § 38-9-8 (1992 & Supp. 1997). 
ALASKA STAT. § 47.24.010 (Michie 1996}. 
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-454 (West 1997). 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-28-203 (Michie 1997}. 
CAL. WELF. & !NST. CODE § 15630 (West 1991 & Supp. 1998). 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17b-451 (West Supp. 1998). 
DEL. CODE ANN .. tit. 31, § 3910 (1997). 
D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2503 (1989 & Supp. 1998). 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.1034 (West 1998). 
GA. CODE ANN. § 30-5-4 (Harrison 1994 & Supp. 1998). 
GA. CODE ANN. § 31-8-82 (Harrison 1994 & Supp. 1998). 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 346.;.224 (1993 & Supp. 1997). 
IDAHO CODE§ 39-5304 (1998). 
IND. CODE ANN. § 12-10-3-9 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 1998). 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 235B.3 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998). 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-1431 (1993 & Supp. 1997} .. 
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 209.030 (Banks-Baldwin 1997). 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403.2 (West 1986 & Supp. 1998). 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3477 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997). 
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 14-302 (1991). 
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. l9A, § 15 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998). 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 400.1la (West 1997 & Supp. 1998). 
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MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.557 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998). 
Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-47-7 (1993 & Supp. 1998). 
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 660.255 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997). 
MoNT. CODE ANN. § 52-3-811 (1997). 
NEB. REV. STAT. § '28-372 (1995 & Supp. 1996). 
NEV. REv. STAT. § 200.5093 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 1997). 
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN~ § 161~F:46 (1994 & Supp. 1997). 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 27-7-30 (Michie 1998). 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-17~9 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 199.7). 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § lOBA-102 (Michie 1994). 
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5101.61 (Anderson 1998). 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 10-104 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998). 
OR. REv. STAT. § 124.060 (Supp. 1998). 
R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-66-8 (1993). 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-35-25 (Law. Co-op. 1997). 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-6-105 (1995). 
TEx. HUM-. REs. CODE ANN. § 48.036 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998). 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A~3-302 (1997). 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 6903 (1991 & Supp. 1998). 
VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-55.3 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1997). 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 74.34.030 (West Supp. 1998). 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.030 (West 1997 & Supp. 1998). 
W.VA. CODE§ 9-6-9 (1998). 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-20-103 (Michie 1998). 
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Appendix C 
POPULATION TARGEfED AND MISTREATMENT COVERED BY STATUTE 
ST. Population Physical Neglect Emotional Financial Sexual Unreasonable Abandonmcnl. Self 
Targeted Abuse Abuse &lor Exploitation, Abuse Confmement Desenion Neglect 
Mental Fiduciafy 
Anguish Abuse 
AL 18+, or 1 yes yes yes yes yes yes 
AK 18+, 1 yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
AZ 18+, 1 yes yes yes yes yes 
AR 18+ yes yes yes yes yes 
CA 18+, 1 yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
6S+ 
co 18+ yes yes yes yes yes yes 
CT 60+ yes yes yes yes implied yes yes 
DE 18+. 1 yes yes yes yes 
DC 18+, 1 yes Yes yes yes yes yes 
FL 18+, 1 yes yes yes yes yes yeJ 
60+, 1 
GA 18+, 1 yes yes yes yes yes 
m •any yes yes yes yes yes yes 
adult,• 1 
m 18+, 1 yes yes yes yes yes 
n.. 60+ yes yes yes yes yes 
IN 18+, 1 yes yes yes 
1 s: if mentally, physically, or emotionally incapacitated or vulnerable 
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Appendix C 
POPULATION TARGETED AND ?.fiSTREA*I'9't'llfMENTCOVERED BY STATUl'E 
:;' 
ST. Population Physical Neglect Emotional F'wncial Scltnl Unrw;c:ub~ A~c~t~::t·. :ct, Sclt 
To eted arg . Abuse Abuse &lor Exptoiution. Abu!,c Cc.afu:e~-:ct ~;:1 Nql:a 
Menf3l f"ldu:iuy 
Anguish Abuse 
7 
lA 18+. 1 yes y~ )·es yes yes yes 
KS 18+,1 yes yes yes yes yes 
. )'d 
KY 1&+.1 yes yes yes yes yes 
LA 18+,1 yes yes yes yes .res .yes 
ME 18+, or 1 yes yes yes yes yes yes 
. 
l-ID 1 yes yes yes yes 
~fA 60+ yes yes: )·cs 
MI 18+ yes yes yes )·es )~ 
MN 18+.1 yes yes yes )~es 
. 
h-iS 18+.1 yes yes . yes yes yes yes 
MO 60+ yes yes yes yes )·cs yes 
18+. 1 
MT 60+ yes yes yes yes 
NE 18+.1 yes yes yes .)"c$ yes 
NV 60+ yes yes yes yes yes 
• 
NH 18+.1 yes yes yes yes yes yes 
1 = ifmen~<~Jiy, physicaUy, or emotionally inap.aciuted or wlnmbte 
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Appendix C 
POPULATION TARGETED AND MISTREATMENT COVERED BY STATUTE 
ST. Population Physical Neglect Emotional t.mancial Sexual Unreasonable Abandonment, ScJr 
Targeted Abuse Abuse-&lor Exploitation. Abuse Conrmement Desertion Neglect 
Mental Fiduciary 
Anguish Abuse 
NJ 18+p 1 yes yes yes yes yes yes 
NM 18+, 1 yes yes yes yes )'e$ 
NY 18+. 1 yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
.. isolation~ 
NC 18+, 1 yes yes yes yes yes yes 
ND .. an adult," yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
1 
' 
OH 60+. 1 yes yes yes yes yes yes 
OK 18+. 1 yes yes yes yes yes 
6S+ 
OR 6S+ yes yes yes 
PA 60+ yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
. . 
RI 60+ yes yes yes yes yes 
sc 18+.1 yes yes yes yes yes 
SD 18+, 1 yes yes yes 
' 
TN 18+. 1 yes yes yes yes yes yes 
TX 65+ yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
18+. 1 
UT 6S+ yes yes yes Yes yes yes 
. 18+. 1 
1 = if mentally, physically. or emotionally incapacitated or vulnerable 
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Appendix C 
POPULATION TARGEfED AND 2\fiSTREAThiENT COVERED BY STA'fUT£ 
ST. Population Physical Neglect Emotional F'mnci:ll Sexu:~l Unr=somb!e A~dlr:! r;::er. Se1t 
Targeted Abuse Abu~ &lor Exp' • . • .Olt3UOD, Abuse Confu:.en~ct Nqt:d 
h{enttl Fiducbry 
Anguish Ab\l$C 
VT 18+. 1 yes yes yes yes )'CS yes yes 
60+ 
VA 18+.1 yes' yes yes. yes yes )"e$. yes 
60+ 
WA 60+.1 yes yes yes yes yes yes 
wv 1 yes yes )"CS )'e$ 
WI 60+, or 1 yes yes yes )"t! yes 
WY 18+.1 yes yes yes )~e$ yes 
1 = if mentally. physically. or emotionally incapacitated or \'Ulncr.ahle 
.. 
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STATB 
Alabama 
ALA. CoDE § 38-9·7 
(1992 & Supp. 1997) 
Alaska 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
ARK. CODE ANN. § S-
28-103 (Michie 1997) 
California 
CAt.. WELF. & INST. 
CODE § 15656 (West 
1991 & Supp. 1998) 
Colorado 
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW 
AppendixD 
PERPETRATOR PENALTIES 
FELONY MISDBMEANOR 
a. intentional abuse or a. reckless abuse or neglect w/ 
neglect w/ serious physical physical injwy=Class A 
injwy=Ciass B felony Misdemeanor 
b. reckless abuse or neglect b. emotional abuse=Class A 
w/ serious physical Misdemeanor 
injwy=Ciass C felony 
c. exploitation w/ value of 
~. intentional abuse or property~ assets .or n;soun:cs t~ 
negtea w/physical than SIOO=Ciass A Misdemeanor· 
injwy=Ciass C felony 
d. exploitation w/ value of 
property, assets or 
reso~ exceeding 
$ l OO=Class C felony 
. 
• 
a. willfully or by culpable 
negligence causes or 
permits injury w/ great 
bodily hann=Ciass-D 
Felony 
.any petSOn who causes a any person who willfully causes 
dependent adult to be or pennits a dependent adult to 
injured or causes their be injured or placed in a 
health to be endangered situation where the adult is 
shall be imprisoned in the endangered is guilty or a 
county jail not exceeding misdemeanor. 
one year, or in the state 
prison for 2,3,4 .yrs. 
[Vol. 31:77 
. 
REFERRAL NOPBNALTY 
OPCASB NOTED 
X 
• 
X 
. 
• 
1998] 
STATE 
Connecticut 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 17b-460 (West Supp. 
1998) 
Delaware 
DEL CODE. ANN. tit. 31 
§ 3913 (Michie 1997) 
D.C. 
Florida 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
415.1055 (West 1998 ) 
Georgia 
GA.. CODE ANN. 
§ 30.5·8 (1996) 
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Appendix ,D 
PERPETRATOR PENALTIFS 
FEI.ONY 
a. intentional exptoibtion 
using infiml adutt• s 
resources more than 
SSOO=Ciass G felony 
b.in~tio~ ~ 
causing boch1y h3nnt 
pem.ancnt disfigun:mcnt or 
pe1mancnt .dis:ibillt)'<bss 
D f'eiony 
e. Intentional abUse 
resulting in dcath-<:13SS A 
felony 
MISDEl\fEANOR 
• 
a. int.cntion31 ~ neglect. 
' . . exp .. o;tmon. or 
misbc:um=t-Cbss A 
Misdcme:1nor 
b. intmtio:i31 cxp!oit:Wcn using 
infirm edult'$ resourc:cs less th:.n 
SSOG-Cbss A l.fisdcme:.nw 
8buse in Vioblio.u or 
provisio~fisdemt:m<n' 
- . .R.t-~~ ~.KW'- OF 
CASE 
It as a rcS'J.tl, or a.t~ 
la\'~UO:l ~~! by 
pro::dlvc $.UYl"s. a 
c!~nnlmt.tl~ Is m~t.: 
·thua~« 
oth:r F.A."'!! h.u 
flr..tt~.ed.. cegl:a:d cr 
cxp!~::cd = c!!:rly· 
~Mil 
infcunutttt-:1 ot !.b= 
will b: rc!cucd b 
writitls to m.~•ls 
~I to d~tunfr:-: 
ifcrim!=l 
J:rc>a:cdioss ~!;!.b:. 
·initf:t.~ed 
Upon reaipt of 
repent or~ the 
dep.".ttmtnl or 
·etdedy nffzUrs Wll 
notify bw 
ettfoteeanc:aL 
175 
NO 
PENALTY 
NOTED 
X 
176 
STATE 
Hawaii 
HAw. REV. STAT. § 
346·228 (Michie 1993 & 
Supp. 1996) 
Idaho 
IDAHO CODE§ 39 .. 5310 
& § l8-1SOS (Michie 
1993 & Supp. l997) 
Illinois 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN.§ 5/12·21 (Smith-
Hurd 1993 & Supp. 
1991) 
Indiana 
IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 12-10-3-10 (West 
1994 & Supp. 1997) 
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW 
Appendix D 
PERPETRATOR PENALTIES 
FEI,ONY 
• 
Criminal Neglect is a 
Class 3 felony 
Any person who abuses, 
exploits, or neglects a 
vulnerable adult is guilty of a 
misdemeanor. 
[Vol. 31:77 
.. -..... :~'~'I~ OF NO 
CASE PENALTY 
Upon inves~gntion. 
the department shall 
talc~ action toward 
prcvcntlt1g further 
abuse and shtill have 
the authority to do 
any or all or the 
following , • • seck 
any protective or 
remedial actions 
authorized by law. 
If • • • it appears that 
the abuse. neglect, or 
exploitation has 
caused injury or a 
• • • • senous unpos1tion on 
the rights of a 
vulnerable adult, the 
commission shalt 
immediately notif)' 
'the appropriate I3W 
enforcement agency 
which shall 
investigate and 
determine whether 
criminal proceedings 
should be initiated. · 
Each endangered 
adult report shall be 
communicated 
immediately to • • • a 
Jaw enforcement 
agency • 
NOTED 
1998] 
STATE 
Iowa 
IOWA CODE. ANN .. 
§ 23SB.3A &. § 726.8 
(West 1994 &. Supp. 
1997) 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
KY .. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 209.990 (Bank,s... 
Baldwin 1997) 
Lo •• UJstana 
LA. REv .. STAT. ANN. 
. 
§ 14:403.2(E}(6) (West 
1986 & Supp. 1998) 
. 
Maine 
M:uyland 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
; 
SAYING GJWINY FROAf THE Jf'OLF 
Appendix D 
PERPETRATOR PENAI.:I1ES 
FELONY 1\fiSDE?\iEANOR 
Wanton neglect of a 
dependent ndult is a serious 
misdent=mor. 
knowingly and \\illfully knowingly rmd willfully !\busing 
abusing causing serious C3lJsing. min~r phystt31 or m=W 
physical or mental injwy or injwy or tanpor:uy 
pc:nnancnt disabllity=Clas$ di~hilit)-=03ss A mlsdeme:mor. 
C felony. 
• 
177 
!ltit-.,.RVT OF NO 
CASE PENALTY 
NOTED . ' 
uw cnf~ccrt=:l 
'&eccles w!J t:Uc 
UJY UU~ CW.S!:J;t 
!M p:c:.ed!D:!2 or 
d~::~cttt e.du:L 
X 
Jtu~a&r 
ln\"CstlsW~ 1b.t 1.:3 
tdtJlt ·= tx:ca t~ 
~~by 
o~~··~lbt 
~c s=rob!:m cv::~t 
be ·~it:.td~ lrJ 
cxtuj~t:bJ ·c=.n.s 
· tht t-dn!t po=sie:» 
as=:y $.btl refer tb 
m:nerto 1b: 
~ •• dh1.M · = 
a~n:.ey ••• ~to 
m:ry mstim~ UfJ 
atmm:d p:oc:c:cdings 
ted ·· • • . ecms~l.: 
&lucctd~~ 
cxistittg b-NS. 
.X 
. 
X 
X 
178 
STATE 
Minnesota 
MINN. STAT. ANN~ 
§ 626.551 {West 1992 & 
Supp. 1998) 
Mississippi 
Miss. CODE ANN. 
§ 43-47-19 (Lawyer's 
Co-op. 1993 & Supp. 
1997) 
Missouri 
Mo. REV. STAT. 
§§ 660.300(11) & 
660.305(3) (Vernon 
1988 & Supp. 1998) 
Montana 
MONT. COD£. ANN. 
§ 52-3-825 & § 46-lS. 
212 (1997) 
Nebraska 
NEB. REv. STAT. 
§ 28-386 (1995 & Supp. 
1996) 
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW 
Appendix D 
PERPETRATOR PENALTIES 
FELONY 
willful infliction Qf 
pbysieal pain or 
inj~clonious abuse 
and/or battery; upon 
conviction, imprisonment 
for not more than 20 yca:s 
knowing abuse=Class D 
felony 
knowing and intentional 
abuse or a vulnerable 
adult=Class IV felony 
MISD~~ OR 
willful abuse, neglect, or 
ccploirntion=misderneanor; upon 
conviction, fme of not more than 
$1000 or by imprisonment not to 
exceed one year, ot both fmc or 
imprisonment. 
diverting fUnds or property or 
&Isifying documencs-=Ciass A 
misdemeanor 
pwposcly or knowingly ab~ 
negteets or exploits an older 
petson with a developmental 
disability, upon farst 
convictionsfinc not to exceed 
$~00 or imprisonment not to 
exceed 6 months, or both and 
upon a second 
conviction=imprisonment not to 
exceed I 0 yr. or fine. not to 
exceed $10,000 or both. 
[Vol. 31:77 
REJrtbR.!<ft . OF 
CASE 
. 
Report is forwarded 
to local police 
d~31'tmcnt. 
prosecuting attorney, 
or county sheriffs Cor 
possible criminal 
prosecution • 
• 
Nothing contained In 
this section shall 
prevent proceedings 
• pgamst a person 
under any statute or 
ordinance defudng 
any act as a crime or 
rnisdemcnnor. 
When no penalty 
otherwise provided or 
ir the offense 1s 
designated a 
misdemeanor. and no 
penalty is otherwise 
provided, may 
sentence the offender 
to a term or 
Imprisonment not to 
exceed 6 months In 
the county jail or a 
ftnc not to exceed 
five hundred dollars 
or both. 
NO 
PENALTY 
NOTED 
1998] 
STATE 
' 
Nevada 
NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 200..5099 (Michie 
1997 & Supp. 1997) 
New Hampshire 
, 
SAJIING GRANNY FRO}.{ THE JYOLF 
Appendix D 
PERPETRATOR PENAL'IlSS 
FELONY 
a. any person who 
abuses an older person. 
causing person to suffer 
unjustifiable physical 
pain or mental 
suffering=category B 
felony punishable by 
• • • unpnsonment m state 
prison for minimum of 1 
yr. Maximum of6 yrs. 
b. e.'\,loitation of older 
person"-" if more than 
$250, but less than 
SSOOO, ~tegory B 
felony by imprisonment 
in the state prison for 
not less than I ynr and 
a maximum tom of not 
more than 10 years or 
by a fine not more than 
$10,000, or by both. 
c. exploitation of older 
person=if more than 
$5000, =category B 
felony by imprisonment 
in the state prison for 
not less than 1 year and 
a maximum tom of not 
more than 20 years or 
by a fine not more than 
ru.ooo, or by both. 
~fiSDE\mANOR 
a. a pe:son \\-ho knowingly n.Gd 
wilfully \-iohtes NRS 200.5093 
is guilty or a mlsdcmc:"nor. 
b. a person who hn.s assumed 
responsibility of mt older 
person and negtec~s the older 
person, permits the older 
person to suffer unjustifiable 
p3in or mentll suffering or 
pomits the older person to be 
placed in n situ:Won when: 
the older person may suffer 
physical p3in or mental 
suffering ns the result or 
abuse or neglcc:tocgross 
misdemeanor. 
c. exploitntion of older 
person=if Jess thna S2SO, 
·~ . . m1 e:~neanor; unpnsonment 
in the county jail for not 
more th:m I year or fmc not 
more th3n $2000, or by both. 
d. if exploited ttnd nmount or 
property cannot be 
determined=gross 
mi~emeanor by 
imprisonment in the county 
jail for not more thnn I )"CZ 
or fmc not more thitn $2000. 
or by both. 
179 
» . ..,.,..,.~'RAT OF 
-· --
NO 
CASE PENALTY 
NOTEI> 
X 
180 
STATE 
New Jersey 
NJ. STAT .. ANN .. 
§ 52:270-4'19 (West 
Supp. 1997) 
New Mexico 
N.M. STAT ANN.. 
§ 28·17·9 (Michie 1996 &. 
Supp. 1997) 
New York 
North Carolina 
N.C. OEN. STAT. 
§ 108A·109 (Michie 1997) 
North Dakota 
. N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ S0-25.2-05 (Michie 
1989 & Supp. 1997) 
Ohio 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
FELONY 
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW 
Appendix D 
PERPETRATOR PENALTIES 
I , 
' 
I· 
• 
[Vol. 31:77 
RE .w.~.,.~"""~ OF N 0 
CASE PENALTY 
If the county director 
has reasonable cause 
to believe that a 
caretaker or other 
person bas committed 
• • a cnmc aga•nst a 
vulnerable adult, he 
shall immediately 
repott the lnfonnation 
to local taw 
enforcement officials 
or the prosecutor or 
the county in which 
the alleged criminal 
act was committed. 
Upon ftnding. 
evidence Indicating 
that a person has 
abused, neglected, or 
exploited a disabled 
adulr. the director 
shall notify the 
district attOrney 4 
The law enforcement 
agen~ may 
investigate the 
allegations in the 
report, and institute 
legal proceedings it 
appropriate~ 
NOTED 
X 
X 
X 
X 
1998] 
STATE 
. 
' 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
R..L GEN. LAWS§ ll·S. 
10 (Michie.1994 & 
Supp. 1997). 
• 
SAYING GRANNY FROAI THE JJIOLF 
AppendixD 
PERPETRATOR PENALTies 
FELONY 
Any person who shall 
commit an assault and 
battery upon a person 60 
or older, causing bodily 
injury, shall be deemed 
to have committed a 
felony and shall be 
imprisoned not 
exceeding S years or 
fined not exa:eding 
SIOOO, or both.. 
hfiSDm.fEANOR 
181 
I? t't .. _MR_AT OF NO 
-
CASE PENAL1Y 
NOTED 
X 
182 
STATE 
South Carolina 
S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 43-35·85 (Law. Co-op. 
1985 & Supp. 1997) 
• 
FELONY 
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW 
Appendix D 
PERPETRATOR PENALTIES 
OR 
a. a person who knowingly and 
willfully abuses or neglects n 
vulnerable adult is guilty of a 
misdemeanor and, upon 
conviction, must be imprisoned 
not more than 3 yrs. 
b. a pmon who knowingly and 
willfully exploits a wlnerablc 
adult is guilty or a misdemeanor, 
and upon conviction, must be 
fmcd not more than SS,OOO or 
imprisoned not more than 3 yrs., 
or both, and may be required by 
the court to make restitution.. 
c. a person who threatens, 
intimidates, or attempts to 
intimidate a wlncrablc adult is 
guilty of a misdemeanor and. 
upon conviction. must be fmed 
not more than SSOOO or 
imprisoned for not more thnn 3 
yrs. 
d. a person who willfully and 
knowingly obstructs or In any 
way impedes an investigation 
conducted pursuant to this 
chapter, upon conviction, is 
guilty or a misdemeanor and 
must be fined not more than five 
thousand dollars or imprisoned 
for not more than 3 yrs. 
[Vol. 31:77 
• 
RE --~OF NO 
CASE PENALTY 
NO 'I' ED 
1998] 
STATE 
South Dakota 
SD. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 
22--46-2, 22-46-3 
(Michie 1988 & Supp. 
1997) 
Tennessee 
TENN. CODE ANN. 
§§ 71-6-103, 71-6.117 
(Michie 1995 & Supp. 
1997) 
Texas 
1EX. HUM. REs. COns § 
48.038 (TEX. PENAL§ 
22.04) and TEx. HUM. 
RES. CODE § 48.002 {I'£X. 
PaW. § 21.08) (West 
1990 & Supp. 1998) 
Utah 
UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-5-111 (Michie 
1995 & Supp. 1997) 
• 
SAYING GRANNY FROAI THE IYOLF 
Appendix D 
PERPETRATOR PENALTIFS 
FELONY 
abuse or negl=t which 
does not c:cnstitutc 
aggravated assauJPC:Ws 6 
Felony 
~fiSDBiEANOR 
theft by 
c:xploit:ltion=s=anlni[s(sd1eemme:e:3mncr 
willful nbuse. neg!Cd, or 
cxptoit:Uion C13SS A 
misdeme:mor 
a. felony of lst degree if sc:xu3l .rt· B 
conduct is committed misdem~nor 
intentionally or knowingly. 
b. if tonduct engaged in 
recklessly, it sb31J be a 
felony of the second 
degree. 
a. any person \\"ho cuses 
elderly 2.dult to suffer 
serious physical injwy 
likely to produce dcatb, iC 
done intentionally or 
knowing})-=- 2nd degree 
felony, iC done 
rcd:lessly=3rd degree 
felony. 
b. any pason v.ilo exploits 
d~led or elder e.dult. iC 
done intentionally and 
profit exceeds SSOOO, 
second degree felony, iC 
done intentionally and 
profit less th:m $5000, Jrd 
degtee felony. 
a. Any pctson who cuscs 
elderly dull to suff'er $Crlous 
physta.l injwy likely 10 produce 
dC3th. if done w/ aimtnat 
negtigc:ncc•CJass A 
misdeme3nor. 
b. Ally person v.ilo autts 
elderly r.dult to sufTc:t ~ 
physt=!lnjwy, it do= 
inttntioWJy or knowingly• 
Class A misdemc:mor, lf' dcmc 
recklessJy•Cbss B 
misdcme:mor, if dOllc w/ 
aim inn! negligence C3.SS C 
misdeme3nor. 
c. Any pason v.ilo exploits 
dis:1bled or elder t.dult. 1C done 
rceklessly, Oass A mlsdemc:nor, 
if done with aimiM1 negUgmt:e 
cbss B mlsdcmc::mor • 
183 
~ ~ t-~~KR.t\1 ~ OP NO 
CASE PENALTY 
NOTED 
184 
STATE 
Vennont 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, 
§ 6913 (1991 & Supp. 
1997) 
Virginia 
Washington 
West Virginia 
W. VA. CODE § 61-2-29 
(Michie 1997) 
Wisconsin 
Wyoming 
WYO. STAT. § 35-20-
109 (Michie 1997) 
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW 
Appendix D 
PERPETRATOR PENALTIES 
FELONY 
any person who engages in 
abuse, exploitatio~ or 
failure to provide 
subsistence or other 
medical care of an elderly 
or disabled. fmed not more 
than $10,000 or be 
imprisoned not more than 
18 months, or both. 
any care giver who 
intentionally abuses, or 
neglects an incapacitated 
adult is guilty of a 
felony, and upon 
conviction shall be 
confined to the 
penitentiary for not less 
than two nor more than 
ten years or be confmed 
in the county jail for not 
more than twelve 
months and fmed not 
more than S 1 ,500. 
any care giver who negleas 
an incapacitated adult is 
guilty of a misdemeanor, and 
upon conviction shall be 
fmed not less than $500 nor 
more than $1500, or 
imprisoned in the county jail 
for not Jess than ninety days 
nor more than one year, or 
both fined and imprisoned. 
a. abuse, neglect, or 
exploitation=misdcmcanor, tine 
not more than S 1000 or 
imprisoned not more than 1 yr. 
or both-upon a second or 
subsequent conviction=-
imprisonment in state pen. for 
not more than 5 yrs. 
[Vol. 31:77 
·~ -4"A~£J OF NO 
CASE PENALTY 
NOTED 
X 
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Appendix E 
PERSONS AND INS . .,..,.TI,.,.,.,fUTIONS REQUffiED TO REPORT; 
PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO REPORT 
ST. Anyone Physician Law Clergy Social Physical, Psychologist 
Enforcement Worker Oa:upallonnl or ~!eolal He:llth 
Personnel Therapist Professional 
AL yes yes 
AK yes yes yes yes yes 
AZ yes yes yes yes yes 
AR yes yes yes yes 
CA yes yes yes yes yes 
co 1 1 1 
cr yes yes yes yes 
DE yes 
DC yes yes yes yes 
FL yes yes yes yes yes 
GA yes yes yes yes 
HI yes yes yes 
ID yes yes yes yes 
n.. 1 
IN yes 
1. Reporting of abuse/neglect is encouraged but not mandatory. 
186 
ST. 
AL 
AK 
AZ 
AR 
CA 
co 
CT 
DE 
DC 
FL 
GA 
HI 
ID 
IL 
IN 
Nurse 
yes 
yes 
. 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:77 
Appendix E 
PERSONS AND INSTITUTIONS REQUIRED TO REPORT; 
PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO REPORT 
Adult's Residential Adult Penalties for Failure to Report 
Caretaker Facility, Day care 
Hospital Facility 
yes knowingly fail to ~port a misd~~anor and punhhed 
by imprisonment for not. more than 6·mo. &. $500 
yes yes yes failure or refusal to :report under§ 41.24.110aClass B 
misdemeanor; (me 
yes failure to report 212 Class 1 misdemeanor 
yes purposefully fail to repon .a Class B misdemeanor: abo 
civU liability foe damages proximately ~u$ed by laUuro 
yes yes yes misdemeanor punishable by not more than 6 mo. ln jaU 
or by a fmc ofnot more than SUlOO, or fino and prison 
1 l 
yes failure to report .- rmc of not more than $500 
none noted 
willful failure to report • misdemeanor. upon 
conviction. subject to rmc not exceeding $300 
. 
yes yes failure to report. or preventing another from doing so • 
2nd degree misdemeanor · 
. 
knowingly and willfully falling to nuke report 1:1 
misdemeanor 
yes yes failure to report. or wWtully preventing another to make 
report a petty misdemeanor 
yes failure to report 1:1 misdemeanor 
knowingly transmits a false report a disorderly conduce 
failure to report 1:1 Class A infraction 
. 
1. Reporting of abuse/neglect is encouraged but not mandatoey. 
1998] 
ST. Anyone 
IA 
KS 
KY yes 
LA yes 
ME 
MD 
MA 
MI 
MN 
MS yes 
MO yes 
MT 
NE 
NV 
NH yes 
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PERSONS AND INS'.....rl'frw'tYfUTIONS REQUffiED TO REPORT; 
PENALTY FOR FAll..URE TO REPORT 
Physician Law Clergy Social PhysiCll Psychologist or 
Enforcement Worker Occupadonnl ltfental He:!llh 
Personnel Therapist Professional 
yes yes yes yes 
yes yes yes 
yes yes yes yes 
yes yes yes 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
yes yes hnrmn 
senices 
\l"'rku 
yes yes yes yes yes 
yes yes yes yes 
yes yes yes 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
yes yes yes 
yes yes yes 
yes yes yes yes 
yes yes 
1. Reporting of abuse/neglect is encouraged but not mandatory. 
188 
ST. Nurse 
IA yes 
KS yes 
KY yes 
LA 
ME yes 
MD 
MA yes 
-
MI yes 
MN 
MS 
MO yes 
MT 
NE · yes 
' 
NV 
NH 
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:77 
Appendix E 
PERSONS AND INSTI'-1'U'l10NS REQUIRED TO REPORT; 
PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO REPORT 
Adult's Residential Adult Penalties for Failure to Report 
Caretaker Facility, Daycare 
Hospital Facility 
~ 
yes Simple misdemeanor and subject to civU liab11lty for 
damages proximately caused by the faUurc 
yes: knowingly failing to make report =- Class D misdemeanor 
yes_ knowingly and willfully violating section e2 Class D 
misdemeanor 
faUurc to report =- rme or not more than S$00. or 
imprisonment or ·not more than 6 mo •• or bolh 
knowingly violates statute commits a c1vU vlolat1on a fhte 
of not more than $500 
' ' 
none noted 
failure .to report if required= nne of not more than $1000 
yes failure to report = civil liability for damages pro:dmatcly 
caused by failure & fme of no.t more than $500 
yes failure to report = misdemeanor & incurs liabUity for 
damages caused by failure 
" 
faUun: to report a misdemeanor; fmc or not mora than 
$500, imprisonment for nor more than 6 mo •• or boih 
failure to repon w/in required drnc, or violating 
confidentiality or reports = Class A misdemeanor 
yes failure to report= mbdemeanor; fmc not to exceed $500. 
' imprisonment not to exceed 6 mo •• or both 
~ 
yes yes yes willful failure to repon. or knowing release of confidcndal 
infonnation = Class m misdemeanor 
-
yes yes failure to report = misdemeanor 
knowing .failure to report a misdemeanor 
1. Reporting of abuse/neglect is encouraged but not mandatory. 
1998] 
ST. Anyone 
NJ 1 
NM yes 
NY 1 
NC yes 
ND 1 
OH 
OK yes 
OR 
PA 1 
• 
RI yes 
sc .with 
actual 
knowledge• 
SD 1 
TN yes 
TX yes 
UT yes 
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Appendix E 
PERSONS AND INSTITUTIONS REQUIRED TO REPORT; 
PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO REPORT 
Physician Law Clergy Social Physical, Psychologist or 
Enforcement \Yorker O.:cuPJ!ionm l'tfcntal Heallh 
Personnel Thempist Professional 
yes yes yes yes yes 
yes yes yes yes 
yes yes yes )'CS yes yes 
yes yes yes 
yes yes yes 
1. Reporting of abuse/negleet is encouraged b'Jt not mandatosy. 
1.90 
;:::::: 
ST. 
NJ 
NM 
NY 
NC 
ND 
OH 
OK 
OR 
PA 
RI 
sc 
SD 
TN 
TX 
UT 
Nurse 
yes 
-
yes 
yes 
-
yes 
yes 
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:77 
Appendix E 
PERSONS AND INS~TI'n"'YfU'l'IONS REQUIRED TO REPORT; 
PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO REPORT 
Adult's Residential Adult Penalties for Failure to Report 
Caretaker Facility, Daycare 
Hospital Facility 
not noted 
-
failure or refusal to .report a misdemeanor 
not noted 
not noted 
willful false report • Class B misdemeanor: falso rcpt 
to law enforcement ofr~Cer • Class A misdemeanor 
yes yes not noted 
willf'ul failure to prompdy repon a misdemeanor 
• 
. 
yes punishable by fmc 
not noted 
fUlC of not n10rc than $1000, or Imprisonment for not 
more than 1 yr •• or both 
yes yes . guilty of mi.sdemeanor, fmc not less than $100 or 
prison for not less than 6 mo. 
not noted 
yes yes knowing failure to report a Class A misdemeanor 
knowing failure to report a CJass B misdemeanor 
-
yes yes not noted 
1. Reporting of abuse/neglect is encouraged but not mandatory. 
"''I 
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AppendixE 
PERSONS AND INSI'Y'WTTI......,fU'ITONS REQUffiED TO REPORT; 
PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO REPORT 
. 
ST. Anyone Physician Law Clergy Social Physiccl. Psychologbt or 
Enforcement \Votker Occup3lional Menial Health 
Personnel Therapist Plo(CS1ion:ll 
. 
VT yes yes yes yes 
VA yes yes yes 
WA yes yes yes yes yes 
. . 
wv yes yes yes yes yes 
WI 1 
WY yes 
Jl 
1. Reporting of abuse/neglect is encouraged but not mandatory. 
• 
192 
ST. 
VT 
VA 
WA 
wv 
WI 
WY 
Nurse 
yes. 
yes 
yes 
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:77 
Appendix E 
PERSONS AND INSTI'-TUTIONS REQUIRED TO REPORT; 
PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO REPORT 
= 
Adutt•s Residential Adult Penalties for Pailure to Report 
Caretaker Facility, Daycare 
Hospital Facility 
yes yes failure to report a rme of not more than $500 or 1 yr. 
imprisonment. or both 
yes, if paid yes yes fmc of not more thaat $500 for 1st failure: not less than 
.regularly $100 nor more than $1000 for subse.que.nt faUures 
yes not noted 
failure to Jcport Q misdemeanor: rme not moro lhan 
$100 or imprisonment NMT 10 dayJ. or both 
' 
not noced 
·not noted 
= 
1. Reponing of abuse/neglect is encouraged but not mandatocy. 
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Appendix F 
TYPE & TIMING OF INFORMATION BY REPORTER 
= II 
STATE Report in Manner of Oral When 'Either Oral 
Any Reporting Repon, Vlrittcn or\Vriucn 
Reasonable Not Followed ReponDue Report 
Manner Specified by Written 
AL 1 not specified 
AK wrm24hrs 
AZ 1 2 
AR 1 2 
CA 1 wfm2 
wking days 
co 1 2 
CT w/inS days 
DE no specified 
•• time 
DC 1 
FL 1 2 
GA no specified 
• t1me 
HI 1 ASAP 
ID 1 
niL no specified 
• ttme 
. ' ' 
UIN 1 
KEY TO TYPES OF REPORTS 
1. report immediately 
2. written report due within 48 hours of oral report 
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Appendix F 
TYPE& , ........ G OF INFORMATION BY REPOR1'ER 
=== 
STATE Report in Manner of Oral When Bither Oral 
Any Reporting Report, Written or Written 
Reasonable Not Followed Report Due Report 
Manner 
. . . 
Specified by Written 
lA no specified 
• tune 
KS w/in 6 hrs 
KY 1 
LA 1 optional 
,. 
ME 1 2 
,. 
MD ASAP 
MA 1 2 
Ml 1 optional 
MN oral only 
MS in long-term in long•tenn no specified 
care, oral • care, ·wntten time 
w/in 24 ·hrs w/in ·72 hrs 
II MO no specified 
• tune 
MT ' , written only 
NE • no ttme if requested 
specified 
II 
NV 1 
)l NH 1 if requested 
== = 
KEY TO TYPES OF REPORTS 
1. report immediately 
2. written report due within 48 hours of oral report 
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Appendix F 
TYPE& ~·- G OF INFORMATION BY REPORTER 
=; 
STATE Report in Aianner of Oral When Either Oral 
Any Reporting Report, Written or Vlritten 
Reasonable Not Followed Report Due Repon 
Manner Specified by Written 
NJ no specified 
II • time 
NM no specified 
time 
NY 
NC no specified 
• lime 
ND ASAP 
OH 1 
OK no specified 
• 
. time 
OR oral only 
PA no specified 
• time 
RI 1 
. 
sc wfm24hrs 
SD 
TN 1 
TX no specified 
• tJme 
. 
UT 1 
= 
KEY TO TYPES OF REPORTS 
1. report immediately 
2. written .report due within 48 hours o.f oral report 
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Appendix F 
TYPE & 1'IMING OF INFORMATION BY REPORTER 
====;::==: = 
STATE Report in Manner of Oral When Either Oral 
Any Reporting Report, Written or \Vritten 
Reasonable Not Followed Report Due Report 
Manner Specified by Written 
. 
VT w/in 1 wk w/in48 hrs 
- . 
VA 1 
WA I , 1 w/in 10 days 
W'l 1 2 
WI no specified 
• ttme 
WY no specified 
• ttme 
KEY TO TYPES OF REPORTS 
1. report immediately 
• 
2. written report due within 48 hours of oral report 
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Appendix G 
AGENCY DESIGNATED TO RECEIVE REPORT; AGENCY RESPONSE 
ST. Welfare, Adult Law Aging Agency Central 
Social Protective Enforcement/ Agency Response Regisuy 
Peace Officer Services, Services Tune 
Human 
Resources 
AL yes yes wfm48 hrs 
AK yes if immediate 3 
need 
,, 
AZ yes yes 2, but yes 
• • mvesUg3tc 
emerg. immed. 
AR yes, if'long- 2 yes 
term facUlty 
CA yes yes, if long· 3 
term facility 
co yes 1 3 
CT yes 3 yes 
DE yes 3 
~-
DC yes 2, but yes 
• • mvesugatc 
• emerg. unmed. 
FL 2, but yes 
• • mvcsugace 
emerg. :inuned. 
GA yes: yes. if protec. 3 
svcs. unava.il. 
m yes 2 yes 
lD yes yes 2, but 
-· . mvesugatc 
emerg. inuned. 
~ yes 3 yes 
IN yes yes_ yes reponwfm. yes 
s days 
KEY: === 
1 .. on weekends and after working hours 
2. no time for investigation given 
3. investigate_ immediately 
4. or to any appropriate agency or organization 
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Appendix G 
AGENCY DESIGNATED TO RECEIVE REPORT; AGENCY RESPONSE 
ST. Welfare, Adult Law Aging Agency Central 
Social Protective Enforcement/ Agency Response Registry 
Services, Services Peace Officer Time 
Human 
Resources 
lA yes 1 2, but yes 
• • mvesttgate 
emerg. immed. 
KS yes 1 2, but yes 
• • tnvestJgate 
emerg .. immed. 
KY yes ASAP 
LA yes yes 3 yes 
ME yes 3 
MD yes 2. but 
• • mvesttgate 
emerg. immed. 
MA yes 2 
MI yes w/in 24 hrs. 
MN yes yes 3 
MS yes w/in 48 hrs. yes 
MO yes 3 yes 
MT yes 2 
NE yes yes 2 yes 
NV yes yes yes w/in 72 hrs. 
NH 1 yes w/in 72 hrs. yes 
KEY: 
1. on weekends and after working hours 
2. no time for investigation given 
3. investigate immediately 
4. or to any appropriate agency or organintion 
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Appendix G 
AGENCY DESIGNA'I'ED TO RECEIVE REPORT; AGENCY RESPONSE 
ST. Welfare, Adult Law Aging Agency Cenual 
Social Protective Enforcement/ Agency Response Regisuy 
Peace Officer Services, Services Time 
Human 
Resources 
NJ yes 
NM yes 2 
NY "may •may •may 
make"-4 make•-4 make•-4 
NC yes 3 
ND yes yes 3 
OH yes wfm24-
72 hrs. 
II OK yes 3 
OR yes yes 3 yes 
PA yes wfm72 
hrs • 
• RI yes 3 
sc yes wfm72 
brs 
SD 
TN yes ASAP 
TX yes wfm24 
hrs 
UT yes yes ASAP yes 
KEY: 
1. on weekends and after working hours 
2. no rime for investigation given 
3. investigate immediately 
4. or to any appropriate agency or organization 
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Appendix G 
AGENCY DESIGNATED TO RECEIVE REPORT; AGENCY RESPONSE 
ST. Welfare, Adult Law Aging Agency Central 
Social Protective Enforcement/ Agency Response Registry 
Services, Services Peace Officer Time 
Human 
Resources 
VT yes w/in 72 hrs yes 
~-
VA yes . yes, for sex 3 ( 
abuse 
WA yes 2 yes 
:. 
wv yes 2, but 
. ~ -mvestigate 
emerg. bnnted. 
WI yes w/in 24 hrs yes 
WY yes yes 2 yes 
KEY: 
1. on weekends .and after working hours 
2. no time for investigation given 
3. investigate immediately 
4. or to any appropriate agency or organization 
1998] 
' 
STATE 
AL 
AK 
AZ 
AR 
CA 
co 
CT 
DE 
DC 
FL 
GA 
11m 
ID 
IL 
IN 
1. Client in Community 
2. Client-in InstitUtion 
SA-YING GRANNY FROAI THE IYOLF 
Good 
Faith 
Appendix H 
PROTECTION FOR REPORTER 
Reporter Protection Against 
Confidential Retaliation 
Immunity 
yes 
yes yes 1, 2 
yes yes 1 
yes yes 1 
yes yes l, 2 
yes yes 1, 2 
yes yes 
yes yes 2 
yes yes 1, 2 
yes yes 1 
yes yes 2 
yes yes 
yes yes 2 
yes yes 2 
yes yes l, 2 
201 
• 
' 
202 
STATE 
lA 
. 
KA 
KY 
LA 
ME 
MD 
MA 
MI 
MN 
MS 
MO 
MT 
NE 
NV 
NH 
1. Client in Community 
2. Client in Institution 
Good 
Faith 
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW 
Appendix H 
PROTECTION FOR REPORTER 
Reporter Protection Against 
Confidential Retaliation 
Immunity 
yes yes 1 
yes yes· 1,2 
yes yes 2 
yes 2 
yes yes 
yes yes 2 
. 
yes yes 1,2 
yes yes 2 
yes yes 1 
. 
.· 
yes yes 2 
yes yes 2 
yes yes 
yes yes 
yes yes· 2 
yes yes 2 
= 
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STATE 
NJ 
NM 
NY 
• 
NC 
ND 
OH 
OK 
OR 
PA 
RI 
sc 
SD 
TN 
TX 
UT 
1. Client in Community 
2. Client in Institution 
Good 
Faith 
SAYING GRANNY FROAf THE Jf'OLF 
Appendix H 
PROTECTION FOR REPORTER 
Reporter Protection Against 
Confidential Retaliation 
Immunity 
1, 2 
yes yes 2 
yes 2 
yes 2 
yes yes 1, 2 
yes yes 1, 2 
yes yes 2 
yes yes 2 
yes yes 1 
yes yes 2 
yes 1 
yes 2 
yes yes 1 
yes yes 2 
yes yes 2 
== 
203 
204 
STATE 
VT 
VA 
WA 
wv 
WI 
WY 
1. Client in Community 
2. Client in Institution 
Good 
Faith 
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW 
Appendix H 
PROTECTION FOR REPORTER 
:;= 
I . 
Reporter Protection Against 
Confidential Retaliation 
Immunity 
yes yes 1, 2 
yes yes 
yes yes 2 
yes yes 2 
yes yes 1 
yes yes 2 
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